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ABSTRACT
“Writing with Risk: Dangerous Discourses and Event-Based Pedagogies,”
responds to the pedagogical work of scholars such as Susan Wells, Nancy Welch, and
Linda Flower by arguing that the risks associated with public writing pedagogies stem
from the transformative nature of the rhetorical event that implicates and rearticulates
actors through co-production, subverting their assumed autonomy. I argue that each of
the three primary vantages of publics scholarship is particularly vulnerable to a certain
type of risk aligned to a specific element of the rhetorical situation: idealist scholarship to
unintended consequences in which the meaning of the text transforms, activist
scholarship to harassment in which the comportment of the audience transforms, and
materialist scholarship to demagoguery in which the rhetors themselves transform.
I explore each of the three risks through the case studies that compose Chapters
Two, Three, and Four of this dissertation. First, I explain how the meaning of Black
Power changed as it was interpreted and co-created by the Los Angeles street gang the
Crips, which was then itself multiply interpreted and co-created by a variety of actors.
Second, I present Gamergate as an example of how audiences can turn from innocuous to
violent before explaining how the alt-right utilizes harassment to build their sphere
public. Finally, I analyze the techno-utopian accelerationists to show how publics
infatuated with their own terministic screens can move from narcissistic to demagogic.
I end by advocating for event-based pedagogies that address these risks by
attuning students to the co-productive and transformative nature of rhetoric. Event-based
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pedagogies follow five tenets, asking students to: 1) enable other actors to participate in
Life as such, 2) conduct nuanced research that illuminates the complexity of public
discourse, 3) be open to the diverse array of opinions and perspectives expressed within
and among various publics, 4) adapt positions and arguments in response to new
information, and 5) attend to the ways in which new arguments are constructed from
elements of prior arguments.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RISKS OF REAL PUBLICS: THE POTENTIAL HARMS OF
IDEALISM, ACTIVISM, AND MATERIALISM
In his 2016 review essay “Publics and Intellectuals, both Real and Unreal,”
Nathan Crick reviews four books that have been published in the field of Composition
and Rhetoric in the last five years: Jay P. Childers The Evolving Citizen, Frank Farmer’s
After the Public Turn, Anna M. Young’s Prophets, Gurus, and Pundits, and Samuel
McCormick’s Letters to Power. Crick notes that each of these books argues that in some
vital way the twenty-first-century public is failing to act as the authors believe it should.
According to Crick, the authors are only able to make this argument because they have
established a dichotomy between a real and an unreal world. Crick argues that Childers
depicts a world in which young citizens no longer participate in the real public sphere of
day-to-day local politics and instead focus on the unreal world of their own interests,
Farmer depicts a world in which inauthentic and unreal normative politics hide the real
authentic publics of marginalized groups, Young depicts the media and political class of
this country as involved in creating an unreal politics for a citizenry whose only hope for
being guided back to addressing their real concerns lies with public intellectuals, and
McCormick depicts a real world in which academics exist in too complex a web of
power to act as public intellectuals, asserting that anyone looking for academics to
become opinion leaders is living in an unreal world. In making this critique, Crick
identifies not simply a problem for these specific books but for Composition and Rhetoric
1

more generally: its tendency to create ideals from the complex, contingent, and material
networks in which authors compose, texts circulate, and audiences interpret.
Scholars of Composition and Rhetoric seem to believe that publics share a
Platonic Form—a common ideal of which material publics are only imperfect
representations. If only publics could be more rational, more community-centered, more
authentic, and more intellectual, then they would be closer to this ideal. The problem with
such an approach is that ideals are misinformed. Idealized spaces of discourse with
transparent actors debating each other until the better argument wins out simply on its
own merit—spaces in which participants do not tie their own interests, identities, and
social positions to their arguments so closely that they are hurt when their positions are
attacked—have never existed and could never exist. Such safe conceptions of the public
sphere neglect to consider the material lives of public actors, which is why idealize
publics have only ever existed in the abstractions of philosophers and glib readings of
Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Real publics are
material, complex, and filled with a myriad of physical, social, and psychological risks
both for those actors explicitly operating within the public sphere and the multitude of
humans and nonhumans who will be effected by the conversations those actors have. It is
because of these risks, not despite of them, that rhetoric is powerful. Rhetoric can change
the world in material ways, and if this were not the case, then rhetoric would incur no
risk, but it would also be of very little consequence.
Despite the material effects of rhetoric, some scholars in Composition and
Rhetoric continue to advocate for discussing publicness in its most abstracted, hyperrational, and sanitized terms—even when dealing with specific publics composed of
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embodied actors. Moving forward, the field of Composition and Rhetoric should
acknowledge the material risks of real publics in order to understand their causes and
teach students to navigate them prudently and ethically. Such an acknowledgement is a
risk to instructors because they may be accused of being too political, too activist, too
agitating, and too allied with those whose political and social struggles they support.
They may be accused of holding biases for and against students, they may even be put on
watch lists. But failing to do so—continuing the penchant for abstraction—risks further
alienating students from one another, from instructors, and from the real material publics
we all share. Not acknowledging real publics, warts and all, risks stagnating the public
sphere by stifling students from understanding the public’s embodied realities, its risks,
and its immense capacity for change.
A clear example of Composition and Rhetoric’s penchant for abstracting material
publics can be found in the article “The Public Sphere and Rhetorical Criticism” in which
Alan Gross takes up the Habermasian line of public sphere theory to argue that the public
sphere must “be properly construed as a center of rational debate” that upholds liberal
democracy through enabling political discourse (144). Gross explicitly rallies against
scholars such as Cara Finnegan and Jiyeon Kang, who “illegitimately extend the scope of
the public sphere” beyond rational discourse by discussing art; Kevin Deluca and Jennifer
Peeples, who “praise this violence [protesting the 1999 World Trade Organization
Ministerial Conference in Seattle] because it garnered media attention;” and Sonja Foss
and Martha Solomon, who erroneously argue that the political beliefs of proponents and
opponents of the Equal Rights Act led to a political impasse instead of realizing “that the
progressive atrophy of the public sphere led to the creation of these separate worlds”
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(142,144). In this criticism Gross is enacting the same critical problem as the authors who
Crick critiques in his review by arguing that the depictions of the public being discussed
by Finnegan, Kang, Deluca, Peeples, Foss, and Solomon are unreal, or at the very least,
are being analyzed in ways that do not do justice to their identities as publics. Gross
argues that scholars interested in publicness should not focus on art, violence, or identity
because these things are inessential to understanding publics as publics. Instead, he
argues that publics scholars should focus on rational discourse that ignores actors’
specific embodied positions in the world; Gross claims that any other focus risks further
decaying the public and its ability to support liberal democracy.
In his response to Gross, “Practicing Rhetoric Beyond the Dangerous Dreams of
Deliberative Democracy,” Kevin Michael Deluca argues that Gross is valorizing an ideal
public that has never existed, will never exist, and if ever existed would be incapable of
creating change. For DeLuca, rhetoric is not only about rational argumentation; instead,
“Rhetoric is force. The rhetorician’s task is to understand and deploy forces that
transform worlds amidst the cataclysms of our times. It is not to promote a moral vision
of an idealized past from which to decry a lacking present” (231). In this response,
Deluca flips the binary established by Crick and Gross, arguing that it is not the deficient
publics in which we live that are unreal—in fact these publics effect the real world and
create new conditions of possibility through material action. Instead, it is the ideal publics
imagined by Childers, Farmer, Young, McCormick, Habermas, and Gross that are unreal
because they are not lived, embodied, or material. While real embodied publics can be
affective, inauthentic, messy, misleading, self-centered, violent, vulgar and most of all
risky, these aspects are a part of living in the material world with other actors; this
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material messiness is how actions take place in the world. If scholars in Composition and
Rhetoric want to understand publics, then they should understand them as they are lived;
however, the stakes of this argument are intensified for scholars in Composition and
Rhetoric who are interested not only in understanding real public discourse but also in
teaching students how to effectively persuade and transform the publics in which they
participate. Because of our duty to students, compositionists cannot simply ask how
publics work but also should ask themselves how they want to influence students to recreate and rebuild those publics through discourse. Similarly, they should consider what
kinds of risks such a pedagogy invites both for instructors and students. To the extent that
these questions are framed around publicness and pedagogical risk, they are relatively
new; however, as these questions relate to audiences, discourses, and risk, they have been
central to considering how compositionists teach writing, even before the word public
came into fashion within the disciplinary scholarship.

Composition and Rhetoric Turns Public
Prior to the popularization of the word public, Composition and Rhetoric was
interested in understanding the groups in and for which writers composed. Scholars in the
field wanted to understand how these groups read texts, how they responded to texts, and
how they circulated ideas. Scholars also wanted to know how best to teach students to
reach these communities and influence them through discourse. In her 1982 essay
“Cognition, Convention, and Certainty,” Patricia Bizzell uses the concept of discourse
community to refer to groups with shared “discourse conventions,” “habits of language
use,” “expectations,” “ways of understanding the world,” and patterns of “interaction
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with the material world” (217-18, 226). The term soon eclipsed Bizzell to become
prominent throughout 1980s composition scholarship. Perhaps the most famous of these
uses is David Bartholomae’s “Inventing the University” in which he argues that though
students realize there are academic discourses with specific conventions, they are
unfamiliar with these community norms and find them difficult to learn. The primary
convention Bartholomae identifies as a site of struggle for students is how best to
establish their authority and create spaces from which to justify their arguments.
According to him, students first attempt to build authority by locating themselves as
participants within their fields or subjects. Then, as they become more advanced, students
mimic the sound of academic prose. Finally, when they actually become members of
their discourse communities, students are able to locate their arguments within competing
strands of argument, which they navigate to create unique arguments with specific
repercussions for specific audiences (623). Pedagogies based on this method of teaching
students how to write for abstract scholarly communities became extremely popular with
first-year writing instructors, and many composition textbooks still discuss how students
can best adapt to college writing, position themselves as academic writers, and establish
authority in their research essays. In other words, these textbooks help students to act
appropriately in supposedly real discourse communities that act deliberatively and
rationally based on their shared values and conventions.
Despite its popularity and longevity, the concept of discourse communities also
has its detractors. Compositionists on the political right fear that theories of community
and the pedagogies they influence glorify consensus and silence the opinion of freethinking individual students. For example, Thomas S. Johnson scathingly critiques
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Kenneth A. Bruffee’s argument in “Collaborative Learning and the ‘Conversation of
Mankind’” that classrooms should operate as communities of consensus by saying, “Do
we not here read yet another case of establishmentarian liberalism paving the wide road
for authoritarianism? If not, what are the specific, substantive distinctions between
collaborative learning and authoritarian leveling toward the norm through peer pressure?”
(76). On the other side of the political spectrum, some on the political left worry that
community ignores the fact that different students are part of different communities. For
example, John Trimbur argues that Bruffee’s notion of consensus is how dominate
communities “legitimize their own conversation by marginalizing others” whose
discourses, identities, and cultures differ from their own. Trimbur argues that
composition classrooms should find consensus not in collective agreement but in
“collective explanations of how people differ, where their differences come from, and
whether they can live and work together with these differences” (741). The debate in
composition then is not only about how real discourse communities function but also
about the best ways instructors can organize their classrooms so as to teach students how
to enact equitable communities that are as of now still unreal.
The overarching problem with the idea of community from both the political right
and the political left is rooted in the same concern: community erases difference both
among individuals and cultures. For many, the solution seemed to come in Mary Louise
Pratt’s 1991 address to the Modern Language Association, in which she famously
critiqued “ideas of community that underlie much of the thinking about language,
communication, and culture that gets done in the academy” and characterized them as
naïve because they only explain how language functions in homogenous communities
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where people all have the same language, dialect, values, interests, norms, and rules
(507). Since few communities are so homogenous, Pratt argues that scholars should
instead think of language use as the “art of the contact zone . . . spaces where cultures,
meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical
relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out
in many parts of the world today” (501). Pratt argues that these contact zones are
complimented by safe houses: “social and intellectual spaces where groups constitute
themselves as horizontal, homogenous, sovereign communities with high degrees of trust,
shared understandings, [and] temporary protection from legacies of oppression” (511).
This pairing of contact zones and safe houses quickly gained traction in Composition and
Rhetoric, and many scholars still use this analogy to represent not only the real way in
which language functions but also how their classrooms should be modeled, with
students learning to share their opinions and perspectives with those whose experiences
differ from their own. It’s worth noting that due to its popularity, Pratt’s essay is still
included in a variety of introductory composition readers. Still, the concept has been
critiqued for paying little attention to the ways in which contact zones can become brutal
spaces as people choose not to engage with other cultures but rather to reaffirm their
beliefs in their safe houses and use the contact zone as a space solely for combatting
those with whom they disagree. Critics are concerned both as to whether or not this is
how groups really act and if this is the culture of discourse Composition and Rhetoric
instructors should be propagating.
In his 1997 book A Teaching Subject, Joseph Harris dedicates his last chapter to
critiquing Pratt’s notion of the contact zone, which he refers to as a “romanticized . . .
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neo-Marxist utopia” (123). Harris begins his critique with what was at the time a standard
argument against Pratt that was established by scholars such as Richard Miller: how
should teachers running their classrooms as contact zones respond to ideas that are
blatantly offensive or violent? Pratt’s essay only deals with dissent that is either cheeky
and cute or exotic and sympathetic; she gives little mention to the types of bigoted
sentiments students often share in class—sentiments that are becoming more prominent
in the age of Trumpism. Rather than being alleviated through contact zone pedagogies,
Harris argues that the problems of bigoted sentiments, confrontation, and violence are
compounded in contact zone classes because students are encouraged to think of
themselves not as members of the class but as members of different safe houses that meet
together in the classroom space to debate the validity of their opinions. To utilize Crick’s
distinction, students feel as if they each belong to their own real publics outside of the
classroom and only enter into the unreal diversity of the classroom to argue with others.
There is little about the shared space of the contact zone classroom itself that promotes
productive conversation, shared culture, common interests, or even the need to just get
along with one another; instead, the contact zone is a balkanized place of conflict that
discourages empathy and compromise in favor of surface level discussions of difference.
Discussions of difference that lack empathy and understanding are disturbing not
only because they offer platitudes rather than a significant space for discourse to students
attempting to share their embodied experiences of the world but also because those
students who express abhorrent ideas are regularly ostracized from the classroom instead
of being encouraged to think outside their hateful mindsets. As Harris argues, the lack of
community within the contact zone teaches students to repress, rather than rethink, their
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positions. Students are able to merely stifle their actual opinions and save them for when
they re-enter their safehouses, which they feel are their real publics. Harris evidences this
characterization of the contact zone not only with examples from the classroom but also
from academic departments, journals, and business offices. These examples reinforce the
idea that contact zones may indeed be the real way groups communicate with each other,
but the question remains whether or not they represent the kinds of communicative
groups composition instructors want their students to recreate, especially when
contemporary researchers such as Steven Pinker believe that these types of spaces, in
which participants are not willing to engage others by explaining their own positions,
enable the rise of blatantly false counter positions. If such siloed spaces are the not what
instructors want to reproduce either inside their classrooms or in the public sphere, then
they need to ask themselves if there is a way to conceptually merge the understandings of
real communication practices with the unreal groups they would like to see manifested
not only in their classrooms but also in the broader culture.
In response to this question, Harris offers an alternative to the contact zone by
identifying another real way that embodied humans in the material world relate to one
another through discourse: the public. Harris argues that publics are groups of strangers
connected by shared interests and concerns that transcend the individual cultures and
identities that compose them. If communities are generally seen “in far too romantic,
organic, and pastoral terms [as] . . . small closely knit villages—where everyone pretty
much shares the same set of values and concerns,” then Harris’s public is a large, chaotic
industrial city where people remain mostly anonymous in their dealings with each other.
The public is a place where people get along despite their differences, not because of
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their commonalities (108). Building on American philosopher John Dewey’s conception
of the public, Harris acknowledges that power imbalances are present in such spaces, and
he takes them seriously, defining the public as “a place where differences are made
visible and thus where the threat of conflict or even violence is always present. This
means that we need to resist moves to romanticize conflict in order to argue for
something more like civility, a willingness to live with differences” (109). Civility is not
being used here as an excuse for keeping the status quo, but rather as a way of using
diverse discourse practices outside of violence to create more equitable publics. This
description harkens to Susan Wells’s influential article “Rogue Cops and Health Care,” in
which she argues that real public communication makes salient all differences, including
power dynamics, which invites risk. Despite these risks, Wells argues that publicness
should tap into shared concerns that transcend visions of community to make sustainable,
negotiated agreements between different people with interrelated concerns. This
publicness is not an abstracted ideal; rather, like Deluca, Wells is describing a real lived
and embodied publicness. Unlike Deluca, however, Wells’s public avoids violence by
continually renegotiating and reproducing itself, and she sees compositionists as having
an important role to play in teaching citizens how to continually build and rebuild the
publics of which they are members.
Early in her article, Wells argues that if composition instructors imagine their
students as potential public actors, then they have to “build, or take part in building, such
a public sphere; [instructors and students must realize] that the public sphere is always
constructed; and that it cannot, in our society, be unitary” (326). The public sphere is
enacted through the interactions among various actors—speakers and audiences
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producing, remixing, and circulating a variety or texts among themselves in the material
world. These discursive practices create complex networks of people connected by
discourses with which they may agree or disagree and with which they will participate
differently using a diversity of media, modes, languages, experience, understandings, etc.
Through participation, however, actors also change how the networks of which they are
distinct parts function, which has material effects for the human and nonhuman actors
within the public. As Wells explains:
[T]he public is neither noble nor inherently oppressive. The cynicism that we
encounter daily in our students and ourselves responds to a fragmented and
contradictory public, a public that must be constructed and reconstructed, that
requires multiple negotiations and positions for every possible speaker. (333)
With each new actor who participates in it, the public is remade in ways that may range
from hardly perceptible to quite obvious. As the public influences individual actors in
ways that might protect its collective identity, these actors are simultaneously relating to
the public in ways that project their individual identities onto it. The continual give and
take between individuals and the complex network of actors that constitutes the public
means that real publics are always materially and socially shifting, an abstract principle
that itself seems unreal.
Since composition instructors train students to participate in the public sphere,
they play a double role in creating publics not only through their own public actions but
also the influence they have on students. To ensure that the real publics our students
effect are constructed thoughtfully, Wells suggests four practices for teaching public
participation: running the classroom as a public, studying public texts, having students
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write for the public, and studying how various disciplines write for public audiences.
These practices teach students how to reproduce the public sphere through their
participation within it not only by studying a variety of texts that imagine and engage the
public differently but also through the creation of public or potentially public texts. For
example, students in a science oriented public writing classroom may examine the
writing in Richard Dawkins’s The Oxford Book of Modern Science Writing in order to
understand how scientists write for people beyond their field, and then they might
practice turning their own research into popular press articles. When such practical
methods of education are accompanied by the abstract and theoretical concepts that have
traditionally composed a rhetorical education, then these courses teach students how to
operate within real publics and use their discourse practices to make them more closely
resemble unreal publics. Instructors in such classrooms not only teach students how to
thrive in existing publics but also provide them with the tools and insights necessary for
making those publics more closely resemble the discursive networks of readers and
writers that have been idealized by compositionists at least since Patricia Bizzell coined
the term discourse communities.

Idealist, Activist, and Material Publics
Since the late 1990s when Susan Wells and Joseph Harris were initially focusing
on the concept of publicness—as opposed to discourse communities or contact zones—as
a way to understand the contexts in which people compose, distribute, and circulate their
messages, both the metaphor of the public and the practice of having students write for
specific publics began to proliferate. While it is difficult to say with absolute certainty
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why this concept became so popular, the term has three characteristics that make it
particularly attractive to compositionists: 1) publicness has ancient roots that are
entwined with the democratic practices of ancient rhetoricians that Composition and
Rhetoric touts as its intellectual forbearers such as Aristotle, Isocrates, Cicero, and
Quintilian; 2) publicness acknowledges Composition and Rhetoric’s image as a discipline
dedicated to teaching students civic values in the line of John Quincy Adams, James
Berlin, Edward P.J. Corbett, Sharon Crowley, and Susan Miller, and 3) publicness brings
with it a long line of Marxist materialist and new materialist philosophers whose texts can
inform Composition and Rhetoric’s understanding of what it means to operate in a public
space such Hannah Arendt, Jane Bennett, John Dewey, Michel Foucault, Jürgen
Habermas, Emmanuel Levinas, and Bruno Latour. While these attributes have clear
moments of overlap—such as contemporary theorists building on the work of the ancient
Greeks, or the practices of civic participation being grounded in either ancient democratic
or eighteenth-century liberal ideals—the different emphases of each has led
compositionists to approach the study of publicness from three different vantage points:
idealist, activist, and materialist. Understanding these vantage points, their orientations
toward the subject, and the types of scholarship and pedagogies they produce can help
contemporary compositionists not only understand how the field has understood
publicness but also what models of publicness are currently being discussed in
Composition and Rhetoric scholarship.
The first of the three vantage points for studying publicness—idealist—has
historically been ethically oriented; it asks, “How can public rhetoric be used to
propagate just democracies?” and it uses specific case-studies to diagnose and treat
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problems within the real public sphere. Sharon Crowley’s Toward a Civil Discourse,
which argues that a rhetorical approach to argumentation can be used to negotiate the
deliberative stalemate in the United States between rational liberal subjects and
fundamentalist Christians, serves as a strong example of this kind of scholarship. The
second vantage point—activist—has historically been political; it asks “What are the
actual practices, discursive or otherwise, that public actors use to negotiate the power
structures in which they live; how can these practices be taught to students?” and it uses
case-studies to understand the development and outcomes of specific rhetorical practices
so as to teach students how to politically participate in the contemporary public sphere.
Nancy Welch’s Living Room, which studies the rhetorical practices of working class
political movements in order to teach these types of practices to students, serves as a
strong example of this kind of scholarship. Finally, the third vantage point—
materialist—has historically been ontological; it asks “What is a public; who are its
members?” and it uses case-studies to push the accepted boundaries of how we
understand publicness. Laurie Gries’s Still Life With Rhetoric, which uses new materialist
philosophies to consider the Obama Hope image as a rhetorical actor who transforms and
is transformed by the other actors among whom it circulates, serves as a strong example
of a contemporary version of this kind of scholarship. Each of these vantages then creates
a very different model of the public sphere.
The ethical orientation of idealist scholarship—used by scholars such as Robert
Asen and Daniel C. Brower, Jay P. Childers, Gerard Hauser, and Michael Warner—
presents an idealist model of an equitable and peaceful public sphere that is generally
rooted in the ideals of discursive democracy. This type of work is primarily conducted by
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scholars in Communication but is often cited and built upon by those in Composition
such as Frank Farmer, Jenny Rice, and Christian Weisser. The idealist model of publics
scholarship approaches publics as groups of peers engaged in rational-critical discussions
about shared problems. Idealist scholars are heavily invested in defining the
characteristics of publics in order to be able to categorize various groups of people as
public or not. An exemplary text of this genre is the title chapter of Michael Warner’s
Publics and Counterpublics, which defines three different types of publics: the entire
population of a polity, the physical audience of an event, and the nebulous network of
people who read the same texts. Warner gives seven attributes that define his third type of
public, which he characterizes as dispersed, poetic, loosely connected, and relatively
cohesive. These publics are built on shared languages and logics, but little attention is
given to the material situations that influence members of a public and the dangers they
face through their participation. The pedagogical result of this idealized model of
publicness focuses on teaching students to create rational and effective arguments.
William Keith and Roxanne Mountford’s “Mt. Oread Manifesto,” typifies the
pedagogical goals of idealist scholars. They begin their manifesto with an appeal for
merging Composition and Communication programs before arguing that the purpose of
rhetorical education should be to instruct students in practical ways to participate in a
rational-critical public sphere as active, motivated, and competent democratic citizens.
The political orientation of activist scholarship—espoused by scholars such as
David Coogan, Ellen Cushman and Erik Green, Kevin Michael Deluca, Jessica Enoch,
Linda Flower, Christina Foust, Paula Mathieu, Nancy Welch, and Susan Wells—presents
a practical model of the public as a network that can be manipulated by specific groups to
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reach their political goals. This scholarship takes as its exigency that the public is in some
aspect broken: people are being excluded, the state is infringing on the rights of people to
protest, or privatization is encroaching into public space. In response to these problems,
activist scholars find groups and individuals who are using innovative methods to enter
into public conversation such as ‘zines, radical cheerleading, blocking intersections with
trash, or posting revolutionary poetry. In other words, activist scholars study the practices
of oppressed individuals and groups who are utilizing their voices to enter publics and
oppose their oppressors. By studying these actors, activist scholars in both
Communication and Composition are able to re-define publics and public action.
Pedagogies from this model of publicness vary but generally fall into two categories: 1)
teachers who ask their classes to act as publics and by doing so encourage their students
to engage in nonconventional and often multimodal forms of communication such as
Frank Farmer and Nancy Welch and 2) teachers who encourage their students to leave the
classroom and enter the public as members of community organizations or protests such
as Jessica Enoch, Paula Mathieu, Phyllis Ryder, and Susan Wells. In the most ambitious
form of this pedagogy, scholars may even attempt to collaborate with communities that
lack spaces for public discourse to establish community organizations that facilitate such
discussions, as in the work of Linda Flower.
Finally, the ontological orientation of materialist scholarship—espoused by
scholars such as Marilyn Cooper, Laurie Gries, Byron Hawk, Jenny Rice, Thomas
Rickert, Nathaniel Rivers, and Margaret Syverson—presents an abstract model of the
public sphere composed of a surprisingly diverse amount of human and nonhuman actors
persuading each other in unexpected ways. Currently, this type of scholarship has moved
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way from deterministic Marxist materialism, which argues that the material world
structures the social world, and toward new materialist approaches of publicness, which
argue that the material world influences, but does not determine, the rest of the world.
Material objects are seen as rhetorical actors who participate alongside humans in the
public sphere. Unlike classic materialism, new materialism can readily be paired with
other theories of public discourse, such as the rhetorical situation or circulation, to create
new insights, which has led this vantage to become quite popular in Composition and
Rhetoric. This popularity is most clearly evidenced by the proliferation of anthologies
such as Scot Barnett and Casey Boyle’s Rhetoric, Through Everyday Things, Laurie
Gries and Collin Gifford Brooke’s Circulation, Writing, and Rhetoric, and Paul Lynch
and Nathaniel Rivers’s Thinking with Bruno Latour in Rhetoric and Composition. Each
of these anthologies primarily sees the public as composed not only of humans engaged
in various types of communication but also a variety of nonhuman actors who act
rhetorically both with humans and among themselves. New materialists take as their
exigency the limitations inherent in traditional conceptions of publicness. They argue that
idealistic and activist scholars limit their understanding of what counts as both a public
and a public actor by focusing too narrowly on humans acting intentionally in specific
rhetorical situations. New materialists argue that public sphere scholars should
acknowledge the ways in which animals, plants, minerals, images, slogans, and all
manner of material objects and forces impact the public sphere.
Rhetoric in materialist scholarship is not about intentional persuasion but rather
about the ability of one actor to compel another to act differently. Materialist scholars do
not take as their base the same political theorists adopted by their idealistic and activist
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counterparts. Instead, they ground their work in conceptions of the social as an enmeshed
network composed of actors acting upon and influencing each other from social scientists
and new materialist theorists such as Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, Elizabeth
Grosz, Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour, Brian Massumi, Annemarie Mol, and others.
Though this vantage has few pedagogies, those that exist focus on the conditions in
which students invent, compose, distribute, and circulate messages. Instructors are
encouraged to be more aware of both the environment of the classroom and how they and
their students—complete with complex lives and histories—effect complex network in
which learning occurs. The goal of education is less about teaching students specific
lessons and more about setting the conditions of possibility in which students and
instructors can co-create knowledge about certain topics. Similarly, students are
encouraged to consider how the environments in which they live affect them and are
effected by them; students are often asked to study the rhetoric of objects or to create
objects that interact and effect not just human, but also nonhuman, actors.1
It is important to acknowledge that though these three vantages are distinct from
one another, complete with unique orientations and models of publicness, they all inform
pedagogies that take as a premise that one of the most important aspects of education—
particularly of rhetorical education—is to teach students to act as citizens who are able to
engage others in discussing and solving complex problems. Idealist pedagogies teach
students to create coherent arguments in a variety of media in order to address others
within a polity. Activist pedagogies teach students how to directly engage others, either

1

Despite the amount of new materialist scholarship interested in public writing, few pedagogies have been
developed from it. I predominantly base my description of these pedagogies on Byron Hawk’s A CounterHistory of Composition, Nathaniel Rivers’s article “Tracing the Missing Masses,” and Jim Brown Jr and
Nathaniel Rivers’s article “Composing the Carpenter’s Workshop.”
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through practicing community participation or through mimicking such publics in the
classroom. Finally, new materialist pedagogies ask students to take into consideration
how material conditions influence rhetorics and how rhetoric can be used to care for often
ignored material actors. In all three cases, students are being encouraged to experiment
with the available means of persuasion so that they can make change in the world. The
core belief that public discourse is valuable and that it is the responsibility of composition
instructors to prepare their students for participation within the public sphere is the same,
regardless of the vantage point from which any given instructor is operating. If all of
these public sphere scholars are correct in asserting that it is the role of composition
instructors to teach students how to prepare for the public sphere, then it is vital for us to
teach them not only how to make arguments, locate audiences, and navigate the material
world but also to be aware of and prepare for the risks associate with publicness. We
should instruct students to consider the harms that can emerge from public
participation—harms that include but are not limited to violence.

Dwelling with the Risk of Violence
Since this dissertation is being written at a large research university for an
audience composed primarily of researchers, perhaps the best definition of risk I can
provide comes from The Belmont Report, which was written by the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research in the wake of the “Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male.”
The Tuskegee study was a forty-year research study on the effects of untreated syphilis in
Black men. The 600 volunteers for the study, all of whom where poor sharecroppers in
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Macon County, Alabama, were told they would be receiving free treatment for “bad
blood” as the scientists studied the best cures for the disease. Instead of being cured,
participants were actually being refused penicillin, which had already been proven
effective in treating syphilis, so that researchers could better understand how the disease
developed in the human body. When news about the unethical experiment was published
in 1972, there was a mass public outcry, Congressional hearings, an investigation, and a
class action lawsuit. One of the outcomes of all these events was the establishment of the
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, which was intended to prevent such
atrocities by establishing guidelines for research on human subjects. The commission
established three fundamental ethical principles to guide all research on human subjects:
1) respect for persons, meaning that every subject must provide informed consent based
on accurate descriptions of the testing; 2) beneficence, meaning that every precaution
must be taken to minimize the risk to volunteers while maximizing the potential benefits
to the field of research; and finally 3) justice, meaning that all procedures much be
administered fairly and without bias. All of these principles are vital to conducting ethical
research, but it is this second one, beneficence, that is most pressing for studies of risk.
While explicating the principle of beneficence in the report, the committee defines
risk as the possibility that harm—be it psychological, physical, legal, social, or
economic—may occur to the research subjects, their families, or society writ large due to
an experiment. The committee acknowledges that all studies are risky, but it argues that
there are also risks associated with not conducting studies. In the former case, a subject
may die; in the latter case, a disease may not be cured and many may die. For this reason,
the committee argues that there needs to be a method for determining when studies are
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appropriate. Of course, the specifics of this decision are always contextual and complex,
but the basic logic is to measure risk against benefits: a calculation that proves
particularly tricky because:
Unlike, “risk,” “benefit” is not a term that expresses probabilities. Risk is properly
contrasted to probability of benefits, and benefits are properly contrasted with
harms rather than risks of harm. Accordingly, so-called risk/benefit assessments
are concerned with the probabilities and magnitudes of possible harm and
anticipated benefits.
The potential harms and benefits of research need to be weighed in regards to likelihood,
severity, and equitable distribution of both possibilities; however, there are some harms
that are never allowed, regardless of the potential benefits. Any risks a test subject
encounters must be ready for human testing, necessary for the experiment, and cannot be
considered “brutal or inhumane.” In this section, the committee makes a split between
violence and risk, though they do not state this explicitly. The final determination is that
it is okay for subjects to incur harm so long as that harm is not excessive, intentional, or
nonconsensual—i.e. subjects can be harmed, but that harm cannot be violent. By this
logic, the Tuskegee experiments were unethical because by intentionally causing
unnecessary harm to the research subjects without their knowledge, the researchers were
enacting violence onto them; the fact that this violence was of little scientific
consequence is beside the point.
Though the difference between harm and violence seems rather clear for
researchers in this country, the distinction appears less stark when considering the close
connection between violence and rhetoric, a relationship in which each informs the other.
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In Deep Rhetoric James Crosswhite argues that violence is unique from harm because it
has meaning, which is given to it via rhetoric: “Without rhetoric, there can be force but
not violence; with rhetoric, the world opens to violence, both the meaningful violence of
war and other overtly physical kinds of violence, and the violence whose force does not
depend so much on direct physical compulsion as on more purely symbolic power” (162).
Violence is not merely a harm; it is a harm that makes meaning as a nonconsensual pain
is forced onto a body, and these kinds of harms, according to Crosswhite, set the
condition for relatively peaceful rhetorics by demarcating a sphere of discourse
surrounded by an otherwise violent world. For Crosswhite, rhetoric and violence are
“intimate partners” that “dwell in proximity” to each other across the chasm of three
bloody borders. He elucidates this point by retelling Protagoras’s fable about the creation
of rhetoric from Plato’s Protagoras. Crosswhite argues that when the sophist tells the
philosopher his fable in the hopes of convincing the latter that rhetoric is the art that
enables people to form cities and live together, he also demonstrates how violence
enables rhetoric.
According to Protagoras, when Prometheus and Epimetheus were tasked with
equipping animals with the attributes needed for survival (hides, horns, talons, etc.), they
ran out of characteristics before providing humans with any power that would enable
their survival. In response, Prometheus stole scientific knowledge and fire from
Hephaestus and Athena so that humans would not immediately perish, and while these
tools did allow humans to survive, our ancestors failed to thrive because they were unable
to work with one another as a collective to accomplish shared goals. Instead, whenever
humans attempted to erect cities, the population would commit injustices on each other,
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conducting wars of all against all. Worried that humanity would completely perish, Zeus
sent Hermes to distribute justice and shame equally among all of the people so that they
could get along with each other. As part of the process, Zeus also demanded that any
person unable to participate in the shared sense of justice and shame should be killed as a
pestilence to civilization. In this way, Crosswhite notes that from its ancient and fabled
beginnings rhetoric was understood as operating in a public sphere marked by three
bloody borders: 1) the border between violent prehistory and civilized history, 2) the
border between animals and humans, and 3) the border between those barred from the
public sphere and those allowed to participate within it (137-8). The ability for humans to
get along with each other peacefully is, in this way, premised on our inability to get along
with those we deem to be less than human.
These bloody borders mark the violences that have been the primary critiques of
the public sphere since the latter half of the twentieth century. When Derrida in The
Animal That Therefore I Am discusses the violences humanity has committed against
animals, failing to empathize with them when they clearly have a consciousness with
which to observe humanity and the ability to suffer, he is arguing against a border
covered in the blood of slaughterhouses, research labs, puppy mills, etc. When Nancy
Fraser argues in “Rethinking the Public Sphere” that the eighteenth-century liberal civic
sphere that Habermas celebrates only existed through its exclusion of women, slaves,
indigenous people, the disabled, and workers, she is pointing to a border covered in the
blood of patriarchy, slavery, genocide, exploitation, etc. But these demarcations are only
one way that violence pervades rhetoric. Building on Walter Benjamin’s famous essay
“Critique of Violence,” Crosswhite argues that violence also undergirds all public
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rhetoric because civic conversation is rooted in the threat of violence insofar as the state’s
authority is rooted in its ability to use intolerable violence at its will. This truth of
governance means that any conditions for speaking in a given society, any attempts to
realize justice, and any pleas for change all play out in a space made possible both by past
violences and implied threats of future violences. The threat of excessive and intentional
physical harm is always very real in civic spaces—whether or not it is felt by citizens.
For Crosswhite, there is no way to abolish violence altogether, and he argues that instead
of attempting to create abstracted philosophical, political, or theological solutions to
violence, we should develop grounded and concrete practices that mitigate and manage
violence as best as possible in specific contexts (172). Crosswhite understands rhetoric as
a becoming in which humans open themselves up the world, and he argues that instead of
rationalizing a pure state of non-violence, humans can open themselves up to new
possibilities of peace through attuning to the specific concrete actors in their lives and the
harms that befall them. By being open and empathetic with others, individuals can
increase their capacities for building peace in the world, not just their capacities for
repelling violence.
This solution to the problem, using rhetoric to focus on a peace that transcends an
absence of violence in order to mitigate a violence that can never be completely
overcome, is not possible for Cynthia Haynes, who in The Homesick Phonebook argues
that rhetoricians should think of violence and rhetoric not as two concepts that dwell near
one another, as Crosswhite does, but rather as two concepts that dwell with one another:
We will never know the why when it comes to conflict and unspeakable
violence. But I do know where they live: right through the front door

25

and inside the rhetorical address of humanity, in our basements, yes, but
also our living rooms, even in our gardens—especially in our gardens.
For they are where we plant the seeds of every new species of alibi,
where we cultivate the roots of complacency and complicity, and harvest
the next crop of tacit torture. The silos in which we store every history,
crime, and good intention should be emptied of their rotting grains of
truth. (10)
For Haynes, rhetoric dwells with violence and violence dwells with rhetoric because they
both dwell with humanity. Violence creates space for rhetoric, while rhetoric justifies the
violence that created it in order to propagate and justify even more new violences. In
Haynes’s contemptuous circle, it is not that violence has meaning because it is a type of
rhetoric but that violence is given meaning through rhetoric. Rhetoric is understood as the
narratives that justify horrific actions and navigate oppressive systems; it is born in
violence, and if there was no violence, there would be neither need nor ability for
rhetoric. Similarly, violence is understood as the use of material force to cause explicit
pain; it is born in rhetoric, and if there was no rhetoric, then harms would have no
justification, and there would be no place for violence. Though different, the two forces
overlap so much that it is difficult to determine their distinctions. Can the rational
arguments of the eighteenth century that Gross romanticizes be considered rhetoric when
they are created from systems of genocide, marginalization, oppression, and slavery that
constitute rhetoric’s bloody borders? Can the destructive protests Deluca studies be
considered violence when they emerge as calculated responses from rational actors to
disrupt conversations that will determine their fates without their input? These are
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difficult questions that threaten to equivocate our understanding of violence and rhetoric
because of their reliance on humanistic understandings of the world.
A shift to a new materialist paradigm, however, makes the world appear much
different because the border between individuals and their environment becomes more
fluid, breaking down the simplified notions of causality on which humanist models of
violence rely. Both Crosswhite and Haynes’s understandings of violence and rhetoric,
though illuminating in how the two function together, depend too much on an
Aristotelian dichotomy between violence and persuasion to be useful in understanding
real material publics. Megan Foley argues that Aristotle understood persuasion as a force
that acts in accordance with nature because the audience chooses to be persuaded, and the
decision to act originates from within their beings. Violence, on the other hand, acts
against nature because the victim is controlled by an external force to act in a certain
fashion (193). Persuasion, and even coercion, are not violent because rhetoric relates to
desire in a nondeterminative fashion; though language influences thought, it does not
force thought or action to do its bidding (197). Violence, on the other hand, is force; the
audience has no choice but to succumb to the will of the violent actor. The problem with
this model is that it requires humans to have complete selves with their own independent
internalities and complete externalities that are themselves composed of a multitude of
separate individuals. Though Aristotle claims that the internal and external meet during
the act of persuasion, he generally understands them as separate spheres.
A new materialist understanding of the world denies the separation between
individuals and their environments. Instead, new materialists acknowledge that
individuals are composed of a variety of other actors—such as the internalized voices of
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those who raised them through childhood, digestive bacteria, and gravity. Likewise, new
materialists acknowledge that humans are permeable to the outside world in relation to
social forces (such as class, gender, and race) and to material forces (such as moisture,
carcinogens, and soundwaves). If soundwaves permeate the brain, change the ways
human synapsis fire, and influence human actions, is this more controlling, external, or
manipulative than a punch that merely bruises the skin and influences a person through
pain? This is not to say that the experiences of listening and being physically assaulted
are not different from one another in very important ways to which the rhetor needs to
pay attention—new materialism acknowledges that experience matters—nonetheless,
these are not categorically different phenomena. Both violence and persuasion are forces
intra-acting with bodies. In neither case is there a clear determinative cause leading to a
simple effect; instead, in both cases, a variety of multiply-composed bodies are intraacting with one another and effects are emerging from those intra-actions. In such a
paradigm, we cannot define violence by either the intensity of the persuasive force or the
type of force utilized. Traditionally peaceful media can be extremely forceful whereas
traditionally violent rhetorics can lack force.
Unable to explain the difference between violence and rhetoric through the types
of force being utilized and the concept of choice, perhaps it is possible to understand their
relationship by examining the intended effects of an interaction; however, this line of
questioning is also complicated by a new materialist paradigm. Though the Belmont
Report’s emphasis on risk/benefit analysis suggests that the intentions of a study,
supported by research that demonstrates the probability of these outcomes, determines
whether or not the study would be ethical, and though their explicit statement against
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brutal and inhumane practices implies that intentionally violent actions are never ethical
in the sphere of research, new materialist rhetoricians do not hold this same standard for
persuasion. Since the structuralist movement, linguists, philologists, philosophers, and
rhetoricians have all argued that speakers’ intentions matter less for meaning than their
words. Only by examining a text can a reader know what it says. Looking beyond text
and toward its relationships with other actors in the world, Laurie Gries takes this
interpretation further from the intentions of the rhetor by demonstrating that meaning is
not found within a text but is rather “temporally and spatially distended” (49). As texts,
which are just as composed and permeable as humans, circulate and intra-act with other
actors, they take on new meanings and have new consequences in the world: “it is only in
tracing a single multiple image’s transformations that unfold with time and space that we
can discover what divergent consequences emerge and thus know for certain what
rhetorical meanings have materialized” (52). If it is not possible to know meaning
through intention but only through the consequences that texts create within their
enmeshed relationships with other actors, then it is also impossible to understand
violence, which itself dwells with rhetoric and is imbued with meaning through rhetoric,
by a standard of intentionality. Instead, violence must be understood as a consequence of
actions, regardless of intention. This does not mean that intentionally violent actions are
not often more nefarious than unintentionally violent ones, but it does mean that material
harms cannot be understood as non-violent merely because they were not intended to hurt
someone or were carried out by a nonhuman actor. Gravity enacts violence; it even enacts
persuasion in the sense that it moves bodies. If intentionality is nixed from the equation,
then anything that persuades is rhetoric, and when it causes harm, it is a violent rhetoric.
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At their root both rhetoric and violence are forces of change enacted by a myriad
of actors constantly influencing each other and struggling within complex relationships of
power. When publics are seen as both real and unreal—material and abstract—it is
revealed that each rhetorical act has a relationship to violence (courting it, rejecting it,
enabling it, diffusing it, etc.) and each violent act has a relationship to rhetoric (inviting
it, stopping it, generating new discourses, etc.). The two types of action are not the same,
and collapsing them together risks equivocating everything to violence, but it is clear that
the two aspects of humanity dwell together and change the world in relationship to one
another. It is not by coincidence that the language of argumentation and the language of
combat are so closely related. Both rhetoric and violence are forces of change that have
material consequences in the world and can be used to positive or negative ends. Some
violences—physical, psychological, social, or economic—stop genocide, protect
children, help students feel validated, or justly compensate the victims of cruel
government experiments. Some rhetorics—embodied, material, political, social, etc.—
devalue human life, cause distress, make people feel threatened, or enable exploitation.
The forces themselves are not constrained to moral categories—violence is not inherently
bad while rhetoric is inherently good—rather every action needs to be evaluated as
ethical or not in its specific contexts. Compositionists can no longer make categorical
distinctions but must ask what futures an act of either violence or rhetoric makes possible
and probable.
Each rhetorical and violent action will have consequences and create change in
the world, and this relationship is co-constitutive. Rhetors change the material publics of
which they are a part, and the public in-turn changes the rhetor. The same is true for texts
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and audiences as well. Because of the complexity of the public, with a multitude of actors
constantly intra-acting together, changes are emergent and difficult to predict. This
uncertainty amplifies the risks of publicness. There is no simple subject exerting its will
on an object so that the object will change in a certain way; instead, there are multiple
subjects influencing each other so that unpredictable change emerges. As Dennis Lynch
et al. argue in their essay “Moments of Argument,” the risks of rhetoric are often
different than the ones we foresee. Discussing the ways in which they urge students to
engage one another in discussion before establishing entrenched positions on a subject,
the authors claim, “the risk in argument is not that you may lose but rather that you may
change” (407). Similarly, James Crosswhite argues “One threat of exposing ourselves to
one another in language is that we may be called on to change” (141). All types of
rhetorical action from the violent to the pleasantly discursive enable the possibility that
the speaker, the text, the audience, and the world will change—often unexpectedly and in
unwelcomed ways. For this reason, entering into a real public is always risky. Change,
perhaps violent change, is always imminent. Moreover, whenever actors act within a
public, they risk helping to create unreal publics different from their original intentions.

Publics as Risk-Laden Events
The unpredictability of change is the great risk of rhetoric and the primary topic
of this dissertation. I argue that the multiple agencies that compose real material publics
are what make the outcomes of our actions uncertain, causing risks both violent and
rhetorical. I evidence my position with three separate case studies because by
understanding how harm occurs in these instances, I am able to ground my understanding
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of risk in the practices of real publics. From this understanding, I am able to create a
pedagogy that responds to risk as I understand it to operate the world. In other words, I
analyze three instances of risk in the public sphere in order to better understand risk and
to better teach students how to consider such risks when they compose for publics. This
method is grounded in the actual rhetorical practices of real publics, which affords it
validity but limits its scope. These three case studies cannot explain every type of risk
associated with composing for the public, but they can begin to form a corpus through
which compositionists can understand risk more holistically. Further study will be
necessary to create a fully formed understanding of risk and the public sphere, but this
dissertation signals a beginning for this work.
The three case studies that compose this dissertation are each indicative of both a
vantage for understanding and engaging the public—idealism, activism, and
materialism—and an element within the rhetorical situation—text, audience, and rhetor—
that is being transformed through engagement with the public. In the first case study, an
idealistically crafted text is unexpectedly changed by more cynical actors participating
with it. In the second case study, several activists see audience responses to their texts
shift from an innocuous mainstream style to one of extremely violent political
reactionaries. In the third case study, materialist rhetors unexpectedly become demagogic
as they participate in argumentation and discourse. Though these risks are distinctly
different from one another, each of the case studies demonstrates violence in that harm is
being enacted on at least one of the implicated actors. Sometimes this harm is physical,
but often it is economic, emotional, legal, psychological, social, or some mix thereof.
Despite the presence of violence, none of the case studies can be understood as merely
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violent. Each case study is always also rhetorical and generative. Focusing only on either
the violence or the rhetoric of the situation provides a skewed understanding of how risk
operates within the events. Ignoring the violence of publicness ignores the embodied
reality of discourse and the dangers such embodiment presents; conversely, ignoring the
rhetoric of publicness neglects the ways discourse produces beneficial and peaceful
changes. My approach to publicness, which balances violence and rhetoric and sees each
as creating the conditions for the other, informs the claim at the end of my dissertation
that rhetorical ecologies are ongoing events in which things change in both harmful and
beneficial ways. Composition is not a process headed toward a product but an continual
event in which actors intra-act and change their shared worlds in unanticipatable ways.
To teach students to write within such rhetorical events, I advocate for the creation of
event-based pedagogies that teach students to ethically operate within publics by
developing their agency, curiosity, empathy, adaptability, and ingenuity. These are not
abstract values but rather practices that pay careful attention to the material consequences
of public action and the ramifications those actions have on a host of human and
nonhuman actors.
Throughout the dissertation, I discuss public action as having a variety of effects
on a multitude of different actors. This argument is not based on a simple causality but
rather an understanding of the public sphere as a dense network of human and nonhuman
actors who use their agencies to shape each other and their shared worlds. The public is
not merely a group of individuals relating to one another but rather a group of actors so
intimately interconnected that their actions cannot help but reverberate throughout the
network. In such an enmeshed environment, agency is not individual but rather is
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distributed in what Karen Barad refers to as intra-action; individuals and their actions
emerge through their relationships with the world rather than relationships being formed
through the actions of individuals (74). Actors emerge from the world just like plants
emerge from the interactions between seeds, soil, water, and sun. There is no outside of
relationality from where an actor can act; individuals can only operate within complex
material and social relationships, and even then, the word individual is just a convenient
shorthand for the multitude of actors intra-acting to create what is commonly referred to
as a subject.
Despite their enmeshed position, individuals still have the experience of acting
and making decisions. Simply because actions are not solely determined by an
autonomous subject does not mean that people no longer have to take responsibility for
their actions, and it does not mean that people are free from thought and judgment;
instead, distributed agency means that individuals’ thoughts, which emerge through intraaction, will effect a host of others who are enmeshed and intra-acting with them. Thus,
acting to shape the world is simultaneously every individuals’ responsibility to others and
to themselves because there is no difference between the two positions. This model of
publicness courts understanding, and like Romantic Irony, event-based pedagogies
acknowledge that instructors cannot fully realize these co-productive publics either in
their classrooms or in the broader culture. Nonetheless, through attempts to enact these
unreal publics in real public spaces, compositionists can make reality more closely
resemble the as-of-yet unreal publics they wish to see manifest; however, in order to
build these ideal publics through rhetorical education, compositionists must first
understand the risks associated with contemporary publics. For this reason, this
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dissertation includes three case studies of real publics laden with risk. In each case the
risk is associated with both a vantage of the public sphere and an element of the rhetorical
situation.
In Chapter Two, “The Risks of Idealism: Mis-using Black Power and Misrepresenting the Crips,” I argue that idealist movements, organizations, and texts always
risk becoming co-opted by other actors because the public is an ecology in which
meaning emerges through the interactions among a myriad of actors. I root this
understanding of publicness in Lloyd Bitzer’s materialist definition of the rhetorical
situation, which has been much derided by social constructionists whose outlooks much
more closely resembled Michael Warner’s account that people create publics to look and
act a certain way. However, I use new materialist theories from Bruno Latour, Stacy
Alaimo, and Margaret Syverson to demonstrate how a co-participative ecological model
does not need to choose between materialism or sociality to understand meaning as
emerging from the intra-actions of a variety of actors who change the meaning of texts so
that no one actor can independently call forth a public that acts or thinks in a predetermined manner. This history of the Los Angeles Street gang the Crips—especially
when understood as emerging from the rhetoric of the Black Panther Party for SelfDefense—demonstrates how different actors can make idealist movements,
organizations, and texts mean differently than they may have originally been intended. I
conclude this chapter by arguing that texts will always be misinterpreted because
meaning emerges as arguments are enacted, not as they are composed. This risk clearly
befell the Crips as they evolved from an anti-gang coalition inspired by the Black Panther
Party to become the largest street gang in the world.
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In Chapter Three, “The Risks of Activism: Gamergate Harassments and the AltRight Sphere Public,” I argue that political action always courts violent responses
because it attempts to rearrange social hierarchies. Since social hierarchies are already
regularly upheld through harassment, which is a demonstration of who has power in a
space and who lacks power, violence is a preferred method for those who wish to
maintain the social order of specific publics. Understanding how social hierarchies
function within publics requires that I differentiate the overlapping concepts of the public
and the social, which I do, starting with the famous distinction created by Hannah Arendt
and ending with Byron Hawk’s conception of sphere publics. I discuss the recent
harassment campaigns by the ultra-conservative populist movement, the alt-right, as an
example of how groups utilize harassment not only to maintain the composition of their
publics but also to make those publics more closely resemble their ideal spaces for
discourse. I specifically focus on the harassment of feminist media critics Anita
Sarkeesian and Zoe Quinn during the Gamergate controversy to demonstrate how the altright utilizes violence and threats of violence as a way of trying to evidence their control
of the public sphere and the weakness of their victims. I conclude this chapter by
claiming that the audiences of activists texts contain the possibility for socially significant
violence because political action upsets the social composition of the overlapping sphere
publics through which political change is enacted.
In Chapter Four, “The Risks of Materialism: Narcissus and the Nascent
Demagoguery of Accelerationism,” I argue that tightly knit materially focused publics
risk becoming demagogic once their participants become entranced by their own
arguments and create righteous communities that ignore arguments, ideas, information, or
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perspectives outside the accepted premises of the community. I develop this
understanding of collective narcissism through theories of how language provides
meaning and structure to the world by Friedrich Nietzsche and Kenneth Burke before
turning to Patricia Roberts-Miller’s conceptualization of demagoguery. I argue that the
myopic and Promethean arguments of the leftist accelerationist movement demonstrate a
public whose fixation with the intersection between technological utopianism and politics
has led them to believe not only that they are the only group among the contemporary left
that understands how to bring about a more equitable future but also that such a future
requires their being in near total control of both human and nonhuman actors. The hubris
necessary for this kind of argument may not yet be demagogic, but it is indicative of the
processes by which a public becomes so. I conclude this chapter by claiming that rhetors
themselves can be changed by the circulation of and responses to their own arguments
within the public sphere. This risk clearly befell the accelerationists as they evolved their
position from trying to invigorate and expand leftist political projects to isolating
themselves through technological utopian fantasies and academic jargon.
Taken together, I argue that these three case studies not only outline three risks of
public rhetoric but also explain how these risks are rooted in the way rhetorical ecologies
change the elements within the rhetorical situation. Change, whether through persuasion
or violence, is the risk of rhetoric, and this risk is inevitable because texts, audiences,
rhetors, and other material actors co-constitute and change each other as they intra-act in
the rhetorical ecology. From this perspective, rhetoric is an event in which the borders
between enmeshed actors are blurred and each begins to change the others. In the event
of rhetoric, actors do not merely influence each other but co-re-create one another. Each
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of the case studies that constitute this dissertation demonstrates how the distinctions
between text, audience, and rhetor are already arbitrary: the text of the Crips is changed
not only by those who embody it but also by those who witness it from the outside, the
alt-right switches from audience to rhetor as they intentionally misconstrue the texts of
other rhetors to fit their narratives, and finally, the rhetors of the accelerationist
movement become their own audience as their texts and intertexts persuade them to
further entrench themselves in their positions.
In response to these case-studies, Chapter Five, “The Risks of Events: Toward
Event-Based Pedagogies” addresses the question of how public writing instructors can
best teach students to better understand and mitigate risk. After explaining how
inaccurately people perceive risks, I argue that the root of rhetoric’s actual hazards is its
transformative characteristic as an event as described by compositionists such as Marilyn
Cooper, Michelle Ballif, and Dianne Davis. I argue that Joe Panzner’s understanding of
the event provides a useful approach to writing that asks rhetors to pay attention to how
their texts relate to others and their capacities to act in the world. This principle informs
my argument for event-based pedagogies that follow five tenets created to helps students
better perceive and manage the risks of public writing. I ask students to increase the
capacity for others to act, conduct thorough and empathetic research, be open to other
opinions and perspectives, adapt to new information, and build new arguments from the
remains of old ones. These practices are rooted in the real publics in which students live
while also helping them to build the unreal publics they deserve.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RISKS OF IDEALISM: MIS-USING BLACK POWER AND MISREPRESENTING THE CRIPS
Perhaps the risk most associated with composing for the public is the inability to
know with certainty how a text will be understood, what influences it will have, and what
realities it will enable. Rhetors, through the very act of rhetoric, risk having thier
messages mis-appropriated, mis-communicated, mis-interpreted, mis-read, and misunderstood. In other words, much can go amiss within the rhetorical situation, and these
unintended consequences are not always based on the rhetor, audience, or text being
erroneous, nefarious, or wrong. Instead, unintended consequences emerge because
meaning is co-produced by a variety of actors. Not every mis-take is a failure of
communication, goodwill, or understanding; instead, mis is an inherent aspect of the
complex nature of the public sphere in which actors co-create meaning together with no
single entity determining what a text means forever and for always. The meanings of
texts change as they encounter new actors and new situations, and this is the mis of
rhetoric. Mis, which has its roots in the Indo-European i-mene meaning “to change or
exchange,” is the characteristic of the public sphere that gives fluidity to both meaning
and interpretation. The unexpected and unanticipated consequences that emerge from
within the public are mis in that they emerge from the rhetor letting go of a message,
enabling it to be circulated and changed by the other actors who engage with it in the
public. The nature of publicness should be understood more as a collaborative mis than as
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a collection of singular intentions being distributed across a network. While actors may
imagine themselves distributing messages with singular meanings, multiple meanings are
being co-created through the texts interactions with a variety of actors. This characteristic
of the public often generates positive outcomes, but it is also a risk for those hoping to
guide the public in specific ways because it does not allow for any guarantees that a
message will fulfill a rhetor’s goals, since the rhetor cannot know how others within the
public will mis-understand the text.
Idealist vantage points are perhaps more vulnerable to the risky aspects of mis
than activist or materialist perspectives because people operating from this position have
clear beliefs about how the public ought to function and the steps needed to arrive at
those goals. The ethical orientation of idealism leads idealist scholars to find actual
publics lacking in comparison to theoretical versions of publicness. This orientation also
leads to these scholars spending a great deal of time describing both the conditions of the
actual public sphere and their ideal versions of publicness not only so that they can take
concrete steps toward realizing their ideal publics but also so that they can measure their
progress toward that ideal. Composition and Rhetoric scholars operating from this
vantage—including Robert Asen and Daniel C. Brower, Jay P. Childers, Sharon Crowley,
Gerard Hauser, Michael Warner, and Christian Weisser—tend to diagnose problems with
the public sphere and offer some potential steps forward. For instance, in his article
“Representing the State in South Central Los Angeles” Robert Asen takes as his object of
critique not only theories of publicness that ignore the ability of the state to participate
deliberatively within the public but also the actual practices of state actors who
participate in discourse with the public. Asen’s specific example is a townhall style
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meeting between CIA Director John Deutch and members of the South Central Los
Angeles community following the 1996 publication of Gary Webb’s investigative
journalism series “Dark Alliance,” which claimed a CIA-backed drug ring introduced
crack cocaine into Los Angeles to finance the Contra war against the communist
government in Nicaragua. Asen claims that the exchange between Deutch and the
citizens of South Central Los Angeles demonstrates the ways in which representatives of
the state can operate as participants within deliberative publics, which changes the theory
of publicness to include the state as an active participant within the public rather than just
the context in which deliberation takes place (139). Asen goes on to show how Deutch’s
changing demeanor throughout the meeting demonstrates how state actors can either
legitimize the concerns of undervalued counterpublics or invalidate them. The article
ends with the claim that, at its best, the state can, “extend the circulation . . . [and]
facilitate the expansion outwards of counterpublic discourse beyond the reach of its
regular advocates” (154). This outcome is not certain, however, and Asen claims that it
will only occur if citizens actively press their state representatives and if state
representatives find value in engaging citizens. In this argument, Asen uses a specific
case study to demonstrate both the problems with the public sphere and its potential
virtues. He ends by presenting an ideal model of public discourse in which the state
listens to its minority constituents, and he provides his audience with some steps for
reaching these goals such as community organizing and creating conditions for the state
to facilitate discussion. Because he has a clear ideal in mind, Asen makes a point to be
explicit and specific as to how the public operates, how it should operate, and how
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citizens can bridge the gap between the two. Asen is explicit in this argument because,
with a definite goal in mind, he does not want to be mis-understood.
Idealists participating within the public sphere often use more direct political
action than Composition and Rhetoric scholars when they attempt to move the public
closer to their ideals. Nonetheless, these actors also spend a lot of time defining both who
they are and what their goals are in order to create a cohesive movement that will move
the public closer to their ideal. These idealists do not wish to be mis-understood any more
than idealist scholars, so they work to make their messages as exact as possible. The rich
textual histories of movements from enlightenment rationalism to material feminism
demonstrate the type of arguments groups create as they attempt to move the public in a
particular direction. However, despite the specificity of their texts, mis still happens
because movements, and the texts they produce, exist in co-productive publics in which
other actors will change the meaning of texts through their engagement with them.
Though movements meticulously craft texts for specific reasons, their rhetors cannot
determine what meanings others will make from them—including meanings that fly
directly in the face of the movement’s primary concerns and values, as demonstrated by
the relationship between the Black Power movement and the Los Angeles street gang the
Crips.

Mis-using the Black Power Movement
The relationship between the Black Power movement and the Los Angeles street
gang the Crips illustrates how the texts of an idealist public can be mis-used by other
public actors to create situations completely antithetical to the original public’s
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intentions. The term Black Power was first popularized within the civil rights community
by Stokely Carmichael during the 1966 March Against Fear. The march had originated as
a solitary protest with the Black activist James Meredith walking the Mississippi Delta
from Memphis, Tennessee to Jackson, Mississippi. After Meredith was shot by a white
sniper on the second day of the march, however, civil rights leaders from all over the
country—including both Stokely Carmichael, representing the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee, and Martin Luther King Jr., representing the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference—came to Mississippi to complete the march that the hospitalized
Meredith could no longer complete himself. By the time they arrived in Jackson on June
26, the march was estimated to have 15,000 participants. According to King, it was
during this march, at a rally in Greenwood, Mississippi, that Carmichael first used the
term Black Power:
Stokely mounted the platform and after arousing the audience with a powerful
attack on Mississippi justice he proclaimed, “What we need is Black Power.”
Willie Ricks, the fiery orator of SNCC leaped to the platform and shouted, “What
do you want?” The crowd roared, “Black Power.” Again and again Ricks cried,
“What do you want?” and the response “Black Power” grew louder and louder,
until it had reached a fever pitch.
So Greenwood turned out to be the arena for the birth of the Black Power
slogan in the civil rights movement. The phrase had been used long before by
Richard Wright and others, but never until that night had it been used as a slogan
in the civil rights movement. For people who had been crushed so long by white
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power and who had been taught that black was degrading, it had a ready appeal.
(31)
King had his reservations about the slogan, worrying that white audiences and the media
would mis-understand it as a violent argument for Black superiority, but the term gained
popularity among younger activists in the civil rights movement. According to the
rhetoricians Robert L. Scott and Wayne Brockriede, the slogan had an important impact
on the summer of 1966, becoming “a revolutionary force in American life” that could not
be ignored (vii).
Due in part to the concerns of advocates like King, Carmichael made his
understanding of Black Power extremely clear not only at his well-attended speaking
engagements but also in the book he co-wrote with Charles V. Hamilton: Black Power:
The Politics of Liberation. In this book, Carmichael argues that previous civil rights
groups were attempting to negotiate with their white political allies before having
accumulated their own power, which forced black leaders into the “beggar’s role, hoping
to strike a responsive chord,” leaving these groups to the whims of stronger political and
economic forces (78). For Carmichael, the only way for the Black community to get out
of its beggar’s role was to unite in cultivating the political, economic, and cultural power
of their communities in order to wield it against that of other political groups. Carmichael
argued that Black communities needed to free themselves from the structures that were
oppressing them and unite under their own systems of power so that they could more
effectively negotiate with the white power structure. An important part of this
accumulation of power was the realization that being Black was not something of which
anyone should be ashamed. Carmichael argued that Black people should realize their own
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natural beauty and stop trying to emulate white culture through hairstyles, dress, and
social organizations like fraternities (“Morgan State”). For Carmichael, Black Power was
both a cultural and a political awakening for the Black community; however, other
groups saw these as separate endeavors, and this created a rift in the Black Power
movement that those hostile to it were able to exploit.
Though there was always some ambiguity surrounding the term Black Power, its
adherents were generally unified until nefarious outside forces, representing white
supremacist society, joined the conversation and sowed mis-trust. The most prominent
and politically active Black Power organization of the 1960s and 1970s was the Black
Panther Party for Self Defense [BPP], of which Carmichael was Prime Minister from
1967 to 1969. Founded by Bobby Seale and Huey P. Newton on October 15, 1966 in
Oakland, California, the BPP adhered to a ten point program that expressed their desire
for freedom, employment, economic justice, housing, education, and changes to the
United States judiciary and military laws as they related to Black people (Newton). Often
remembered for exercising their rights to bear arms while policing the police around
Oakland in order to ensure that officers were not violating the rights of Black citizens, the
BPP also focused on community initiatives including free breakfast programs, free
furniture programs, and a program to research Sickle Cell Anemia (“Black Panther
Community Programs”). The group’s popularity grew quickly not only because of their
revolutionary message but also because of their style, with members sporting afros,
turtlenecks, black leather jackets, sunglasses, and berets. Unsurprisingly, the United
States Government was suspicious of the BPP, with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, famously saying, “the Black Panther Party, without
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question, represents the greatest threat to the internal security of the country” (PBS). As
such, the FBI launched a counterintelligence program meant to disrupt the party by
exacerbating disagreements between members, incarcerating high ranking officials, and
even assassinating those who they could not otherwise control.2
The FBI’s Counterintelligence program was successful in sowing discontent
within and among Black Power organizations by mis-identifying and mis-representing
the positions of both individuals and institutions. The most famous mis-communication
propagated by the FBI is the escalation of the dispute between the BPP, who believed in
amassing Black Power through political change and community involvement, and the US
Organization that believed in creating Black Power by promoting African cultural unity
through programs such as Swahili language classes and the establishment of AfricanAmerican holidays such as Kwanzaa. Though the BPP and US were complimentary
organizations, they found themselves competing with each other for recruits, which
caused tension. The FBI stoked these tensions by mailing death threats and humiliating
cartoons to each group under the guise that these texts were created by the competing
organization. The dispute came to a head on January 17, 1969 when the founder of the
Southern California Chapter of the BPP and former Slauson gang member, Alprentice
“Bunchy” Carter, along with the leader of the Los Angeles chapter of the organization,
John Huggins, was killed at a meeting of UCLA’s Black Student Union by alleged
members of the US Organization after the two BPP leaders were overheard making
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I realize that to claim the Federal Government assassinated civil rights leaders is one with which many
people will take exception. While the FBI may not be able to be held completely responsible for many of
the deaths of the movements most prominent leaders such as Malcolm X, George Jackson, and Alprentice
“Bunchy” Carter, the death of Fred Hampton is unambiguous in its indictment of the organization. See
Jeffrey Haas’s book The Assassination of Fred Hampton for more details.
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derogatory comments about the US Organization’s founder, Ron Karenga. Due in part to
this incident, as well as problems with the government and other types of internal strife—
all of which were being amplified, if not completely manufactured, by the FBI’s
counterintelligence program—the BPP lost much of its power and popularity around this
time; however, their style and rhetoric continued to influence their communities in ways
they would not have anticipated.
One community that the Black Power message of the BPP influenced, though by
no means the only community it influenced, was the Los Angeles street gang the Crips.
While the exact relationship between the two organizations is uncertain, the influence is
obvious. Established by Raymond Washington in 1969, early Crips wore earrings in their
left ears, plain white muscle shirts, khaki pants, tan leather Biscuit shoes, and leather
jackets. Not only was the uniform reminiscent of the BPP, but the idea of having a
unified style came directly from the movement. According to the former Crip member
Gregory “Batman” Davis, Washington modeled the Crips after the BPP, which he knew
about from his relationship with Bunchy Carter (“Raymond Washington”). However,
alleged Crip cofounder Stanley “Tookie” Williams claims that neither he nor Washington
knew anything about the BPP when the gang was formed (87). Most accounts, however,
lay the influence somewhere between these two extremes. It seems likely that
Washington and other early Crip members were familiar with the BPP and may have
attended free breakfast or education programs offered by the party; still, there is no
reason to suspect a more official connection between the two groups. Based on this loose
connection, it appears that Washington understood the style and the anger of the BPP but
not their message of political revolution. As former gang member Raymond “Dhanifu”
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Cook says in the documentary Crips and Bloods: Made in America, “At thirteen and
fourteen years old, we really didn’t know what the hell [the BPP] were saying, only thing
we really understood was the pigs.” The Crips, which went on to be one of the world’s
most infamous gangs, are not direct descendants, or necessarily a logical extension of the
Black Power movement or the BPP. They are not necessarily “the bastards of the [Black
Panther] party” as Los Angeles historian Mike Davis refers to them in his book City of
Quartz.
Nonetheless, the mis of the public sphere, the co-productive exchange that
provides multiple meanings to texts, movements, and ideas morphed the ideas of Black
Power and the revolutionary style of the BPP into something they otherwise would not
have become when they influenced the Crips. Some of the actors involved in this mis
were explicit proponents of Black Power, some were wary of the term, others maliciously
opposed it, and some were mostly unaffiliated with it, but all of these actors engaging
with a text changed its meanings through their engagement, despite Stokely Carmichael’s
careful explication of what the term meant. The Black Power slogan was, and still is, not
stagnant, it changes as actors involve themselves with it. The slogan is still influencing
activism, arts, politics, and scholarship as contemporary audiences engage with it and
make meaning from it. Many of these new engagements, like the Black Lives Matter
movement, are quite reminiscent of Carmichael’s original articulations.
This shifting meaning for Black Power is indicative of the mis of rhetoric. Once a
text—be it a book, movie, slogan, or the tenets of a political movement—enters the
public sphere, no one can be certain how other actors will understand it, engage with it,
or change it. The text is not the singular creation of the author but rather a multiple object
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that is interpretable, malleable, and shifting. As actors exchange texts, meaning emerges.
Once publicness is understood this way, it becomes impossible to see public composition
as anything other than mis, making mis-understanding a constant, if not unavoidable,
aspect of the communicative act. Publicness is so complex that it is impossible to know in
advance the consequences of entering into it. This understanding is based in the
articulation of a materialist rhetorical situation, which was first articulated by Lloyd
Bitzer in the 1960s.

Co-Producing the Rhetorical Situation
Lloyd Bitzer articulates a materialist understanding of the rhetorical situation
when he claimes that rhetoric only exists in response to a situation that grants
communication rhetorical significance. He claimes that such situations invite fitting
discourses that are rhetorical in that they possess the ability to “change reality through the
mediation of thought and action” (4). Communication is rhetorical, then, only when it is
able to act as a force in the world: to act as an agent of change in co-producing the world.
Such forceful agency only emerges within the confluence of actors who constitute the
situation; it does not exist independently of context. In this way, communication is not
independently effective; rather, it is effective within an enmeshed situation constituted by
other actors. Bitzer categorizes these other actors, what he refers to as the “complex of
persons, events, objects, and relations,” into three categories based on their relationship to
the speaker: exigence, audience, and constraints. Exigence is “an imperfection marked by
urgency” that can be positively modified by discourse. Audience is those persons who are
both “capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change.” And
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constraints are those things which limit the means of persuasion available to the rhetor (68). Bitzer sees the rhetorical situation as an invitation to rhetoric that emerges from this
confluence. Such an situation is not abstract; it is explicitly material in that it is created
by the interactions of embodied humans and nonhumans. This understanding is not a
vulgar realism that believes the world creates meaning intrinsic to itself, which is then
discovered and understood by humans; rather, Bitzer describes a dynamic material world
that co-participates with humanity in creating meaning.
In his famous critique of Bitzer, Richard Vatz ignores the complexity of the
former’s materialism, claiming that Bitzer is simply a vulgar realist who believes that
objects, events, and situations have meaning intrinsic to them, which the rhetor merely
discovers before advocating for positive modification. Vatz asserts that rhetoric is far
more complicated than such realism, however, and he argues for something approaching
social constructionism when he asserts that more complex situations do not have simple
material solutions: “One wonders what the obvious ‘positive modification’ of the
military-industrial complex is” (156). In this example, Vatz chooses a conceptual
multiple object to demonstrate not only the complexity of the world but also the social
dimension of language. The military-industrial complex does not exist in the same way
that a stone exists, easy to see and identify; instead, the military-industrial complex is
composed of a variety of material actors whose actions create global conflict and military
action resulting in profits for weapons manufacturers and other combat industries. It is
impossible to easily point to the military-industrial complex, but as Vatz gestures toward
it, he demonstrates that it still exists, and there is a term for it. Vatz uses this example to
argue that rhetoric is not descriptive, it is generative in that creates concepts that allow us
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to understand the world. Language for Vatz does not merely mirror a thing’s intrinsic
identity; rather, language creates an identity for the thing. For example, by naming the
military-industrial complex, rhetors created a concept where there would otherwise be
seemingly disparate war profiteers. For Vatz, this creation occurs in two vectors: rhetors
sifting through contexts to choose the events they will communicate to their audiences
and rhetors creating meaning through their “linguistic depiction[s]” of the events (157).
The problem with this argument is that the military-industrial complex is still composed
of material actors, and if it wasn’t then there would be no need to name it. The material
and the linguistic co-produce the military-industrial complex, but Vatz ignores this, as he
does with his other, seemingly more rhetorical, example of declaring an end to the war in
Vietnam.
To elucidate the difference between how he and Bitzer understand the rhetorical
situation, Vatz discusses George Aiken’s suggestion that the United States first declare
victory and then remove troops from Vietnam. Vatz claims that seeing the war in
Vietnam as a situation that required American intervention had been a rhetorical act in
itself, meaning that, regardless of the material situation, it could also be remedied
rhetorically (159). The United States could control how the situation was understood by
using language to define both the situation and the nation’s role within it. However, as
the Paris Peace Accords and the fall of Saigon demonstrated, controlling how a rhetorical
situation is understood is more difficult than it may appear because Bitzer’s material
complex of “persons, events, objects, and relations” refuse to be easily kowtowed by
language. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, the
Provisional Revolutionary Government, the norms of war, the tradition of colonialist
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intervention, the complexities of American politics, the amassing of military forces in
North Vietnam, and a myriad of other material and social forces resisted any one rhetor’s
attempts to make sense of them. It could be argued that the Vietnam War is simply a bad
example because it was rhetorically mis-handled, but the Iraq War teaches the exact same
lesson, which is that no amount of narrative will be able to completely constrain material
conditions so that new meanings and understandings will cease to emerge from the
interactions of material actors. The United States invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003, and
President George W. Bush declared victory on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln on
1 May of that same year. Despite this rhetorical move, the United States did not remove
its troops until 2011, and though the war is technically over not only does the conflict and
its material ramifications continue but also there are still United States troops in the
region. In short, claiming an end to the war twice failed to end the war not only
materially but also socially in the minds of many Americans and Iraqis.
The examples of the Vietnam and Iraq wars demonstrate the problems with
unnuanced social constructionist understandings of the world. Vatz articulates a belief
that humans create their worlds through language, attributing an immense amount of
world-shaping power to the rhetor, but the rhetor does not singularly wield such power.
This is not to say that Vatz’s position is entirely erroneous; language is also a material
force that allows humans to understand the world and bring new identities into being, but
this position fails to understand the ways in which the social world interacts with the
material world. As such, Vatz fails to pay attention to the ways in which the
consequences of speech cannot be solely attributed to the intentions of an author because
there is more than social production happening within the rhetorical situation.
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Bruno Latour offers a productive way to understand the relationship between the
linguistic power of the rhetor and the material power of the world in his critique of the
nature/culture binary in his book We Have Never Been Modern. The relationship
articulated in the text not only explains the philosophies that inform Vatz’s social
constructionist understanding of world but also better illuminates the type of materialism
articulated by Bitzer. Latour argues that the difference between nature and culture was
developed through the work of enlightenment philosophers and scientists to propagate
their worldview, though it failed to accurately describe either the material or the social
world particularly well. Using the work of Stephen Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Latour
demonstrates that Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle’s debate over the merits of
mathematical philosophical knowledge compared to empiricist experimental knowledge
helped to create the two ontologically distinct categories whose separation defined
modernity: pure nature and pure culture. Contrarily, Latour demonstrates that these two
realms can only exist when they are in communication with one another other because
human culture and ingenuity is needed to understand the natural world via scientific
processes, and nature is the necessary base upon which human cultural practices are built.
The moderns intentionally ignored these connections, and focused instead on purifying
everything to the realm of pure nature and pure culture because doing so allowed them to
pivot between different operative logics that would justify their seemingly contradictory
social beliefs such as natural human rights and the practices of slavery and colonization.
Latour claims that the modernist worldview, what he refers to as the modern
Constitution, is powerful only because of the way by which it separates enmeshed reality
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into these two different categories, allowing Western culture to justify any of its
practices by appealing to one of the two concepts.
Latour argues that the separation of nature from society allows the modern
Constitution four paradoxical guarantees: 1) Even though humans construct nature, the
natural world exists as if it were not constructed; 2) even though humans do not construct
society, the social world exists as if it were constructed; 3) nature and society must
remain absolutely distinct from the work of mediation, and 4) God’s transcendence
distances him from interfering with both the natural and social worlds, but he can be
appealed to in the event that the two forces are in conflict. These four tenants, all
simultaneously imminent and transcendent, allowed the moderns to legitimize or
delegitimize any practices they wished by alternating between the categories of nature,
society, and divinity as it fits their needs. Modernists could “mobilize Nature, objectify
the social, and feel the spiritual presence of God, even while firmly maintaining that
Nature escapes us, that Society is our own work, and that God no longer intervenes” (34).
The system for justification only began to unravel as hybrid issues, those that could not
be explained away and critiqued as either completely natural or completely cultural,
became more ubiquitous. Problems such as computing, pollution, and contraceptives
combined the natural and social worlds in ways that began to erode the modern
Constitution.
Latour illuminated how Vatz mis-reads Bitzer because Vatz is operating from
within the logic of the modern Constitution while Bitzer is not. Vatz sees rhetoric as
purely social, and he understands Bitzer as seeing the world as purely natural. Instead,
Bitzer’s understanding of the rhetorical situation is an early articulation of something that
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operates outside of the binary. Bitzer’s understanding of rhetoric is akin to what Latour
refers to as a hybrid or a quasi-object: something that is simultaneously completely
natural and completely social. Whereas modern sociologists attempted to explain material
objects dualistically, claiming that some objects were mere social chimeras whereas
others were biologically determined, quasi-objects are simultaneously both (53). This
claim is neither to say that all objects have aspects of nature and society, which is an
extension of the dualism, nor to say that all objects exist on a spectrum between the poles
of nature and society, which also reaffirms the binary; rather, the definition of quasiobjects claims that nature and society are both forces that operate in creating how we
experience everything within the world, including ourselves. There are neither distinctly
natural objects nor distinctly social subjects; instead, there are only quasi-objects and
quasi-subjects constituted both by human agency and material reality. Nature does not
create humanity, nor does humanity create nature; instead, a variety of human and
nonhuman actors are always co-creating each other. The robot is both as natural and as
social and the dandelion; they are just differently so. To move beyond the modern
Constitution, Composition and Rhetoric should build on Bitzer’s perspective and see
rhetorical persuasion as neither a product of nature nor a product of language. Rhetoric
should be understood as both cultural and material. If the discipline hopes to deal with the
complex communicative issues of the twenty-first century, it must realize how multiple
actors co-create meaning and consequence within the public sphere.
To imagine what it would be like to see public composition as a quasi-object,
Composition and Rhetoric scholars can turn to new materialist scholars in environmental
humanities who are already doing this kind of work. In her article “Trans-Corporeal
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Feminism and the Ethical Space of Nature” Stacy Alaimo asserts that understanding the
human body as both a cultural and natural entity elucidates the interconnectedness of
contemporary problems such as healthcare, environmentalism, and social justice. In
making this argument, Alaimo demonstrates how multiple actors are enmeshed in
contemporary problems in complex and influential ways. Starting from a critique of
feminism, Alaimo argues that much feminist theory has worked to detangle the figure of
the woman from nature, because this connection had been used to cast her “outside the
domain of human transcendence, rationality, subjectivity, and agency” into the realm that
Latour would refer to as pure nature (239). However, Alaimo argues that attempts to
combat this understanding of womanhood by demonstrating that the woman’s body is
socially constructed worked to merely re-enforced the binary by placing femininity in the
realm of pure social rather than demonstrating the “nonsense” of biological determinism.
Alaimo argues that contrary to popular opinion, women and other marginalized groups
may benefit from more focus on the body, not less. She claims that a new wave of
material feminists, scholars who take seriously social construction while also trying to
understand how the social butts up to the nature of bodies, are rethinking materiality by
considering how the body is not limited to the autonomous borders socially imposed by
modernist thinkers in order to consider new solutions to pressing problems. Alaimo is
arguing that women operate as quasi-objects that are not only both socially and materially
constructed but also co-construct the worlds they live in with other social and material
actors. For Alaimo, the border that separates humans from the world are not as definitive
as the modern Constitution claims. Following the work of feminist scholars such as Julia
Kristeva, she claims that bodies are much more porous.
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New materialist theorists like Alaimo are exploring the interconnectedness, the
co-constitutiveness, and the mis of the world. They are exploring how nonhumans—
plants, dirt, animals, technology, cells, toxins, viruses, etc.—exert force within the world
and interact with humans. What emerges from these various new materialist instantiations
of the world is an understanding of humans as so materially and socially entangled with
the rest of the world that those terms, and the binary between them, no longer seem
relevant. These thinkers demonstrate the ways in which the objects we produce both
affect and are affected by other material bodies in the world. Nothing is an autonomous
individual; rather, everything is always co-created through mis. Alaimo demonstrates this
point by showing how poisons from factories change the chemical composition of human
bodies. In the quest for better industrial cleaners, humans have mutated themselves (15).
Moreover, these same chemicals affect animals and ecosystems, creating more toxic
bodies that are consumed by other animals, dirt, and plants, creating more toxic bodies. In
this situation, no individual actor is simply the active subject nor are any actors merely
passive objects. Instead, everything is quasi-object and quasi-subject. Everything cocreates consequences, and no one individual can escape this intra-active complexity. The
same is true for texts, which are not independently authored by autonomous subjects but
rather are co-created through the intra-active exchanges of human and nonhuman actors.
Moreover, the text is its own actor that helps to co-create the world through it intraaction. In this way, texts exist in a rhetorical ecology in which they are constantly being
co-created by and co-creating the world.
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Ecological Situations and Circulating Texts
For the last thirty years scholars within Composition and Rhetoric have been
developing ecological models of composition to understand how texts both co-produce
meaning and are co-produced by the world. Scholarship in the area has historically been
sparse, but it has grown more rapidly in the last decade. Ecological theories of
composition generally trace their roots back to Marilyn Cooper’s 1986 essay “The
Ecology of Writing,” which argues that writing is not produced by a single solitary
genius author, as the cognitive model of writing had assumed; instead, Cooper claims that
writing occurs across a variety of complicated social systems such as ideas, purposes,
interpersonal interactions, cultural norms, and textual forms (369). Cooper argues that
authors are influenced by these social systems as they navigate them to best fit their
purposes. In her 1999 book The Wealth of Reality, Margaret Syverson argues that though
Cooper’s model is a gesture away from flawed cognitive models and toward more
ecological ones, it is still based on five cognitivist assumptions: 1) Cognition is the
function of individuals, 2) language merely represents thought, 3) thought precedes
language, 4) a group is a gathering of individuals, and 5) composing can be conceptually
separated from the material conditions of its production and consumption. For Syverson,
Cooper’s model still relies too much on individual authors and does not pay attention to
the agency of the material world that helps to compose them, their texts, their contexts,
and their audiences.
Working against Cooper’s cognitive assumptions, Syverson offers an ecological
model of rhetoric that traces the ways in which every aspect of the rhetorical situation—
audience, rhetor, and text—is composed of a multitude of human and non-human actors

58

co-creating activity within a complex system. Unlike Cooper’s model, which focuses
solely on social forces and human actors, Syverson’s complex systems pay attention to
the ways in which a myriad of different human and nonhuman actors interact with each
other physically, socially, psychologically, temporally, and spatially in order to create the
discreet elements within the rhetorical situation; in this model the text, rhetor, and
audience are not single individuals but rather complex amalgams of human and
nonhuman actors. In this understanding, the rhetorical situation writ large is a confluence
of rhetorical elements. The rhetorical situation is as an ecological “metasystem” in which
the complex systems of the text, rhetor, and audience interact with each other to produce
a variety of meanings. Meaning is not the fixed intention of the complex system of the
rhetor, inherent to the system of the text, or dependent on a multiplicity of audience
interpretations; rather, meaning emerges through the interactions of these complex
systems within an ecology.
This ecological model of the rhetorical situation has been extended into the study
of circulation as well. Jenny Edbauer Rice, argues in her 2005 article “Unframing Models
of Public Distribution” that the elemental and atomistic way in which previous scholars
imagined the rhetorical situation does not account for the ways in which rhetoric engages
other situations, histories, spaces, feelings, and lived-experiences. For Rice, rhetoric
cannot be limited to any specific situation, as if every act of persuasion was to begin the
entire rhetorical process anew. Instead, Rice argues that elements of the situation “bleed”
into other situations, publics, and social processes. As an example, Rice tells the history
of the “Keep Austin Weird” slogan that was developed by local businesses to protest the
incentives the city of Austin, Texas was giving to national chain stores. The slogan
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impacted people affectively, and they modified it for other conversations such as pledge
drives, city council meetings, and the marketing of other local businesses. The slogan has
even gone so far as to be appropriated by national chain stores, adopted by other cities,
and parodied by cynical youth. Because of the emotional resonance, social significance,
material brevity, and cultural ubiquity of the slogan as a text, it has bled beyond the
ecology of its rhetorical situation to become a part of the culture writ large, which
increases the ways in which it will be interpreted, used, remixed, and shared. This
example shows that, as circulation increases, the mis increase, as does the meanings.
Laurie Gries’s Still Life With Rhetoric builds on Rice’s work to demonstrate the
ways in which circulation changes the meaning of a text and amplifies its potential
consequences within the public. Building explicitly on new materialist theories from
Bruno Latour, Karen Barad, and Jane Bennett, Gries argues that a circulating image can
change the actors and ecologies with which it interacts while simultaneously being
changed by them as well. Since identities and meanings are not intrinsic to individuals
but rather emerge through the interactions among human and nonhuman actors, the
circulating text both changes the actors it encounters and is changed by them. To
demonstrate how this occurs, Gries abides by a strict method she refers to as
iconographic tracking in which the researcher collects as many instantiations of a given
image as possible, organizes those iterations into categories, conducts more focused
research on each category, and then conducts a close analysis of all the different
communities with which the image has interacted. Gries’s proof of concept is a four-part
case study of Shepard Fairey’s famous Obama Hope image; she investigates how the
image came to change the 2008 election, United States copywrite law, political parody,
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and global activism. Notably, Gries demonstrates how within these larger ecologies
Obama Hope’s circulation also transformed a myriad of smaller ecologies such as
Fairey’s professional reputation in the United States art scene, Occupy Wall Street
protests, and bottled water sales in Ghana.
The transformations that Gries elucidates in her study help to further demonstrate
a Bitzerian model of the rhetorical situation that ignores the nature/culture binary of the
modern Constitution to become an ecological site in which meaning emerges from the
social interactions of material actors. In other words, Gries demonstrates that rhetoric
takes place in the types of new materialist ecologies discussed by Alaimo. A new
materialist public is neither elemental nor static; rather, it is a constant re-assemblage of
beings, forces, and meanings that bleed and circulate into new situations and social
realities. Such publics are continually being reinvented as new actors enter into the
interaction, meaning that the public and its actors are constantly being rearticulated.
Actors are constantly creating new texts and engaging old texts in new ways. Each of
these articulations and rearticulations creates different consequences because each of the
elements exerts slightly different forces and recreates the world in slightly different ways.
Such a complex and perpetual ecology makes the emergence of unintended consequences
inevitable because texts will always both be co-created by other actors and co-create
those actors, generating new meanings and implications through the mis of rhetoric. Of
course, care, diligence, and research can be used to try and mitigate the worst of these
effects because the actions of the rhetor are still forces that act within the public;
however, as we saw in the example of Stokely Carmichael, unintended consequences, be
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they malignant or benign, can emerge from the mis of even the most meticulously crafted
texts.
The unintended consequences that emerge from the co-productive mis of the
public are intensified by the amount of actors involved and the intensity of their actions,
which are in part driven by their beliefs in the message’s ability to create change. The
Black Power movement struck the national consciousness, and actors—including the
BPP, FBI, SCLC and US Organization—acted intensely to force their meanings onto the
slogan because they believed that the text could move the public. Actors cared about
Black Power because of the material realities they believed could emerge from it. This
example demonstrates that the co-productive nature of meaning is less about texts than
about movements and their material repercussions. Rice’s example of “Keep Austin
Weird” was not only about a slogan but also about an economic and cultural movement
to promote local businesses and preserve the culture of the city. Similarly, Gries’s
example of Obama Hope was not only about an image but also about a political
movement to elect the first black president, a liberal who promised change from the
failed policies of the Bush administration. In each of these situations, the texts acted in
the world, and people acted with them in hopes that they could make them act differently
in order to bring about new material realities, publics, and ways of being-in-the-world. In
each of these cases people co-opted and changed texts because they wanted to change the
public in which they circulated. Ultimately, no one rhetor gets to determine the identity of
a public because this identity emerges from the mis of the public itself. A clear example
of how a multitude of forces operating on a group can change its direction in unexpected
ways is the formation and proliferation of the Crips.
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Defining a Multiplicity of Crips
The National Alliance of Gang Investigators labels the Crips a national-level
street gang that allies with prison gangs, neighborhood-based gangs, drug-trafficking
organizations, and Mexican transnational criminal organizations; however, defining Crips
is much more difficult than this because the gang is amorphous with a multitude of
members defining what it means to be Crip in different ways through their daily
practices. According to the United States Department of Justice, Crips have an estimated
30,000 to 35,000 members operating in 221 American cities in 41 states. The National
Gang Intelligence Center claims that Crips have expanded internationally to places
including Bermuda, Canada, Great Britain, and the Netherlands; however, it is uncertain
if these international instantiations of the gang have direct connections to their
counterparts in the United States or if they have merely appropriated the name because of
its extremely violent reputation. Regardless of whether or not these international gangs
are directly connected to those in the United States, it is certain that the Crips have an
international presence due to their participation in drug trading, human trafficking, and
military service. Traditionally, Crips have made the majority of their money through drug
and arms sales, but they have also been involved in crimes such as automobile theft,
falsifying tax documents, identity theft, money laundering, prostitution, and sex
trafficking. While it is difficult to track the exact size of gangs, Crips are commonly
referred to as the second largest street gang in the world, second only to the Bloods. Due
in part to the massive size of the organization, there is no singular Crip identity
The Crips, though often depicted as a unified crime syndicate, are better
understood as “a collection of structured and unstructured gangs that have adopted a
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common gang culture” (Department of Justice). There is no single unified Crip gang but
rather a loose confederation of small neighborhood-based gangs, known as sets, that
identify with the gangster culture of Crip such as wearing blue, C hand signals, tattoos,
Crip Walking, and the use of Crip slogans such as “Can’t Stop, Won’t Stop,” “Crips
don’t die, we multiply,” and “Chitty Chitty Bang Bang, Nothing but a Crip thing.” Some
of these sets are quite large, with international and national connections, including close
ties with Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Other sets are quite small and may be
confined to a single neighborhood. Interestingly, law enforcement agencies report these
smaller neighborhood-based gangs to be more significant threats than their national-level
counterparts in regards to violent crime (FBI). Some of these neighborhood sets have
“legitimate” claims to the Crip gang and were founded by Crips from other sets; some
sets are “copy-cat” gangs that are affiliated with the national organization only in name
and color, but even the use of blue, one of the most distinct Crip attributes, changes from
neighborhood to neighborhood with some sets, such as the Grape Street Crips and the
Hoover Crips, associating with different colors, purple and orange respectively, that
represent their specific neighborhoods.
With all of these different sets enacting the gang differently, the similarities
between Crips become tenuous, especially as the gang continues to grow. According to
the 2015 National Gang Report, Crip membership is currently on the rise, though gang
power is once again concentrating into major metropolitan areas after a brief expansion
into more rural spaces. Metropolitan gangs are often composed predominantly by adults
who have lived in their city for years, whereas rural gangs are often composed of younger
members who are looking for new opportunities outside the city, not all of which are
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necessarily gang related. Many of the Crips sets that are still forming in larger cities
began as non-aligned neighborhood-based gangs that eventually joined with the Crips to
gain protection, connections, and recognition from their alliance with the national gang.
Cooperation among these different Crip sets varies depending on local politics and the
histories of the neighborhoods. In fact, despite sharing an overarching gang culture, Crip
sets often war with each other over resources, territory, and personal feuds. The former
Crip member Sanyika Shakur has claimed that, despite the popular narrative of the Crips
being at war with the Bloods, the most common killer of Crips is other Crips, an assertion
that is verified by reporters such as Michael Krikorian and the gang sociologist Malcolm
Klein (Shakur 19, Krikorian, “Raymond Washington”). Overall, gang loyalty is much
more complicated than a singular devotion to an organization, which can also be seen in
the 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment claims that there is currently a rise in hybrid
gangs whose members claim multiple affiliations and adopt symbols from national level
street gangs such as the Crips without obtaining the kind of membership and support
from the gang that law enforcement would usually expect. As such, what it means to be a
Crip is amorphous—it changes depending on the specific actors and contexts involved.
For this reason, I argue that the Crips are what Michael Warner refers to as a “productive
fiction” in that they are a concept used to understand the relationship between a group of
human actors, most of whom would otherwise lack strong connections to one other.
Being a productive fiction means the Crips are a public; they are a group of
strangers loosely connected by shared culture, interests, movements, practices, texts, and
intertexts but who lack strong bonds and associations. While individual sets may be close
knit, the overarching public is only connected by a Crip culture that is so fluid and
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nebulous that seemingly the only constant is the name. However, even this marker of
identification varies significantly not only from set to set but also from person to person.
Specifically, the origin of the name Crips is a hotly disputed topic. One of the earliest
gang members, Jamel Barnes, claims that the name is a portmanteau of crib and R.I.P
meant to emphasize the lifelong commitment of being in the gang (Sloan).3 Another
prominent gang member, Colton Simpson, claims that the name stands for “Community
Revolutionary Inter-Party Service (125). Yet another former gang member, Sanyika
Shakur, claims that the name stands for Clandestine Revolutionary Internationalist Party
Soldiers (304). An unnamed gang member in the Blaxploitation style documentary War
Stories claims that the name stands for Community Revolution In Progress, while selfproclaimed cofounder of the Crips, Stanley “Tookie” Williams, rejects the acronym
theory altogether, claiming that inebriated gang members merely mis-pronounced the
gang’s original name: the Cribs (xix).4 One time gang member Calvin “Snoop Dogg”
Broadus also claims that the name is a mis-pronunciation of Cribs, claiming that during a
robbery a Korean grocer screamed after two Crib gang members, and a newspaper
reporter who mis-heard the grocer published the gang’s name as Crips (74). Among those
who believe that the name was originally cribs are those who believe that it was a
shortened form of the name baby avenues or avenue cribs, named as on homage to the
gang the Avenues who refused Washington membership into their gang because he was
too young (Fortier 55). There are also those who claim that Cribs was a reference to the
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I use the spelling Jamel Barnes because that is the spelling used in the documentary, though elsewhere the
name is spelled Jimel Barnes.
4
Interestingly, when Stanley Williams claims that the name is not an acronym he cites completely different
names than the ones other gang members mentioned: “It is also fiction that the Crips functioned under the
acronym C.R.I.P., for Community Resource Inner-City Project or Community Revolutionary Inner City
Project. (Words such as “revolutionary agenda” were alien to our thuggish, uninformed teenage
consciousness)” (xix).
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gang being the younger generation of the BPP (“Raymond Washington”). The
documentary Inside Bloods and Crips, claims that the name was always the Crips, a
reference to the canes that members carried early in their formation. Zach Fortier, who
wrote an authorized biography about the Crip’s founder Raymond Washington, claims
that the name was a reference to Washington’s brother Reggie, who walked with a limp
(54).
Which account of the name’s meaning and history a person believes often
depends on the way they understand the gang’s relationship to the rest of the world. From
the cradle to grave emphasizes loyalty. Clandestine Revolutionary Internationalist Party
Soldiers emphasizes the revolutionary possibilities of the group, and Community
Revolution in Progress focuses more on local change. If the gang’s name was originally
an homage to another street gang, then the Crips are direct descendants of Los Angeles’
history of street and car gangs, but if it is a reference to the BPP, they are the descendants
of revolutionaries. If the name is a reference to the cane, then style is their defining
attribute, but if it’s a reference to Reggie, then the gang in rooted in familial connections.
Because there is no official record of the gang’s formation, all of these explanations are
simultaneously both valid and invalid. There is no Crip identity, just identities; there is no
history, just histories. But this is not to say that every history is equal. For instance, it is
fairly doubtful that Raymond Washington walked around his neighborhood carrying a
bassinet; however, when there is witness testimony for each of these identities and
histories, how can anyone determine which is true? In the case of the Crips, all of the
histories are true because each different account bears witness to a manifestation of a
multiple public that was created not by a single actor but rather by the mis of a public.
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The identity of the public emerges from this exchange. Still, there are some aspects of the
Crip’s history that are generally agreed upon, and it is vital to understand them in order to
understand how the Crips emerged from the exchange of texts within the public sphere
and how they participated in creating new texts that changed not only their specific public
but also the public sphere writ large.

The Histories and Influences of the Crips
This history of the Crips is a case study in how a variety of actors, likely misunderstanding the BPP, composed their own movement that was, and continues to be,
mis-read by the larger culture in ways that have re-articulated both the gang and the
larger public sphere of which it is a part. By most reports, the Crips were founded by
Raymond Washington on the East Side of South Central Los Angeles in 1969. These
accounts claim that the Crips expanded their territory the same way street and park gangs
in Los Angeles traditionally had, through forcefully acquiring other gangs in ritual fist
fighting in which the losing party’s gang would be subsumed by the victor’s. Raymond
Washington was allegedly so skilled in hand-to-hand combat that he never lost one of
these contests. If a rival gang leader refused to bet his power on a fight, then Washington
and his gang would deride, harass, injure and mock him until the reluctant leader would
either acquiesce to the fight or his demoralized followers would abandon him. As the
Crips acquired more gangs and gang members, they became more powerful, which
allowed them to acquire even more territory and influence. In 1971 the Crips merged
with gangs associated with Stanley Williams on the West Side of South Central, making
them the largest unified gang in the area. Williams, who is regularly criticized for
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referring to himself as the cofounder of the Crips despite him joining two years after it
was already established, claims that the first meeting after the merger was “the largest
body of black pariahs ever assembled,” but the gang was still small enough to be able to
gather at the bleachers of Washington High School where he was enrolled (89).
According to Williams, the goal of the merger was to “commence an urban cleansing of
the gang element” (87). Other reports claim that the formation was even more benevolent
and modeled on the BPP in their devotion to protecting the Black community (“Raymond
Washington”). The memoirs of Sanyika Shakur and Colton Simpson even go so far as to
discuss an upper tier of the Crip gang called the Blue Note Crips who, even after the gang
became an explicit criminal organization, were still dedicated to the cause of protecting
and liberating the Black community in the style of the Black Power movement. However,
there are many reports from people who lived in the area that the gang was never about
community protection; critics claim that outside gangs were only kept out of Crip
neighborhoods so that the gang would be free to terrorize residents without repercussions.
Lorriee Griffin Moss, who lived next door to Washington, claims, “Raymond was a
bully. A muscular bully. He wouldn’t let anybody from outside our neighborhood bother
us. He would bother us” (Krikorian). In this way, from the origins of the gang, their
intentions have been nebulous and open to interpretation. What is certain, however, is
that the Crips became larger than any previous Los Angeles gang, and their rapid growth
changed gang practices in the area.
The rise of the Crips changed the nature of gangs, which is clearly seen in the
founding of the Bloods. According to most histories, the Crips’ traditional rivals, the
Bloods, were founded as an alliance of smaller street gangs who refused to submit to the
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power of the Crips. While there are several stories explaining who started this alliance
and how they did it, accounts agree that the gang was initially founded in an agreement
between three neighborhood gangs: The Bishops, Athens Park, and Piru Street. Perhaps
the most interesting origin story claims that the leader of the 92 Bishops, Bobby
Lavender, escaped from a mob of 300 Crips by hiding on his mother’s roof. While on the
roof, Lavender turned to a friend and said, “When we get down off this roof, we’ll never
hide from them again” (Sloan). Another account, from an interview Lavender gave to a
local news station in 1988, claims that he started the Bloods after his friend Skip was shot
in the neck while walking down Bandera Street in Los Angeles. A third account claims
that the leaders of the Piru Street Boys, Sylvester Scott and Vincent Owens, began
offering other gangs protection from the Crips after Robert Ballou was beaten to death in
1972 outside of the Hollywood Palladium for refusing to relinquish his leather jacket to a
group of Crips. While each of these three origin stories is different, they all demonstrate
that only a year after the merger of Washington’s Crips and Williams’s gang, the Crips
were a large and violent enough force within South Central Los Angeles that members of
other gangs believed they needed to unite in order to protect themselves against them.
Robert Ballou’s heinous murder, and the fact that he was killed over something as
trivial as a leather jacket, propelled the Crips into the national spotlight. As they gained
infamy, they also amassed territory, and different sets began to develop their own unique
practices that differentiated them from the gang as a whole. Some of the clearest
examples of these differences can be seen in sets’ different initiation rituals. Some early
gang members, such as Sanyika Shakur, tell stories about having to prove themselves
tough enough to be in the gang by being beaten and having to murder members of rival
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gangs; Shakur claims he was only eleven when this happened to him (8-11). Colton
Simpson tells a very similar story, but claims he was only ten when it happened to him
(20). Other gang members, such as Calvin Broadus, claim that entering the Crips was
easy: “There was nothing secret or special about it. . . . Shit, they want you in. There’s
strength in numbers” (76). Broadus admits that he was asked to fight his friend Blue as a
sort of initiation, but he claims that the boxing match was much more playful than it was
dangerous. Other initiations seem non-existent, with membership being based simply on
birthplace. For instance, the Crip Caddy claims, “I didn’t get jumped into this. I grew up
in this. My mom grew up in my neighborhood. My dad from my neighborhood. All my
uncles from my neighborhood. So I don’t look at it as no gang thing, it’s just family”
(Bloods and Crips Made in America). But not all gang members join because they have
been raised by the gang. Shakur claims to have joined the militant Eight Tray Gangster
Crips in 1973 because he thought the older gangsters were cool, and he wanted to be like
them. Broadus joined the financially minded Rolling Twenty Crips in 1987 because he
wanted to make money selling drugs, which had become a prominent Crip practice by the
1980s. The Crip Bandana, on the other hand, intimates that he joined the Crips in the
early 2000s out of feelings of obligation: “When he hooks up with his crew, they feed
him, they’re looking out for him, putting clothes on his back, okay. But now it’s time to
get in his car and go get these niggers who just shot up my house. What you going to do?
You obligated to do; that man just fed you” (Bloods and Crips Made in America). In this
way, both the reasons for joining the gang and the initiation into it are various because
they are co-created by the individuals, the set, the neighborhood, the time period, and
other contextual factors. Nonetheless, it appears that some of the more infamous initiation
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stories like cutting a stranger so that they require 150 stiches or driving with headlights
off and killing the first person to flick theirs as a reminder are more urban myth than
reality.
There are many urban myths about the Crips, but they make up only a small
portion of the ways in which the gang has influenced culture in the United States and
beyond. By the 1990s gangster rap albums, movies about inner-city gang violence, and
gangster memoirs that explicitly mentioned the Crips were extremely popular and
profitable. Rappers such as Dead Prez and Bobby Shmurda still rap about being Crip and
their Crip heroes. More exploitatively, companies such as L.A. Gang Tours continue to
profit by taking tourists to the places sensationalized by albums, movies, and memoirs.
Mainstream United States society wants to see the material spaces of the Crips, which
have been marked and changed by the gang. They want to see the churches where bodies
were pushed out of caskets to be shot again. They want to see the crack houses where
overzealous police officers handcuffed scores of people and identified them permanently
as gangsters. They want to see where the drive-by shootings occurred. Conversely, these
tourists also want to see the spaces that helped to create the gang because they know that
the spaces influenced the gang as much as the gang influenced the spaces. Specifically,
Stanley Williams discusses how the cruelty of the ghetto, in particular the abuse of
animals—including dog fighting and racing enkindled pigeons—influenced his cruel and
selfish worldview (15).
But it is not just the material conditions of these spaces that influenced the
formation of the Crips, the gang was also shaped by the larger media culture. The movie
Superfly, the novels of Iceberg Slim, and the music of James Brown are regularly cited as
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helping Crip’s understand who they were within the United States culture and who they
wanted to be. Superfly in particular is credited with popularizing the idea of individualism
over BPP style community involvement (Sloan). Similarly, Iceberg Slim’s glorification
of crime and misogyny were influential to rappers such as Ice-T and Ice Cube who
named themselves after the famous pimp (Sloan). Even a song as popular as James
Brown’s “The Payback” played a part in Crip culture as the unofficial gang anthem
because Stanley Williams would listen to it before leaving his house on any gang related
activities (Shakur 249, Williams 186). It is hard to overstate the significance these media
are given in gangster memoirs and documentaries; these depictions of Black life
influenced how young Black men saw the world in the same way that the Kerner Report
claimed that the riots of 1968 were in part influenced by white affluence being “flaunted
before the eyes of . . . the jobless ghetto youth” by way of the television screen (National
Advisory). Media influenced how the Crip founders understood themselves and how they
helped to co-create the world.
The relationship between popular culture and the Crips is a complex feedback
loop that demonstrates how people interact with the publics of which they are a part and
create new meanings by combining different facets of life and culture in ways that are
much less linear than indicated by the term loop. For example, the themes of
individualism, gangsterism, and the Romantic criminal that mark both Superfly and the
work of Iceberg Slim are recreated in gangster films such as Boyz n the Hood, Juice, and
Menace II Society. Meanwhile gangster rap artists such as Snoop Dogg were utilizing
popular aspects of funk music—heavy bass lines, sexually explicit lyrics, the radio DJ
interlude—in the creation of their rap albums. In these examples, the Crips act as a filter
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through which popular media enters and influences the gang’s culture before being
recreated by the gang and recirculated back into popular culture. As the objects of the
mass culture enter into the public, these artifacts are remixed, remade, and represented by
other forces such as movie directors and album producers, meaning that Crip culture is
also being influenced by people outside of it. Cultures, both Crip and mainstream, are
being created through the exchanging mis of the public with various actors making texts,
making meaning, and moving the public in various ways. As individuals associated with
the Crips such as Raymond Washington, Stanley Williams, and Calvin Broadus were cocreating what it meant to be Crip through their exchanges both with each other and those
outside the publics such as the LAPD, James Brown, Ice-burg Slim, and Alprentice
“Bunchy” Carter, so too were the Crips as a collective participating in the mis of the
mainstream public through music, movies, and news reports. In both these ways, the
Crips were co-creating the public, and perhaps one of the least obvious but most poignant
ways they were doing so was through the gangster memoir.

Crip Memoirs as Idealist Public Texts
While the outlaw narrative has long been a staple of American culture, the
gangster memoir gained new prominence in the first decade of the twenty-first century as
Crip members began to write prison memoirs about their growth from cynical delinquents
to idealist leaders prepared to re-create the world. Three of the most popular such
memoirs are: Blue Rage, Black Redemption by Stanley “Tookie” Williams, Monster by
Sanyika “Monster Kody Scott” Shakur, and Inside the Crips by Colton “Lil’ Cee Loc”
Simpson. While each of these narratives responds to a unique exigence—Williams is
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trying to demonstrate his redemption in hopes of being spared execution, Shakur is in
solitary confinement for his crimes and wants to demonstrate the ways in which
impoverished environments create violence, and Simpson was convinced to tell his story
by his coauthor despite his book later being used as evidence against him in criminal
court—they follow a similar idealist narrative arch that moves from a poor upbringing to
criminality, incarceration, and finally a type of idealized enlightenment that the authors
commonly refer to as redemption. Josephine Metcalf, in her book The Culture and
Politics of Contemporary Street Gang Memoirs, argues that the conversion trajectory of
the narrative has long had a place in American literature, and she claims that it is
particularly common in the stories of subjugated people, especially Black Americans.
Metcalf claims that redemption stories, from the slave narrative to the prison narrative,
allow the author to assert the individual identity that made them strong enough to
overcome their circumstances while simultaneously addressing the sociopolitical issues
that face their community. For this reason, the memoir has often been an effective way of
persuading the American public toward social change. Within this tradition, Crip gang
memoirs most closely follow the examples of revolutionary black prison narratives such
as those written by James Carr, Eldridge Cleaver, George Jackson, Huey P. Newton, and
most influentially, Malcolm X. All of these narratives begin with the illicit escapades of a
young man and then follow him into prison and solitary confinement, where he converts
to a more socially conscious and just way of being that focuses on racial awareness (47).
It is not surprising that racial awareness is described as blossoming in the
California prison system where prisoners face de facto segregation in an environment that
constitutes a perpetual race war punctuated by small stretches of uneasy peace. While
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separating prisoners by race is not an official policy of the prison system, it is widely
documented in gangster memoirs as well as documentaries and news reports that
prisoners are organized into four overarching race-based gangs: Blacks, Norteños,
Sureños, and whites. Much like the Crips themselves, these gangs can be seen both from
a broader perspective and a more specific one. For example, The Norteños, who are
predominantly Mexicans from the northern part of California, ally themselves with the
Blacks; the Sureños, who are predominantly Mexicans from southern California, ally
themselves with the whites. Looked at from this perspective, the entire California prison
system is organized as two large gangs. Conversely, each race-based gang is composed of
a variety of smaller gangs. The Blacks are predominantly composed of Crips, Bloods, and
Black Guerilla Family; Norteños are mostly composed of Nuestra Familia but include
other Hispanic gangs from north of Bakersfield; the Sureños are mostly composed of the
Mexican Mafia, otherwise known as La eMe, but also include other Hispanic gangs from
south of Bakersfield; and finally, the whites are composed of mostly white supremacist
gangs such as the Aryan Brotherhood, Nazi Lowriders, and the Dirty White Boys. Seen
from this perspective, the California prison system is composed of many gangs, and this
can be further complicated by noting that these gangs, like the Crips, are broken into a
variety of sets. Because of the complexity of allegiances, prison makes salient the racial
divides in the United States while also demonstrating how a lack of racial consciousness
can be detrimental. As an anonymous Nazi Low Rider told reporters, “When there’s a
war, there’s a war. . . . You’re a target just because of the color of your skin, so you might
as well. You’re going to have to defend yourself. The lines get divided. You’ve gotta take
sides. . . . It’s definitely racist. . . . Prison made me this way” (Sullivan). Forming such a
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race-based defense, however, requires that sets and gangs overcome their internal
divisions, which is difficult. As Sanyika Shakur argues, “tribalism,” attacking other
members of one’s own racial gang because of inter-gang or set conflicts, often prevented
Black prisoners from organizing against more powerful and organized forces (207). In
this way, the material reality of the California prison system seems to engender a new
kind of racial awareness in prisoners that makes the other movements and organizations
of which they are a part less important, and this change is definitely true for the writers of
gangster memoirs. Previously, the authors claim not to have thought much about race
because they were much more interested in being Crips, but in prison, the topic becomes
unavoidable: they not only become racially aware, but they want to actively work to
bring about a more equitable future for Black people.
Besides functioning as a necessity of surviving the prison system, in the memoirs,
burgeoning racial consciousness is encouraged by mentors such as prison imams and
older gang members. For Shakur, Simpson, and Williams, this education teaches them the
extent of Black subjugation throughout the history of the United States, and it influences
them to work toward justice against oppressive white power structures. However,
education does not have this effect on everyone mentioned in the books. Shakur tells a
particularly disturbing story in which a prisoner named Fat Rat reads a book on slavery,
and then uses this information to break prison bitches by beating, degrading, and raping
them (293). Despite such violent possibilities, the protagonists of the memoirs are able
use their education to change who they are for the better. For Simpson and Shakur
specifically, education gives them a new found sense of what it means not only to be
Black but also what it means to be a Crip. It is at this point in their respective books that
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both these men learn about the revolutionary history of the Crips—their relationship to
the BPP and the elusive Blue Note Crips still working for revolutionary change in
America. Not surprisingly, both men are initially suspicious that the gang could mean
anything more than violence and crime, but through learning Kiswahili and participating
in ritual chants that recite an idealized Crip history, they come to think about the gang as
not only having a revolutionary past but also as having a possible revolutionary future
that they can help to make manifest. The writers believe that they can, like idealists, play
their part in moving the public in a specific way.
While the racial dynamics of the prison, along with mentors and education, help
to bring about enlightenment in these memoirs, the most important space of the
conversion process in each memoir is solitary confinement. In this space, the author is
forced into deep introspection and finds something he can equate with a more authentic
self; further, through surviving the psychological torment of solitary confinement, the
author demonstrates that he is too strong to be broken by his material conditions. Perhaps
the clearest articulation of the change associated with solitary confinement in the
revolutionary literature is the story of when Huey P. Newton was forced into “the soul
breaker.” In this isolated space, Newton chose to meditate and focus on his memories for
psychological strength, while limiting his water and food intake so that he did not have to
soil the small room in which he is trapped (39-42). In his memoirs, Williams teaches
himself languages, philosophy, and history while maintaining a strict fitness regimen to
stay sane; through maintaining this routine, he claims to come to a deeper understanding
of his value as an individual and the value of Black Americans as a people. Similarly,
Shakur comes to admire Black revolutionaries, deciding that the only way for there to be
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real justice for “Afrikaans” is for them to separate from the Americans and the “Toms.”
Simpson comes to a less radical sense of Black pride, but when he tries to describe it to
his friends, he is accused of “sounding white” and being prideful, which makes it difficult
for him to understand where a newly educated Black man belongs in the world (284).
This is a particularly relevant question because the Secure Housing Unit [SHU] cells
where each of these authors were isolated are, by design, apart from the world, not a part
of it.
The official purpose of SHU is “to monitor, to control, [and] to isolate” the most
violent prisoners in order to tamp down the gang problem in the rest of the prison;
however, being moved to solitary has become a badge of honor for many gang members,
so it no longer works as a deterrent (Sullivan). Despite the reputational draw of the SHU,
the small confined living space where prisoners spend 22 ½ hours of their day is not a
pleasant experience. Many prisoners experience severe anger, anxiety, depression, and
psychosis from prolonged confinement in these isolating spaces, and some experts
consider their use a form of torture (Office of the Inspector General 16). In each of the
memoirs, the writers were meant to be broken and made more submissive through their
time in solitary confinement, but instead, they became more radical, intelligent, and
determined. This is by no means the effect solitary has on most prisoners, and the
narratives are not meant to justify the practice of isolation but rather to demonstrate the
individual’s strength and by extension, the strength of those among the readership who
identify with them. The SHU cell is the place where the writer is cut off from the
circulation of texts and forced to determine meaning for himself in a psychologically
traumatic space that is different from all other experiences in that it is uniquely his.
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Though he still co-participates in this space with actors such as the walls, the guards who
slide him his food, morality, power, and the police state, there are far less actors to
directly engage with in this space than in most other situations and publics. Similarly,
those actors that he remembers such as family, friends, movies, music, and the gang itself
have less immediate force in this place. In short, there is less mis to this public, which
provides the prisoner the opportunity to take more responsibility in their creation of
meaning as they consider the outside world of which they were a part and of which they
may be a part again.
Indicative of this ability to create meaning with other texts is the education each
author receives while in prison. Though all the memoir writers received similar
educations in prison, they do not come to the same political conclusions. Just like Fat Rat
turned the book on slavery into an instruction guide on how to break a prison bitch rather
than to understand the historic oppression of his ancestors, so too are all texts malleable
to the users, settings, and situations within which they find themselves. Similarly, the
Crips, as a movement, were intended to be a force for radical community change in the
style of the BPP, but they quickly became a destructive force that destroyed black lives
and gave the LAPD a way to vindicate their increasingly aggressive policies toward
inner-city neighborhoods. Regardless of intentions, the drugs, violence, money, etc. of
the gang world changed the Crips into what they are today. Similarly, the BPP’s
intentions did not create the public for which they hoped. Through being dismantled and
destroyed by the FBI, the BPP helped to influence a culture of gang violence that
terrorized black neighborhoods. The BPP of course is not to blame for gang violence, but
their idealist intentions, despite being meticulously crafted, were mis-understood and
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mis-handled by the mis of the public sphere, though some gangster have come to misread this relationship in more productive ways, as seen in the memoirs.

The Malleable Text and the Malleable Public
The lineage between the Black Power movement and the Crips demonstrates how
the mis of rhetoric, the co-productive way in which meaning emerges from the
interactions between a variety of human and nonhuman actors, changes not only how
texts mean but also in so doing changes how publics understand themselves. This change
is particularly relevant for idealists such as those associated with the Black Power
movement. The movement hoped to make the public more equitable and just, and it
created a variety of texts in order to do this. They created traditional texts such as books,
newspapers, plans, and speeches and more embodied texts such as organizations and
protests. Of course, not every Black Power organization imagined their goals the same
way or had the same tactics; they debated fervently over these issues as well as what the
term meant and what worlds they wanted to create with it. In this way Black Power was
being co-created through mis. Seeing the power of these various messages, the FBI and
other groups attempted to make them mean something completely different not only by
arguing against Black Power in the media but also my dismantling organizations and
turning them against one another.
Perhaps one of the greatest changes to the understanding of Black Power was the
rise of the Crips, who did not engage with the slogan or idea directly but justified
themselves, at least in part, through their association with the revolutionary BPP. This
conflation, though a departure from the BPPs ideals, was not unprecedented. As George
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Barganier argues in his dissertation Fanon’s Children, “Black nationalists of the Black
Power era often viewed Black criminality as an essential component of Black political
consciousness” and though most Black youth have neither been in a gang nor in a radical
political group, “the historical relationship between the two social collectives illuminates
a fundamental aspect of Black consciousness (1). The co-productive relationship between
the revolutionary movement and the gang element existed from the beginning and cocreated what revolution meant in that moment. This connection can most clearly be seen
in the claims that Raymond Washington started the Crips as an anti-gang gang that
would make his neighborhood safer. However, an anti-gang gang is still a gang, and by
the mid-1980s, through the co-creative that defines a public through intra-action, the
criminal aspect of the group seems to have taken over, defining not only a radial criminal
public within Los Angeles but also, in its way, a new interpretation of Black Power. The
memoirs of gang members reflecting on their own histories as well as their engagements
with the ideas of the 1960s and 1970s revolutionaries demonstrate the ways in which the
Crips helped to co-produce Black consciousness, though of course they weren’t the only
ones. A myriad of actors—from African-American studies professors, to community
organizers, to school teachers, etc.—were co-participating in this conversation about
Black Power as a text, a movement, and a potential world.
As Black Power influenced the Crips, so too did the rise of Crip culture, in its
various manifestations, influence American culture writ large as people engaged with the
cultural products both being created by Crips and about them. Crips influenced music,
movies, and literature in significant ways, while also co-creating what it meant to be a
Crip as well as the gang’s significance and its history. In this way, the gang demonstrates
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that the mis of rhetoric means not only that texts are malleable but also the networks in
which they exist are malleable. The texts of the gang are only as mis-understood and misspoken as the gang itself. A gang is maintained through its history, embodied practices,
and collected symbols, but all of these things are understood and enacted differently by
different sets for different reasons. What it means to be Crip is different for each Crip.
The Crip experiences of Stanley Williams, Sanyika Shakur, and Colton Simpson
are all markedly the same and markedly different, and their memoirs demonstrate the
different ways they believe Crip both has changed society for the worse and can be used
to change society for the better. However, these articulations run into the same problems
as other idealist texts. No matter how meticulously and convincingly the rhetors argue for
their understanding of the gang, they will always be mis-read and mis-understood
because meaning is not up to the individual—it emerges through the intra-actions of a
multitude of actors. No matter how much rhetors prepare their texts, they always risk
being mis-understood and creating unexpected realities. Perhaps there is no clearer
example of this in the memoirs than in Colton Simpson’s own redemption narrative being
used to convict him in a criminal trial. Still, the problem of mis is not exclusive to texts
because meanings effect entire rhetorical ecologies in ways that change publics, societies,
and material worlds as well. As a text is rearticulated by the world so too does it, with all
of its multiple meanings, rearticulate the world. Mis is a constant risk for both the rhetor
and the world.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RISKS OF ACTIVISM: GAMERGATE HARASSMENTS AND THE
ALT-RIGHT SPHERE PUBLIC
One of the most concerning risks associated with the public sphere is the
possibility of harassment. By entering into interactions with strangers, an actor becomes
vulnerable to transgressions both miniscule and great. In her 1995 book Passing By:
Gender and Public Harassment Carol Brooks Gardner famously defined harassment as
the “group of abuses, harryings, and annoyances characteristic of public places and
uniquely facilitated by communication in public . . . harassments include pinching,
slapping, hitting, shouted remarks, vulgarity, insults, sly innuendo, ogling and stalking”
(4). Primarily, these violences are perpetrated by men onto women because, as Gardner
explains, women are undervalued and seen as less deserving of respect. For this same
reason, people of color, members of the LGBTQAI community, and the poor are also
more likely to be harassed in the United States than cisgender white men, though,
ultimately, it is possible for anyone to be targeted for harassment. According to Gardner,
harassment often serves to silence people and perhaps even punish them for entering the
public. Though the purpose of any individual act of harassment is idiosyncratic, multiple,
and complex, all harassments work to demonstrate that the harassed is not as strong,
valuable, or intrinsically worthy as the harasser. Harassment enacts a social order in
which the harasser, and to a lesser extent all of those who are able to go about their world
un-harassed, are seen as more deserving of respect than the harassed. These aggressive
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signs of disrespect that lower the status of an individual often discourage the harassed
from entering the public sphere altogether or encourage them to modify the ways they
behave when they do decide to act publicly. Gardner argues that these ways of
responding to harassment create “both a gulf between private and public realms and a
gulf between the individual’s private and public selves” (11). In this way, harassment
threatens the entire public by limiting both the diversity of actors and the diversity of
opinions that circulate within it.
Activists vantages are perhaps more vulnerable to the risk of harassment than
idealist or materialist perspectives because people operating from this position are
actively advocating for specific changes to the public sphere, and as agents of change,
they are apt to encounter those adverse results that are often referred to as blowback.
Unlike idealist scholars who are trying to define the perfect public so that they can
develop strategies to achieve it, activist scholars study the tactics political actors use to
negotiate the worlds in which they live in an attempt to understand not only the
effectiveness of such actions but also their implications. In other words, activist scholars
are distinctly less teleological than their idealist counterparts in that they focus on how
publics are changed rather than the ideal they believe the public should change into. This
orientation does not mean that activist scholars do not have their own political
commitments and desires that influence their work—in fact many scholars working from
this vantage are proud of their political activism and the ways that it informs their
interests, subjects, methods, and conclusions—however, the political orientation of
activist scholarship leads these scholars to study how politics are enacted rather than what
politics should be ideally. Despite the lack of teleology, these scholars are attuned to the

85

effects of rhetorical practices, including the responses to them. One of the primary
concerns of these studies is whether or not the type of political discourses being observed
either are harassment or are being met with harassment. The goal of the activist scholar is
often to find means for discussion that are both effective and equitable when the
disenfranchised are fighting the powerful for their rights, so they are keenly aware of
harassment.
Erin Rand’s 2013 article “‘What One Voice Can Do’” clearly demonstrates the
kind of tactics-based studies that emerge from the political orientation associated with
activist scholarship. This article examines the ways in which the LGBT activist training
event Camp Courage utilizes storytelling, chanting, and applause to build community.
Rand argues that such choric communicative practices—that is rhetorics that are
communally synchronous, rhythmic, and embodied—not only build community among
disparate actors without assuming a common identity but also demonstrate the
indivisibility between rhetoric and performance (29). By participating in community
story-telling, chanting, call and response exercises, and applauding, Camp Courage
attendees establish a community while maintaining members’ sense of individuality and
idiosyncrasy. These exercises are not intended to persuade participants to think the same
way but rather to create solidarity through affective performance; the practices create
embodied collectives rather than abstract unities. Rand explains that in the context of
Camp Courage, choric activities are meant to teach participants how to build their own
collectives in their own neighborhoods while also reminding them that they are part of a
larger support system intended to help members navigate the risks associated with
advocating for the LGBT community (45). In this way, Camp Courage’s exercises not
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only create social bonds without harassment but also help to mitigate future harassments,
or at the very least, provide succor for the pain such harassments may cause. Rand is
ultimately very positive about these exercises and their capacity to create community
while respecting individuality because she, like most activist scholars, is invested in
finding effective rhetorical tactics for creating social and political change without the
need to conform to a singular position. Activist scholars generally hope to enable
diversity by advocating for tactics of public communication that enable a multiplicity of
actors to co-produce the world collectively.
Of course, such choric practices are not completely unproblematic, and Rand
critiques the ways in which Camp Courage ignores the conflictual histories between labor
movements, civil rights movements, and the LGBT community. Understanding these
types of problems is particularly important given how rhetorical practices—especially
using contemporary, digitally connected media—can either be used to build alliances or
destroy diversity. In general, the internet allows for a myriad of cruelties that we not
possible only a few decades ago. Activists in the twenty-first-century United States
public sphere risk not only the traditional physical and political blowback associated with
upsetting the dominant public but also a diverse array of online harassments that can best
be understood through the complex public debacle know as Gamergate, in which
members of the alt-right viciously harassed feminist media critics and video game
designers who they felt were threatening the masculine ethos of the video game
community. I use Gamergate as a way to understand the ways in which the alt-right tries
to use harassment—violent manipulation of publicness’s sociality—in order not only to
create their ideal public but also to make their public the dominant one. Ideally, the alt-
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right wants to replace the contemporary public sphere—which is better understood as
multiple sphere publics intra-acting with each other—with a monolithic public composed
of predominantly cisgender white men who argue with each other based on a common set
of assumptions. Such a public would accept a diversity of identities and thoughts, but
only within a very narrow scope; everyone else would be annexed to the private sphere.
Not surprisingly, those the alt-right wants to relegate from the public are the same people
who have traditionally been barred from participating in it: foreigners, minorities, the
poor, radicals, queers, and women. To help manifest their ideal public sphere, the altright often acts as a vicious audience whenever a representative of these groups critiques
their assumptions, values, and worldviews. Because of the digitally connected nature of
the contemporary public sphere, the alt-right has a diverse array of harassment tactics at
their disposal.

Gamergate and the Harassments of Anita Sarkeesian and Zoe Quinn
The well-publicized harassment of Anita Sarkeesian during the height of the
misogynistic video game controversy commonly referred to as Gamergate is a clear
example of the ways in which seemingly innocuous arguments within the public sphere
can garner harassment from unexpected forces. Sarkeesian’s story is particularly
illustrative of the ways in which activists risk harassment because, though her arguments
were well researched, expertly crafted, and generally inoffensive, Sarkeesian was met
with particularly hateful, sexist, and violent types of harassment. Leigh Gruwell argues
that this case is particularly relevant for compositionists because:
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In many ways, Sarkeesian has done exactly what digital compositionists have
argued students should be doing in composition classes: through critical,
rhetorical engagement with the affordances of new media, she created and
circulated compelling arguments for public audiences.
Despite the quality of her video series “Tropes vs Women in Video Games”—the first of
which explains the project by claiming, “This series will include critical analysis of many
beloved games and characters, but remember that it is both possible (and even necessary)
to simultaneously enjoy media while also being critical of its more problematic or
pernicious aspects”—Sarkeesian was subject to extreme forms of harassment, coming
from a group of gamers and internet personalities who would later be identified as part of
the alt-right movement.
To understand the harassment Sarkeesian faced, it is important to understand the
history of her videos before examining some of the responses they garnered. According
to the “About” page of Sarkeesian’s educational not-for-profit website, Feminist
Frequency, the media studies organization began in 2009 when “Sarkeesian borrowed a
camera and some lights, tacked a piece of fabric up on her living room wall, and started
making videos examining pop culture from a feminist perspective.” Sarkeesian did not
become a prominent public figure, however, until her 2012 Kickstarter campaign to raise
funds to continue her research and produce more videos raised $158,922 from almost
seven thousand individual backers. As Sarkeesian’s success grew, she also began to
receive a flood of online harassment by video gamers who claimed she was both
misrepresenting and attacking the games they loved in her attempt to get rich through
internet fundraising. In July of 2012, a member of the entertainment and social media
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website NewGrounds.com went so far as to upload a simple flash game in which players
were invited to punch an image of Sarkeesian’s face that would became increasingly
battered and swollen with each strike (Sterling). Two years later, in August of 2014,
Sarkeesian received death threats that were so specific that she contacted police and had
to evacuate her house (Robertson). In October of that same year, Sarkeesian had to cancel
a speaking engagement at Utah State University because the school refused to take steps
to guarantee her safety after an alleged student sent an email to several school staffers
threatening, “the deadliest school shooting in American history,” in response to her visit
(Ahmed and Marco).
And while the events of the previous paragraph highlight the severity of
Sarkeesian’s harassment, they do not represent the continual onslaught of degrading,
derisive, and violent comments she was receiving on social media; this constant barrage
is illustrated in a Tumblr post where Sarkeesian displays a week’s worth of “hateful”
Tweets that were sent to her @femfrequency account between January 20, 2015 and
January 26, 2015. In total there are 157 tweets. I have pulled a few exemplary ones from
the list, but they are by no means the worst:
•

@femfreq Everyone knows, you’re a liar, a con, an attention whore, a
femenazi (not a feminist), a sexist pig. an all-round joke. get real.

•

@GamingMattersUS @femfreq “harassing” will continue and accelerate.
We’re not going to stop until no one will openly admit to being feminist

•

@fremfreq I WANT TO FUCKING STAB YOUR STUPID FUCKING
UGLY SHAPED FACE YOU FEMINIST CUNT, KILL YOURSELF,
NO ONE WILL CARE BITCH
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•

im going to come to your house and violently rape you in front of your
family @femfreq

The hateful and violent responses Sarkeesian received to her videos are indicative of how
severe public harassment can be. While it is expected that her arguments would invite
responses from other critics, video gamers, and perhaps those in the video game
industry—and it should be noted that representatives of each of these groups have created
counterargument videos on YouTube that explain their positions while generally also
accusing Sarkeesian of being an ideologue who evidences her biased arguments with
“cherry-picked” and unrepresentative data—these types of reasoned responses, even
when they are laden with the typical snark and condescension that have become typical of
internet culture, are not the problem. Disagreement is not harassment.
Some prominent alt-right critics—such as Sargon of Akkad, Milo Yiannapoulos,
and the Internet Aristocrat—attempt to dismiss claims of harassment by asserting that the
harassed are over reacting due to their inability to cope with disagreement, but this
position only serves to further disrespect the victims and position them as weak and
unworthy of respect by downplaying the severity of the harassment they are suffering.
These critics want to position misogynistic, threatening, and violent discourse as
normal—as the kind of thing with which they could easily cope. Many of these critics
claimed that if Sarkeesian cannot put up with being harassed, then she has no right to
participate within the public sphere. However, harassment is explicitly meant to silence
opinions by frightening and devaluing those who espouse them. By claiming that such
conduct is normal, these critics exacerbate the problem, creating a cycle in which the
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victim is harassed, leading to more criticism, leading to more harassment, etc. This cycle
is not a productive discourse, but it is a common part of the contemporary public sphere.
Even public actors who do not enter into the political fray may face harassment. A
2014 Pew Internet study found that 40% of internet users have faced harassment online,
and research conducted by the advocacy group Stop Street Harassment suggests that 65%
of women and 25% of men have experienced harassment in a non-digital public space
(Duggan, Kearl). Most of the men who reported being harassed identified themselves as
queer, and among women who reported harassment, most were women of color. Clearly,
embodied realities effect the likelihood of an actor being harassed, and this is even true
online. According the Pew study, men were more likely to be called offensive names and
purposefully embarrassed in online environments, whereas women were more likely to be
stalked or sexually harassed. Young people between ages 18-24 by far experienced the
most online harassment with men and women reporting at about the same rates in all the
different categories, except stalking and sexual harassment, which were overwhelmingly
experienced more frequently by young women. Unsurprisingly, those who were stalked,
sexually harassed, and underwent sustained harassment felt more traumatized than those
who were called offensive names or purposefully embarrassed. Thus, the report seems to
indicate that though men are more likely than women to experience harassment online,
the harassment experienced by women is likely to be more severe—especially if the
harassed is a young adult.
An example of unexpected harassment befalling an unsuspecting young woman
can be seen in the story of the Gamergate victim Zoe Quinn. Though she was not a critic
like Sarkeesian, at least not prior to Gamergate, Quinn could be seen as an activist in her
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own right in that her game Depression Quest was designed “to illustrate as clearly as
possible what depression is like . . . [in order to] spread awareness and fight against the
social stigma and misunderstandings that depression sufferers face . . . [while also
hoping that through playing] sufferers will come to know that they aren’t alone, and
hopefully derive some measure of comfort from that.” Nonetheless, Quinn was not
actively involved in discussions about gamer culture; instead, Quinn was dragged into the
Gamergate controversy when her ex-boyfriend Eron Gjoni created a WordPress blog
about her in which, among other allegations, he claimed she had engaged in sexual affairs
with journalists in exchange for them writing favorable reviews of her game, which had
won several important awards. Based on what Gjoni wrote, alt-right thought-leaders
created elaborate conspiracy theories. Vox Day claims, “Given the very poor quality of
Depression Quest, it seemed readily apparent to casual observers that the unusual amount
of media attention garnered by the game must have been the result of the developer’s
liberal distribution of her sexual favors” and the Internet Aristocrat argues that Quinn was
upset about what Gjoni had written not because it exposed her private life but because it
unveiled the identities “of the people she slept with—that she cheated on him with during
the relationship and who they are, and specifically what they can do for her as an
entrepreneur. Gaming journalism reached a low point” (qutd. in Sandifer 176-81). In
short, alt-right gamers and journalists used a libelous screed written by an angry exboyfriend to place Quinn at the center of a conspiracy in which video game journalists
were not only exchanging positive reviews for sex but also were slowly attempting to
change “gamer culture” by discussing social issues, such as depression, in their
publications. It did not help matters that Depression Quest is not a video game in the
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usual sense but rather a hypertext fiction, or a written narrative connected by hyperlinks
the player can choose from in order to get different results. The format of hypertext
games is reminiscent of the choose your own adventure “branching-path” gamebooks that
were popular from the 1970s-1990s. The unusual format of the game and its bleak subject
matter combined with Quinn’s gender, politics, and style made it easy for alt-right leaders
to depict Zoe as an outsider who was not really invested in gaming, despite women
making up almost half of the gaming community (Yee).
By November 2015 more famous members of the alt-right, often referred to as the
alt-light, including Milo Yiannapoulos and Christina Hoff Summers, were appearing on
more approachable far-right shows such as The Rubin Report to claim that Gamergate
was not about attacking women but rather about problems with video game journalism
and the preservation of gaming culture. As Elizabeth Sandifer demonstrates in her book
NeoReaction A Basilisk, all of the claims they were making, however, were
unsubstantiated. The allegations that Zoe exchanged sex for positive reviews has been
debunked both because the men she slept with did not review her games and because she
slept with them months after they mentioned her game in their articles. Similarly,
socially critiquing games has been a part of the industry for at least the past twenty years,
as best evidenced by Keiron Gillens’s 2004 manifesto “The New Games Journalism.”
Finally the demographics of gamers is much more diverse than the stereotypical image of
the young heterosexual cisgender white man that the alt-right likes to propagate, and
despite what they may claim, young white cisgender straight men do not own the medium
or culture of video games (182). In short, Sandifer demonstrates that all of the critiques
against the game industry that surround Quinn are not true; they are simply hurtful,
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misogynistic, and false. However, as with Sarkeesian, the worst harassment Quinn faced
was not from thought-leaders but rather from less well known members of the alt-right
who threatened her, released her personal information online, and released nude photos of
her.
The sustained harassment of Quinn was complex and involved. Sandifer mentions
that screenshots Quinn herself released from Gamergate related message boards show
users contacting Gjoni to get her personal information and coordinating harassment
campaigns against her. Sandifer also outlines more nuanced attacks that members of the
alt-right used against both Quinn and Sarkeesian, such as the creation of fake Twitter
accounts purporting to be women and minorities that sided with the alt-right in order to
make Quinn and Sarkeesian seem like fringe thinkers, the use of fake Twitter accounts
purporting to be feminists pushing extreme positions such as #EndFathersDay and
#WhitesCantBeRaped to make feminism look like a radical position, and the creation of
long-term counter intelligence operations on feminist organizations that are reminiscent
to those used by the FBI when dealing with civil rights organizations. As Sandifer
evidences, when the alt-right planned these campaigns they assumed that Quinn and
Sarkeesian were also using false flag operations and sock-puppet accounts to build
support; the alt-right assumed these women were playing the same games they were, and
they used this assumption as an excuse to ignore any criticisms of Gamergate (191). In
the minds of the harassers, the complex harassment levelled against Quinn and
Sarkeesian was not only justifiable, it was necessary for fighting an ideological war.
The harassment of Quinn and Sarkeesian was necessary in the minds of many in
the alt-right because these women were understood as attacking the video game
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community rather than participating with it. Quinn and Sarkeesian were vilified for not
being tough enough to deal with the harassment that was meant to excise them from the
public. They were attacked because members of the alt-right believed these women were
clearly engaging in covert operations to destroy alt-right gaming communities. Quinn,
who now runs the Crash Override Network that provides free support and counsel to
victims of online harassment, sums up her experience differently, however:
There’s been campaigns like this across a bunch of different industries. It’s a
symptom of this larger brewing negative sentiment toward anybody that could be
perceived as other [sic]. The further away you get to the 1950s sitcom dad, the
more people there are out there that hate you. All of the bigotry and hatred and
stuff that happens offline definitely translates online, so really this was just the
game-flavored version of that rather than something that is unique to games.
This larger movement that Quinn is referring to is the alt-right, a term I have been using
throughout this section to discuss those who harassed Sarkeesian and Quinn. In general,
the term refers to a loosely connected group of far-right fringe thinkers including men’s
rights activists, paleoconservatives, and white nationalists. The group rose to prominence
during the election of Donald Trump and have become well known for their harassment
campaigns, including those against Quinn and Sarkeesian. These campaigns are effective
because the public sphere is not the sterile space for discourse that many idealist scholars
argue it should be; rather, as activists know, the public is a messy space where culture,
embodiment, identity, and social standing are just as important to persuasion as rationalcritical discourse. If a group can rally their allies and shout-down their enemies, they
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have no need to engage in rational-critical debate because the public is social, not just
discursive. In fact discourse and sociality are co-constitutive and inseparable.

Socializing the Public
Much of the scholarship on the public sphere has neglected to consider the
public’s relationship to sociality and has instead focused on publicness as a unique form
of interaction that is free from social hierarchies and prejudices; this is a dangerous
position, and one that needs to be remedied. The most prominent example of this position
is Jürgen Habermas, who actually begins Transformation of the Public Sphere by arguing
that the ancient Athenian polis was composed of citizens whose claims to family, land,
and slaves freed them from having to concern themselves with the necessities of life,
allowing them to instead tend to the affairs of state (3). In this way, the Athenian polis
literally separated the social world of embodied relationships from the abstracted
discursive world of public deliberation. The model Habermas later provides for the
eighteenth-century public sphere—a group of private citizens collected together to make
their will known to the state and to hold it accountable to their will—is based on this
same premise. Because their immediate needs for survival were guaranteed, bourgeoise
men could focus their energies on utilizing their economic power to subvert the European
monarchies (27). However, in order to hold the monarchies to their will, the bourgeois
public had to first determine what their will was. To understand their interests and
determine the best course of action for securing them, the bourgeoise used rationalcritical debate. In order to ensure that debate highlighted the best ideas over everything
else, both rhetors and audiences were asked to bracket their personal identities and
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interests before debating so that they could all deliberate objectively, without the burden
of their individual identities clouding their collective judgement (27). This method
claimed, in no uncertain terms, to strip away the social prejudices from each argument so
that the audience could evaluate them from a strictly logical perspective.
This bracketing of sociality, according to Habermas, is how the bourgeoisie
ascended to power and implemented democratic forms of government, but Nancy Fraser
famously refuted this argument in her article “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” by showing
how the bourgeoisie were never able to successfully bracket their identities and engage in
completely disembodied rational-critical debate. Instead, Fraser argues that those people
whose identities would trouble the perspectives of the bourgeoisie public sphere—
foreigners, minorities, poor people, queers, radicals, and women—were excised from
public discussion. These groups were shunned from the public sphere in the same way
that they are still the most likely groups to be silenced in the contemporary public sphere
via harassment. Fraser argues that because they were excluded from the dominant public,
these groups created their own subaltern counterpublics where they could consolidate
power, plan agitational activities, and attempt to hold the dominant public accountable to
their will. In this way, the subaltern counterpublics closely resembled the dominant
public against which they struggled, except they were keenly aware of the important
influence sociality has on publicness.
Like the subaltern counterpublics she studies, Fraser acknowledges the social
nature of public engagement and the ways in which social inequalities lead to public
inequalities. By showing how identities, discriminations, and the need for subalterns to
consolidate power have co-produced multiple public spheres based on social relations,
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Fraser demonstrates that the public sphere is not a space of pure reason populated by
abstract concepts but rather an embodied space populated by material actors.
Acknowledging this social aspect of publicness, she argues:
We should question whether it is possible even in principle for interlocutors to
deliberate as if they were social peers in specifically designated discursive arenas,
when these discursive arenas are situated in a larger societal context that is
pervaded by structural relations of dominance and subordination. (12)
Without a completely egalitarian society, Fraser doubts there can be an egalitarian sphere
of discourse because the social will necessarily influence the composition of the public.
Similarly, Hannah Arendt argues that though the social and political were once separated,
they are now so intertwined that it is near impossible to tell them apart. Arendt, however,
is less concerned about hierarchical divisions and much more concerned about
conformity of thought and behavior.
Arendt’s argument in The Human Condition is unique in that she not only
contrasts publicness to privateness but also contrasts both of these spheres to sociality.
Arendt begins much in the same way as Habermas, by demonstrating that participation
within the Athenian polis required the citizen to first free himself from the necessities of
life by subjugating others. She goes as far as to claim that this divide was also the divide
between violence and speech because the former was seen as the tool for organizing a
household built on patriarchal rule whereas the latter was seen as the tool for promoting
action among peers within a democracy (31). The two spheres were completely different:
whereas the household was ruled monarchically by the citizen, the polis was egalitarian;
whereas the household focused on communal survival, the polis focused on individual
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greatness. The distinctness between these spheres was blurred by the rise of the social,
which Ardent defines as “the collective of families economically organized into the
facsimile of one super-family” (29). Arendt explains that as the bourgeoise took power in
Europe during the eighteenth century, public life became increasingly concerned with
economics rather than politics and “the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and
nothing else assume[d] public significance.” As such, people became less concerned with
individual action and increasingly concerned with proper behavior that would enable
economics to flourish unhampered (46).
In other words, the subjugation of the household began to permeate the public,
and Western Civilization became more equitable not by allowing everyone the individual
differentiation of publicness but by making publicness as homogenized and controlling as
the private sphere had been. Note that in the Gamergate controversy both sides are
arguing over social norms, behavior, and consumer goods; the controversy is about
determining shared values and how people should behave themselves in a public that has
become a super-family. Seen in this way, the use of harassment is almost unsurprising in
that violence has historically been the tool used to create order among those seen as
unequal within the private sphere—those who were restricted from having a public life. It
was the prominence of this violence in the domestic space that spurred many feminists,
along with others on the new left, to proclaim “The personal is political” during the 1960s
(Echols 16). Similarly, because many in the alt-right believe in “traditional gender roles”
and strict father morality, it is unsurprising that they felt the need to take it upon
themselves not only to act as patriarchs in this debacle but also to enact particularly
disgusting and violent versions of fatherhood and husbandry as they tried to force
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Sarkeesian and Quinn into the social roles they had designated for women. Sarkeesian
and Quinn, however, refused to retreat into the private sphere, and both are still working
for social change. This ability to continue acting in the public sphere demonstrates both
personal resilience and the multiplicity of overlapping publics within society. Both Quinn
and Sarkeesian were not only involved in the discursive and social public of the
Gamergate controversy, they were also members of other, more supportive publics. The
twenty-first century is not a world in which one is either part of the dominant public or
relegated to privacy or membership in a subaltern counterpublic; instead, in the twentyfirst century there are multiple publics centered around different poetic worlds that are
constantly diverging, converging, and overlapping.
Seeing the public sphere as comprised of multiple publics in this way was
popularized in no small part by Michael Warner’s book Publics and Counterpublics in
which he argues that the word public refers to three different types of entities: polities,
physically present audiences, and loosely affiliated readerships. Warner’s study focuses
predominantly on the third type of public, which he defines through seven characteristics.
Publics are: 1) self-organized, 2) relations among strangers, 3) both personal and
impersonal, 4) constituted through mere attention, 5) created by reflexive circulation, 6)
dictated by the temporality of their circulation, and 7) involved in poetic world-making.
The first four of these definitions are rather easy to understand, and they serve mostly to
demonstrate the ways in which the loose connections among publics are different from
clubs and organizations where there may be governing structures, people may know each
other, messages may be localized, and people may have to be initiated in order to join.
Unlike these kinds of clubs and organizations, Warner argues that publics are rather
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amorphous, with texts being delivered to a potentially infinite number of audience
members who may or may not pay attention to them.
The last three characteristics of Warner’s definition are much more nuanced than
the first four. Warner claims that publics are not created by one text but rather by a
multitude of texts written about similar issues, referencing each other, and circulating
among the same basic readership. From the circulation of these texts, a poetic world
emerges in that readers co-produce a collective relationship with the world that they
would not have had otherwise. As long as a public’s texts continue to circulate, the public
and its poetic world can be said to exist, but once circulation ceases, so does the public.
Seen from this angle, it is easy to see how multiple overlapping publics can exist at the
same time because different readers participate within different networks. For instance,
while it would be misguided to think of the readership of Feminist Frequency as a public
because it is only one organization, Composition and Rhetoric scholars should consider
the network of readers who are not only watching Feminist Frequency videos but also
reading other feminist authors, volunteering with feminist organizations, and
participating in Tumblr-based feminist subcultures as a public. Similarly, critics can think
of the alt-right as a public that is defined by the circulation of far-right texts and memes
on news sites such as Brietbart, message forums such as 4Chan, and printing presses
such as Counter-Currents. As Gamergate demonstrates, these publics are not exclusive;
they have overlapping in interests, concerns, texts, and maybe even readers. However, it
would also be erroneous to think of either of these publics as representative of dominant
American society, especially when they both define themselves against what they see as
dominant cultural standards, even while appealing to common cultural virtues such as
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fairness. Of course, these publics are also not equally subaltern; while members of both
publics will claim to face prejudices because of their embodied identities and their
political beliefs, the struggles they face are very different from one another. Finally,
members from both of these publics participate in the dominant discourse as well; both
Anita Sarkeesian and Milo Yiannopoulos have been interviewed on broadcast television
networks and allowed to speak on college campuses. In other words, both of these publics
exist and create poetic worlds, but they are not separate from the other publics that
comprise not only American society but also global politics.

A Multiplicity of Digital Sphere Publics
Both contemporary feminist media criticism and the alt-right enjoy the popularity
that they do in no small part because they predominantly exist in digital spaces that
enable public actors to circulate their poetic worlds across time and space to interested
readers who will help to co-produce and propagate the public. Warner’s definition of
publicness does not account for the reach of digital publishing because his book was
released at the very start of the social media revolution (a year after Facebook was
founded and a year before Twitter). As such, Warner does not account for the ways in
which internet technologies have changed the public sphere, and he is skeptical about
their ability to do so; however, Byron Hawk’s 2011 article “Curating Ecologies,
Circulating Musics” updates Warner’s model of publicness from a multitude of publics
distributing different poetic worlds through analog media to a multitude of public actors
circulating and sharing poetic worlds in both digital and analog environments. In this
article, Hawk makes three major updates to Warner’s model. First, he argues that
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understanding contemporary publics requires scholars to abandon traditional notions of
both circulation and distribution, both of which have traditionally been used to describe a
process in which a single entity provides others with texts. In contemporary publics, such
as those involved in Gamergate, texts do not simply move from one sender to multiple
receivers but rather from multiple senders to multiple receivers, with those roles being in
constant flux. In short, distribution is not centralized, it is radicalized. Second, Hawk
argues that the timeliness of contemporary publics is based not solely on the rhythms of
producing texts but also on the emergent interests of readers. Unlike print journals, which
keep their political relevance through punctuated circulation focused on the moment of
writing and distribution, digital information can be accessed whenever the reader is
interested. In such a public, the kairos of the writer and the kairos of the reader may be
completely different, but they are equally as important to the moment of engagement.
Finally, Hawk argues that contemporary “sphere publics” connect individuals though
different media, timescales, and intensities. Since these publics are non-structural and
non-hierarchical, they are always being created and re-created by those who participate
with them.
In many ways, Hawk’s description of sphere publics describes traditional publics
that share, archive, and co-create texts; in this way, he is describing a change in intensity
rather than a change in form. People are able to share more content with more people at a
faster pace than ever before in human history; similarly, finding old articles requires an
internet search rather than a trip to the library, and people are able to respond, remix, and
rearticulate messages with more speed and ease than they were with analog media.
Gamergate is a testament to the speed and intensity in which contemporary public
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discourse can spread. The controversy began suddenly in August of 2014, and an
astounding amount of content—ranging from essays to message board posts—was
created to respond to the problem within days. Likewise, the majority of the harassment
and discussion was over within a year. In the contemporary media landscape, messages,
arguments, and controversies can emerge, proliferate, and defuse quite quickly. This
intensity is further complicated by the sheer number of arguments circulating at any
given moment.
In the twenty-first century, there are so many sphere publics producing so much
content so rapidly that rhetors who want their messages to be read need to find ways to be
noticed by potential audiences within the attention economy. These authors must choose
tactics that will convince people both to read and to share their work. How to accomplish
this goal is a question that concerns not only logical argumentation but also style, which
aligns well with the dynamic possibilities of contemporary media. Warner argues that
publics are not created by texts that persuade people to take interest in them but rather by
texts that gather people who already recognize themselves as the ones being addressed:
Public discourse says not only “Let a public exist” but “Let it have this character,
speak this way, see the world this way.” It then goes in search of confirmation
that such a public exists, with greater or lesser success—success being further
attempts to cite, circulate, and realize the world understanding it articulates. Run
it up the flagpole and see who salutes. Put on a show and see who shows up. (114)
Warner—like Fraser, Arendt, and Hawk—knows that publics are social entities, and they
create connections between individuals affectively as well as rationally. Publics
proliferate because audiences identify with styles, tones, ideas, and opinions of texts and
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authors. A text does not persuade a public into being; rather, it calls forth a public who
already cares, sympathizes, and identifies with its message, even if the members are not
yet aware that they do.
In the context of Gamergate, this calling forth can best be seen in the style of
Sarkeesian’s more recent installments of Tropes Vs. Women in Video Games and Troy
Leavitt’s response video “Anita’s Pinhole.” The early editions of Tropes are extremely
professional in their style. Sarkeesian’s voice is clear, and each video game discussed is
accompanied by graphics that evidence the arguments being made. Sarkeesian herself is
professional but nondescript; her makeup is neutral and her hair is singled-colored and
tied back. Similarly, her scripts are informative, if not a bit bland; she demonstrates an
affection for the games she is discussing and then provides her critiques of them. Later
episodes keep the same clear voice and professional production quality, but Sarkeesian
herself has a notably bolder style including more vibrant make-up, two-toned hair, and a
little bit of snark in her critiques. This style is not meant to reach out to those who will
disagree with her, as the original videos seem to be; instead, these videos speak to
existing members of her public and those who will see the video and identify as
members. Sarkeesian’s style says, “Let contemporary feminist media criticism look this
way, speak this way, and see the world this way.”
Similarly, Leavitt’s response, which was first published in 2016, has its own style.
The production is not as professional as Sarkeesian’s, but it is not amateur either. His
voice is clear and friendly, though distinctly condescending. His arguments against
Sarkeesian are clearly organized and directly stated. He utilizes appropriate visual
graphics throughout, but his use of jocular, and sometime explicitly derisive, music
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seems out of place. Unlike Sarkeesian, there is no video of Leavitt speaking in the
presentation, though he does show a few pictures of himself at the beginning of the video
and includes an image of himself in the bottom left hand corner of the screen throughout.
Though it is unclear exactly who his target audiences is—the alt-right, conservatives who
want to criticize Sarkeesian without associating with the alt-right, moderate gamers, or
someone else—he is clearly talking to the digital gaming public, and his style says, “Let
online video game criticism look this way, speak this way, and act this way.” Sarkeesian
and Leavitt’s political orientations and styles seem to be speaking to two separate publics,
but there is clear overlap between groups, and both speakers are attempting to capture the
attention of online audiences who are interested in gender and video game criticism.
Kevin Deluca has, perhaps more than any other scholar in Composition and
Rhetoric, dealt with the issue of garnering attention in the context of digital sphere
publics. He argues that one of the primary ways to gain attention is to create image events
that are so startling they change the way people understand and engage the world. Such
image events will affect audiences so deeply that they will not only engage with the
public but will also distribute and propagate its messages. In an article co-authored with
Jennifer Peeples, Deluca goes as far as to argue that in the attention economy, arguments
must be publicized through spectacle in order to then be engaged. This leads him and
Peeples to claim that the rioters at the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle,
WA needed violence in order to gain the attention of those who might distribute their
story, read their arguments against global capitalism, and contribute to their cause.
Violence was necessary for the protestors to gain attention because the public had
become desensitized to nonviolent protests. Deluca and Peeples do not see the spectacle
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as mere bait to garner attention for traditional arguments however; instead, they see the
image event itself as a transformative text that can open up the conditions of possibility
for re-thinking the social sphere and acting differently within it.
Gamergate embodies the type of rhetorical spectacle discussed by Deluca and
Peeples. The violent online harassment of photogenic women made for a myriad of
stories not only in culturally aware digital gaming magazines like Kotaku and Polygon
but also traditional presses like the ABC News, CNN, and the New York Times. While
there were no striking images besides screenshots of cruel tweets and memes, the
harassment itself was a shocking enough spectacle to garner attention. Even for those on
the alt-right, the publicity was good. People became interested in the group and their
messages. Websites like Brietbart gained considerable boosts in traffic when reporting on
Gamergate, and Milo Yiannapoulos transformed from a regular journalist to a minor
celebrity. And it is not surprising that the alt-right gained prominence through the
spectacle of harassing women game developers and critics because the group both traffics
in cruelty and is particularly media savvy. By taking a look at the alt-right as a sphere
public, it is possible to understand how this group uses digital and analog harassment
both to silence the opinions of those with whom them disagree and to amplify their own
voices.

Defining an Alt-Right Sphere Public
To understand how the alt-right uses harassment, it is important to first define the
group. A clear definition, however, has eluded journalists, pundits, and scholars because
the alt-right appears to be a patchwork of different interests and actors. As such, the

108

group has been referred to as an amorphous political movement, a counterculture, a
coalition of reactionaries, and a loose affiliation of groups. This ambiguity stems from the
collective’s three characteristics as a sphere public in which 1) members distribute
information among themselves through a multitude of channels without a singular hub, 2)
texts are created at kairotic moments but are often engaged atemporally, and 3) collective
identity is co-created by members. All of these characteristics are intensified by the
group’s online presence, which allows members access to a massive audience without
having to negotiate with the gatekeepers of traditional media. Being online provides the
alt-right with the ability to create a larger community than prior fringe groups could have
imagined because the weak ties that connect members are radically distributed. This also
means that no one person or entity created the alt-right. Though Richard Spencer has
taken credit for popularizing the term, the sphere public is not his. Though news
organizations like Brietbart, discussion boards like 4chan’s /pol/, and thought-leaders
such as Paul Ramsey are important actors within the sphere public, they did not birth the
alt-right either, and they do not control it. The sphere public emerged from a confluence
of actors utilizing specific spaces, ideas, and media to create and distribute messages
among themselves. As some ideas gained traction, some styles became popular, and some
members continued to participate in the discussion, a very specific public culture—what
is now understood as the identity of the alt-right—became increasingly salient. But
because the culture emerged through actors co-participating with each other within the
public, understanding the exact make-up of the alt-right is difficult, and any attempt to
map it requires decisions as to what to include and what to exclude.
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The multiple identities and understandings of the alt-right can be understood by
analyzing three histories produced by members of the sphere public at different times for
different purposes for different audiences: 1) Allum Bokhari and Milo Yiannopoulos’s
“An Establishment Conservative’s Guide to the Alt-Right,” which was written in March
of 2016 to defend the movement from the criticisms of traditional conservatives; 2)
Andrew Anglin’s “A Normie’s Guide to the Alt-Right,” which was written in August of
2016 to justify the seriousness of the alt-right to people who became interested in the
group after Hillary Clinton’s famous alt-right speech in Reno, Nevada; and 3) Roaming
Millennial’s three-part interview with Richard Spencer, which was published in May of
2017 as a way of presenting her “classical liberal” audience with a different perspective
on contemporary social justice issues. When analyzed side-by side, these three histories
demonstrate the ways in which the co-created nature of the alt-right enables different
participants to understand the sphere public and its demographics in idiosyncratic ways
based on their own experiences.
First, Bokhari and Yiannopoulos—neither of whom personally identify as altright, despite their chronic associations with it—argue that the sphere public is composed
of four categories of participants: 1) the intellectuals, 2) the natural conservatives, 3) the
meme team, and 4) the 1488ers. In this hierarchy, the intellectuals—such as Steve Sailer,
Jack Donovan, and Nick Land—write philosophical texts on issues such as nationalism,
race, gender, technology, and accelerationism that natural conservatives—those who
believe that western culture is a cohesive entity that needs to be protected from outside
corruptions—use to support their cultural and political beliefs. The meme team spreads
the beliefs of natural conservatives by creating and distributing memes that promote their
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ideology and derisively mock contrary ones. The images produced by the meme team
range from innocuous pro-Trump cartoons to virulently racist images, such as the altright mascot Pepe the Frog dressed in a Nazi uniform or standing in front of an open oven
threatening to incinerate his enemies. Bokhari and Yiannopoulos make a point to argue
that the images created by the meme team are not actually racist but rather ironic
criticisms of the leftist media’s hyperbolic reactions to conservative movements. In this
way, the authors attempt to distinguish the meme team from the 1488ers—the title of
which is a portmanteau of 14, a reference to the fourteen-word skinhead slogan “we must
secure the existence of our people and a future for white children," and 88, a reference to
Heil Hitler based on H being the eighth letter of the English alphabet. Bokhari and
Yiannopoulos claim these explicit white supremacists are actively ostracized from the altright because of their racism and violence, though some 1488ers still participate in the
discourse through the community’s selective openness as a digital sphere public
grounded in the circulation of multiple texts and media. According to the article, then, the
alt-right believes in preserving white western culture by limiting immigration and cultural
exchange, and though the group will make jokes about genocide to demonstrate their
ideologies, they distance themselves from the active white supremacist organizations who
are clearly a part of the public because they want to claim that the alt-right believes in the
peaceful preservation of white culture rather than violent white supremacy.
Andrew Anglin’s “A Normie’s Guide to the Alt-Right,” which was published on
the explicitly white supremacist website The Daily Stormer, creates a very different map
of the sphere public than that presented by Bokhari and Yiannopoulos. Anglin claims that
the group is “a confluence of White men who reached the same objective truths through
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different avenues.” The avenues he references are a hodgepodge of right-wing
subcultures such as conspiracy theorists, libertarians, paleoconservatives, men’s rights
activists, pick-up artists, and traditional white nationalist organizations. The objective
truth Anglin claims all these different sub-publics promote is, unsurprisingly, the
superiority of white culture. Anglin goes as far as to claim that the alt-right can most
easily be understood as a “re-boot of white nationalism.” Unlike Bokhari and
Yiannopoulos, then, Anglin sees white supremacy as the core value of the alt-right,
claiming that all other interests are secondary to this one; however, like Bokhari and
Yiannopoulos, Anglin emphasizes that the alt-right is a peaceful group dedicated to
preserving whiteness through political change rather than through force, though his
sincerity is highly suspect due to the amount of violent imagery and language he uses.
Of the three sources, Richard Spencer is the least interested in providing a
taxonomy of the sphere public; instead, he defines the alt-right as “identity politics for
white people” and claims that its participants hold a diversity of views around this basic
premise. In his interview with The Roaming Millennial, Spencer provides a history of the
group in which the alt-right emerges in 2009 in opposition not only to current leftwing
politics but also to George W. Bush style Republicanism. The core values uniting the
movement are racism and nationalism. Spencer claims that those interested in the altright in the early days argued that race is a determining factor of identity and that politics
should be “derived from a racial understanding.” These thinkers believed in the selfdetermination of nations, which not only fueled their racist ideology but also led them to
oppose all types of foreign intervention ranging from the Iraq War to the United Nations.
From these basic premises, the alt-right began to attract members who identified with
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their concerns and found their arguments compelling, even if they initially thought about
the movement as a joke. For Spencer, a distinct alt-right identity began to coalesce
around the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump in 2015 because he was a prominent
politician espousing a worldview that spoke to the interests of the nascent public.
However, after Donald Trump’s election, the movement once again began to diffuse, and
members once again argued over policies, values, and worldviews. In this way, Spencer
sees the alt-right sphere public as much less defined than Bokhari and Yiannopoulos
describe it, but he agrees with them that the main purpose is cultural nationalism through
peaceful means. Similar to Anglin, this nationalism is based on the importance of
whiteness; however, unlike Anglin, Spencer distances himself from the term white
supremacist and prefers to refer to the alt-right as “an identitarian movement.” On the
whole, Spencer likes to present himself as more cosmopolitan than traditional white
supremacists like Anglin, with a contemporary fashion style and more accepting views on
Jews, homosexuals, and women.
Looking at these three understandings of the group, it is clear that, due be being
co-produced by its participants, the alt-right has hazy borders with some actors regularly
participating in the public, while others join the conversation only when it piques their
interests. As Anglin says, there is no over-arching alt-right structure: “the mob is the
movement.” Nonetheless, among this mob there are thought-leaders, platforms, and
arguments that are more influential than others; still, none of these figures singularly
dictates the movement’s identity—even as they try to dictate the identity of a nation.
Richard Spencer even goes so far as to claim that this attribute of the alt-right
demonstrates the network’s relevance and diversity (Roaming). Of course, many would
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not see the coalition of white supremacists, conspiracy theorists, paleo-conservatives,
men’s rights advocates, nationalists, gamers, and anti-Semites as a diverse crowd, but
these actors do hold different opinions on issues such as civic nationalism, femininity,
homosexuality, religion, spirituality, and violence that they find very important. In fact,
these are issues that the community debates in excruciating detail, often arriving at stasis
without being able to move forward. These differing opinions are acceptable, if not
actively encouraged, within the public, and Spencer even claims that he does not want to
see the alt-right become “a closed system” whose message does not resonate beyond the
interests of a few inter-related actors; however, this freedom of opinion clearly has strict
limits within the white supremacist sphere public.
Though someone like Greg Johnson, author of Confessions of a Reluctant Hater,
can make arguments about stereotypically liberal causes, such as environmentalism and
healthcare, he his accepted within the public only because he discusses these issues
within the context of cultural and racial purity. Belief in racial purity, white culture, and
ethno-nationalism is the key to belonging to the alt-right. If someone attempts to engage
the sphere public without having these core values and a white body, they will be
harassed until they leave. Like the ancient Athenians, the alt-right uses harassment to
create a social system in which those with certain bodies and identities are given freedom
to express their opinions and debate within the public, while those who are barred from
the public because of their bodies and identities are characterized as inferior.
Occasionally, this harassment leeks into the alt-right sphere public itself, most often in
regards to the movement’s spokeswomen like Tomi Lahren, Lana Lokteff, Lauren
Southern, and Ayla Stewart, who are intermittently harassed and defended for subverting
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traditionally feminine roles by participating in the public. The problem became so
prominent in December of 2017 that the outspoken ethno-nationalist Tara McCarthy
argued in a series of tweets that some men in the alt-right were trying to bully her and
other female alt-right thought-leaders off the internet. McCarthy argued that other men in
the movement would have to decide if they were going to passively endorse such
behavior or speak out against it in order to better promote ethno-nationalism. She asked
her audience to choose between racism and sexism.
The fact that McCarthy’s harassment is so similar to what happened to Sarkeesian
and Quinn is no coincidence, both events spring from the perception by men in the altright of who belongs in the private sphere and who belongs in the public. Like the ancient
Athenians, these men are willing to use violence to maintain that boundary because only
by subjugating others do they believe they can be free. In both cases, harassment is
justified by the harassers because they feel as if their values—the norms they grew up
with—are under attack and need to be defended. This is the standard alt-right justification
for all their harassment campaigns. The group always argues that they have to defend
themselves. Such a justification is not surprising because a victimized mentality is
necessary to maintain social cohesion within the type of populist coalitions that the altright sphere public so closely resembles.

Digital Populism Through Harassment
As a sphere public, the alt-right lacks a cohesive agenda but different actors
attempt to ascribe various agendas to it in order to meet their own political desires, as
demonstrated by the different depictions of the group presented by Allum Bokhari and
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Milo Yiannopoulos, Andrew Anglin, and Richard Spencer. According to Ernesto Laclau,
this struggle to define an agenda is the primary characteristic of populist movements.
Laclau claims that such movements begin with a group of people making a demand of
their government. If this demand is not met within a reasonable time, the group begins to
suspect that their neighbors have equally unsatisfied demands and critiques. Finding that
this is true, the neighbors band together to hold the government accountable to their
various demands. Eventually, the government is unable to deal with the demands as
individual problems and an “equivalential relation is established” among the disaffected
citizens (73). This chain of demands then turns into a gulf between the people and their
leaders. Common citizens begin to believe that those in charge of the country are
detached from their collective concerns. As they begin to rebel against the government,
the populist movement creates symbols, images, and slogans to represent their newfound
collective identity. These discursive signs of unity are empty signifiers, allowing those
within the group to negotiate their meaning as they see fit. Each different dispossessed
faction understands the symbols to represent slightly different desires, identities, and
interests (69, 76). The populist symbol may never resonate with every citizen, but it can
stop infighting between important but separate factions within the movement, at least for
a while, by providing them with a common symbol they can all unite behind. Finally,
Laclau claims that populist movements will eventually fracture because there is little of
substance to unite the various factions and prevent infighting.
This narrative is currently playing out with the alt-right. The reason the sphere
public is such an ideological hodgepodge is because it is composed of a variety of actors
attempting to find common ground among disparate concerns with varying degrees of
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validity. Men worried about their jobs, status, and civil rights; citizens concerned about
mass migration, economic security, and safety; gamers concerned about losing a
subculture they understood as predominantly masculine; scientists feeling ostracized
because of their methods; journalists feeling as if their work is being stifled; and a variety
of other people with various concerns came together when their specific demands were
not being satisfied. Notably, these concerns are mostly not governmental but personal,
economic, or social, which is why so many of the groups to which the alt-right is opposed
seem so abstract: e.g. cultural Marxists, elites, feminists, globalists, and the media. Since
the alt-right’s problems are so varied, it is necessary that they understand the forces
oppressing them as not only completely controlling but also as too diffuse to actually
engage.
Seeing their various gripes as equivalent and having identified their abstract
enemies, members of the alt-right began to develop and appropriate symbols and slogans
to identify themselves as a collective through digital poetic world making practices such
as sharing memes and commenting on anonymous forums. Pepe the Frog, a previously
innocuous meme based on a character from Matt Furie’s stoner comic Boys Club, is the
symbol most representative of the sphere public; however, the group also has other
identifying markers. Using slang such as cuck, shitlord, and social justice warrior [SJW]
clearly marks someone as a member of the alt-right, as does a “fashy” haircut that is short
on the sides, longer on top and combed with a bit of pomade. Other symbols—such as the
flag of Kekistan, a fictional country based on Korean internet slang for laughing; (((echo
parenthesis))), which are meant to symbolize the extent of Jewish influence on society;
and fashwave, which is a fascist appropriation of the popular internet music vaporwave—
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are also meant to symbolize the entire sphere public while having a stronger appeal with
some factions than others. Since all of these symbols are vague and have either little
meaning or multiple meanings, different factions within the alt-right alliance can define
them as they see fit. Pepe for instance is simultaneously a symbol of internet subculture,
Donald Trump, populism, resistance to political correctness, and white supremacy; the
frog maintains his fluidity even as he is mutated to resemble Trump, a Nazi officer, or
Slimer from Ghostbusters. Notably, the histories of the alt-right from Bokhari and
Yiannopoulos, Anglin, and Spencer all read the character of Pepe differently. Bokhari
and Yiannopolous see him as a playful resistance to dominant culture, Anglin sees him as
an articulation of white nationalism, and Spencer sees the character as a concrete symbol
for the alt-right movement writ large. Most likely, interpretations of Pepe will continue to
proliferate until the alt-right fractures, and he becomes the symbol for a single faction.
According to Laclau’s account of populism, these groups believe that their
ingroup is being actively oppressed by opposing forces, so they intentionally create
discursive spheres in which the dominant public will not feel comfortable. That the
dominant public finds the alt-right’s use of language repugnant is part of the appeal of
that language for the sphere public because it demonstrates the ideological opposition
between the movement to the dominant public. Language is a way of creating the barriers
between “normies” who don’t understand the movement, “lefties” who oppose the
movement, and the movement itself. The shared language is not a political argument but
rather a social argument that homogenizes the group to certain behavioral and linguistic
norms more suited to a family than a public. In this way, language functions as a barrier
that separates the alt-right from those with whom they would disagree, and the

118

particularly blunt and hateful language they often utilize serves this purpose quite
effectively. Harassment functions as an attempt to extend this barrier because it
demonstrates who is allowed to speak in a certain space or on a certain topic. In the
example of Gamergate, alt-right factions within the gaming community were attempting
to say that women, particularly feminists, were not allowed to express their opinions
about video games because that culture belonged to the alt-right. In this way, the
harassment of Sarkeesian and Quinn was also a threat to anyone who might try to defend
them or oppose the culture of the alt-right. Part of the goal was that “normies” would find
the discourse and the practices so repulsive that they would just look away.
Much has been written on the ways in which the alt-right harasses people, with
some authors claiming that the alt-right’s existence is itself harassment. Nonetheless, I
would like to provide a brief list of some of the more extraordinary ways in which the altright harasses people as a function of digital poetic world making. This list goes beyond
trolling, which is itself a diverse set of practices, and enters into malicious and harmful
territory (Phillips, Beyer, and Coleman). Not all of these tactics were created by the altright and they are not exclusively used by people who would identify with the sphere
public; however, each of these tactics are commonly used by this public.
•

Doxing—Derived from the word documents, or docs, “dropping dox” is an old
hacking technique in which a harasser collects personal information about their
target—generally using social media, reverse phone look up services, and
government websites—and posts it on the internet so that people can call, write,
visit, or message an otherwise anonymous user. Famously, actress and avid video
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gamer Felicia Day was doxed in 2014, shortly after speaking out about
Gamergate (Hern).
•

Revenge Porn: Revenge porn is when someone distributes sexually explicit
material of someone without consent. It is referred to as revenge porn because it
is often used to spite ex-lovers; however, the category is larger than this single
motivation. During the height of the Gamergate controversy, nude pictures of
Zoe Quinn were leaked on the internet.

•

Shaming: Public shaming is a when an internet community castigates someone
for a socially deviant behavior. During the Gamergate controversy, the alt-right
site The Daily Stormer encouraged readers to shame Nintendo employee Alison
Rapp for an old college essay she wrote defending Japanese child pornography as
a cultural practice. Readers were encouraged both to post about Rapp’s essay on
social media and to directly contact Nintendo executives and request she be fired.

•

Swatting: Swatting is when someone makes a false emergency call in order to
send a SWAT team to a target’s door. Besides being intensely frightening,
swatting often leads to destruction of property, detainment, psychological
distress, physical injury, and a waste of public funds. In 2014 several users of the
online video game streaming platform Twitch, were swatted solely because they
were women (Fagone).

•

Threats of physical violence: While such threats are not exclusive to the internet
age, the alt-right has successfully used treats of violence, rape, and death to
harass their enemies until they had to abandon their social media accounts and in
some cases even leave their homes for extended periods of time.

120

•

Violence: In the last few months the alt-right has become increasingly violent at
their rallies. The fame, reverence, and resources being received by Klye
Chapman—better known as Base Stickman or the Alt-Knight—after he beat
Antifa protestors with a stick during the Berkley protests, demonstrates not only a
willingness for the sphere public to get involved in violence but also to celebrate
it (Donut Operator). Also, it should be noted that members of the alt-right have
killed over one-hundred people in the United States, including James Fields who
drove his car into counter protestors during the “Unite The Right” rallies in
Charlottesville, Virginia injuring nineteen people and killing Heather Heyer
(Hankes and Amend).
In each of these harassment techniques, the alt-right uses the internet to silence

those whom it wishes to expel from the public sphere. Even in the case of John Chapman,
who physically beat Antifa protestors, the internet is used to raise money for his legal
fees and insure so that he can attend other marches. The internet in these instances is not
just a medium through which to distribute ideas to a public; it is also a tool to distribute
information, collect resources, develop plans, and form community. Likewise, since the
alt-right exists among other publics, it can use the internet to understand, research, and
reach these other publics. For example, Alison Rapp was not targeted by the alt-right
because of her college essay, she was targeted because of her feminist beliefs and
because she was a woman in the video game industry. In fact, many in the alt-right who
had been attacking Rapp prior to the essay being published had accused her of toning
down the sexualized depiction of minors in Nintendo games, despite her not having that
authority. The alt-right shamed her as a pedophile not because they oppose pedophilia—
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in fact, two of the most popular alt-right forums, 4chan and 8chan, are known to be
hotbeds of child pornography—but because they know that members of other sphere
publics and organizations find pedophilia to be abhorrent (Klepek). In this way, the altright is not only trying to create their own sphere public with unique beliefs and linguistic
styles, they are trying to silence people outside their group and spread their social
standards to other publics via harassment. If they can get those who disagree with them to
cede digital communities, then those communities essentially become alt-right.
The threats against Anita Sarkeesian and Zoe Quinn were meant to silence the
ability of these women to speak in communal spaces shared by multiple publics. Like the
subaltern counterpublics discussed by Nancy Fraser, the alt-right is trying to use their
power to influence what they see as the dominant public, but the alt-right’s power is not
found merely in their ability to discourse. Their power is found in their capacity to utilize
the embodied and affective aspect of publicness to simultaneously build a collective and
exclude people from it, and if they are not opposed, this network can easily continue to
grow. Growth, however, may be the downfall of this particular populist sphere public
because as a populist movements grow, differences between thought-leaders and interest
groups become more apparent and more divisive, which fractures the larger community.
Similarly, as the sphere public expands, more people know about it, which allows for
more opposition to it. Awareness of the alt-right among supporters, detractors, and
normies might be the sphere public’s downfall. But, it is hard to measure the growth,
intensity, or interconnectedness of the group. Some people believe the alt-right to be a
mass movement, while others claim that it is “not as large as it’s able to appear online”
(Zuylen-Wood et al.). Some people have glibly argued that alt-right internet campaigns
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created Trump, while others point out that they were at most one factor among many
(Phillips et al.). Recently, it was reported that the alt-right is in decline (Wilson).
Nonetheless, though it is uncertain how big or influential this populist sphere public is or
how long it will last, it is clear that the alt-right’s willingness to utilize harassment makes
it a dangerous force within contemporary American culture and politics.

Harassment and the Risk of Audience
Harassment is particularly frightening in this historical moment because the
public sphere is touted as a place for everyone. Whereas for the Athenians and the
Enlightenment bourgeoise there were strict economic, gendered, and racial requirements
for participation within the public, the contemporary American public is supposed to
belong to everyone, regardless of identity. When Americans enter the public sphere they
expect to be treated by their audience with the respect due a peer. No speaker expects to
be met with the type of violences that had previously maintained the bloody barrier
between the public and the private because the social code states that such conduct is no
longer acceptable. Contemporary United States society has norms that are supposed to
govern behavior; however, social norms are malleable. If, as Hannah Arendt claims, the
social describes the affective relationships between material bodies, then these
relationships can be changed based on how those bodies relate to one another. The
example of Camp Courage demonstrates how bodies can relate to one another to create
new heterogenous collectives that respect individual identities. Conversely, the example
of Gamergate demonstrate how bodies can be used to keep people from participating in
the public. I know neither what kinds of responses Anita Sarkeesian expected when she
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created Tropes Vs. Women in Video Games nor those Zoe Quinn anticipated when she
created Depression Quest; however, both women have stated that they did not expected
to face the kinds of violent harassment they did. Neither of them expected to become
symbols of alt-right hatred. Both of these women expected to be treated with some kind
of respect by their audience, but they weren’t; instead, they were barraged with
harassment. And one of the things that made that harassment so frightening is that the
audience with which they were hoping to connect subverted their expectations and
transformed into violent antagonists.
The violent transformation of this audience was unexpected, but by studying the
composition and history of the alt-right, scholars in Composition and Rhetoric can begin
to understand how and why the group—and groups similar to it—use harassment to
establish their own sphere publics with a shared, if malleable, identity based on a set of
core principles. Likewise, researchers can begin to understand in what types of spaces a
rhetor is likely to experience this type of harassment by asking what conversations and
communities the group is attempting to take over. Knowing this kind of information is
important for composition instructors specifically because, as Gruwell argues, many
digital compositionists are asking their students to enter into the same kinds of publics
that became so toxic for Quinn and Sarkeesian. The internet is not an inherently safe
space for discourse, and compositionists can no longer pretend that it is the Habermasian
rational public that idealists want it to be. Composition and Rhetoric needs to continue to
acknowledge that the public is a social sphere in which the reactions and responses to
embodied realties create hierarchies, often violently. This is not to say that instructors
should not have their students compose in digital spaces; as Quinn says, internet users
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should not “cede the internet to whoever screams the loudest at the most people, and just
hand over this amazing technological achievement to the nastiest people” (Valenti).
Nonetheless, the field also should not teach students to enter these spaces uninformed, as
if publics did not contain real risks both for students and those they will meet there,
including the risk of reaching audiences that they didn’t intend, the risk of having their
messages appropriated and misused by audiences, and the real risks of harassment and
potentially even violence. By training students to think about the social and embodied
realities of the internet, perhaps activist pedagogues will not only prepare them to deal
with the risk of harassment but also teach students to think about the effects their
messages will have on the embodied experiences of others.
Asking students to consider the potential risks that could befall themselves and
others when they enter the public sphere is particularly important for activist pedagogues
who ask their students to enter into the public sphere and try to create new poetic worlds
using the tactics derived from activist scholarship. Creating poetic worlds can be an
invigorating experience for those who find themselves able to call forth sphere publics of
likeminded individuals; however it is also risky because sphere publics overlap, and
existent sphere publics may see new arguments as a challenge to the status quo that
benefits them. These threatened publics will respond, and they may do so violently. And
while this potential risk is no reason not to act in the public sphere, it should make
instructors reflect on the practice of having students enter the public sphere for a grade.
Instructors should ask themselves how much they are willing to have students risk
because no matter how skillfully rhetors compose, there is always the chance of
harassment in the public sphere. Though students can be taught how to interact with
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others productively, instructors cannot control how others will respond to them. If
students are harassed for what they create and publish for a course grade, then their
instructors must be seen as in part responsible because they coerced those students into a
public whose sociality breeds the potential for harassment. And though it is a cruel aspect
of the public sphere, instructors, especially activist instructors, cannot pretend that
harassment does not exist. Harassment, in one form or another, will always exist in the
public sphere because the public is social and embodied. In light of this reality,
instructors should ask how they want to train their students to perceive and navigate this
risk, not how they ask them to embrace it.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RISKS OF MATERIALISM: NARCISSUS AND THE NASCENT
DEMAGOGUERY OF ACCELERATIONISM
One of the least conspicuous risks of the public sphere is that the rhetor will
create or otherwise become a part of an insular public that is so zealous in affirming their
collective worldview that they come to consider themselves the only people with a clear
understanding of reality. This distinct form of narcissism—the belief that the group a
rhetor belongs to is superior to all other groups because only they see the world
correctly—can serve as a precursor to demagoguery, which Patricia Roberts-Miller
defines as “a discourse that promises stability, certainty, and escape from the
responsibilities of rhetoric through framing public policy in terms of the degree to which
and means by which (not whether) the outgroup should be punished for the current
problems of the ingroup” (Characteristics). When publics begin to fashion strong beliefs,
identities, and worldviews that distinguish them from other publics, they can easily begin
to lapse into simple binary thinking wherein they understand themselves as an intelligent
and righteous ingroup and all those who disagree with them as members of an ignorant
outgroup. As members come to increasingly identify with the ingroup, they also become
susceptible to accepting increasingly radical opinions and beliefs when espoused by the
thought-leaders of that group because they wish to demonstrate their loyalty and by so
doing prove their intelligence and righteousness in the esteem of their public. In other
words, members of the ingroup can become increasingly radical in order to avoid being

127

associated with the outgroup. Such a strong identification with an ingroup is dangerous,
often leading those within it to strongly dislike, distrust, and deride the outgroups. This
animosity creates the conditions for demagogic types of rhetoric that advocate for the
punishment of outgroups for their perceived sins against the ingroup. Narcissism
functions as a precursor to demagoguery by promoting the belief that one specific public
is not only more correct in their understanding of the world than the rest but also that
their members are inherently better people because they understand the world correctly.
Materialist vantages are perhaps both more vulnerable to and more aware of the
risks associated with narcissism than idealist or activist ones because their ontological
orientation encourages them to question both the ways in which publics exist in the world
and what constitutes a public actor. Such ontological questions—rather than the ethical
questions of idealists or the political questions of activists—encourage materialist
scholars to spend much of their time exploring the border between those considered
active subjects within a public and those considered passive objects. This exploration has
led new materialists—who make up the vast majority of materialist scholars in
Composition and Rhetoric and who are much less deterministic than their Marxist
forbearers—to the conclusion that all material objects in the world are potential public
actors because autonomous agency is neither a key characteristic of rhetoric nor an
essential aspect of public actors. New materialists argue that public rhetoric is about the
influence one material actor has on another, and neither consciousness nor agency in the
traditional sense are required for an actor to exert this kind of influence onto another in a
public, private, or social sphere. Similarly, since actors are constantly influencing one
another, then no one actor can be said to have an intrinsic agency; instead, agency is co-
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produced by the intra-actions of various actors as they relate to each other. Such an
emergent understanding of agency does not relieve any individual humans of
responsibility for their actions; rather, it asks each of them to consider how they can best
intra-act with the actors with whom they are enmeshed in order to create the conditions of
possibility for productive change. And though this conclusion is ostensibly benevolent, it
runs the risk of narcissistic demagoguery because it, like the ontological positions and
assumptions it is critiquing, claims to understand the nature of existence, which makes
other interpretations of agency, existence, identity, and rhetoric suspect. Part of the
suspicion new materialists have for other ontological claims stems from the meticulous
standards by which this scholarly community argues for and studies their ontological
understandings of the world. However, no matter how meticulous a group is in their
methods, any claims to ontology remain dangerous because they are inherently claims to
know how the world actually operates, even if those operations run contrary to the
experiences and lived realities of others.
In the 2014 article “Tracing the Missing Masses” Nathaniel Rivers navigates the
tension between the indetermination that accompanies an emergent understanding of
public agency and the determination that accompanies advocating for any particular
ontological understanding of the world. His article begins with the argument that Latour’s
sociology and Jane Bennett’s political ecology—both of which argue that objects are
influential actors within public life—can help Composition and Rhetoric to better study
publics as emergent phenomena that “are themselves ever products of nonhumans and
humans in (oftentimes agonistic) relations.” He then explains a pedagogy he developed
that is inspired by these sources, which asks students to trace instances of nonhumans
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participating in public life. He justifies his pedagogy by claiming, “attending to the
nonhuman makes for compelling student work” and because “teaching is enculturation:
where better to make the case for symmetrical understandings of rhetoric and public
life?” It is this second justification that is of interest here because Rivers’s enculturation
takes place on two vectors as he asks his students both 1) to take part in a type of
publicness composed of humans and nonhumans acting rhetorically and 2) to accept an
ontology that will enable them to understand the world this way. Because of this duality,
students are both being enculturated into the public of things and into the conversations
of new materialists.
The enculturation taking place in River’s pedagogy is unique in that it is coconstitutive. Students are not only acquiring the characteristic and norms of these two
cultures but also are helping to create those characteristics and norms through their
engagements. This exchange can be clearly seen in the object analysis assignment, where
students conduct creative and multimodal analyses that ask what a specific object in the
world does and is rather than what it means. The assignment has distinct parameters, but
the instructions are broad enough to allow for play, experimentation, and codetermination in regards to how the students understand the objects they are studying, the
publics of which they are a part, and the ontological commitments of the class. By
designing the class this way, Rivers relates to it as a complex object that not only
influences students to understand publics as emergent and co-produced entities but also
invites them to co-create that understanding of publicness through their engagements
with specific public objects. By using such inventive methods to teach this ontology,
Rivers avoids determining the understandings that will emerge from his students’
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engagements with the objects and publics they are studying. Of course, as the instructor,
Rivers has an inordinate influence on what emerges from the relations of actors that
compose the class, but he takes strides to actively avoid forcing his ontological beliefs
onto this network. Instead, Rivers uses creative pedagogies to avoid the risk of becoming
demagogic about ontologies that are themselves opposed to demagoguery, and in so
doing he avoids one of the most prominent, though perhaps sophomoric, critiques of coconstitutive rhetorics: that rhetors acts deterministically merely through the act of making
their argument and that the teacher acts deterministically merely through the act of
teaching.
Avoiding the tendency to act narcissistically when discussing ontology is more
difficult than Rivers lets on in his article. Often when someone comes to an
understanding of how things exist in the world—whether this understanding is reached
through affect, argument, belief, community, desire, hallucination, socialization, etc.—it
is difficult to express the newly discovered truth in a way that allows for doubt and
invites collaboration. Instead, new devotees often expresses themselves with unyielding
certainty and perhaps even righteousness as they attempt to share their newly discovered
information with the world. If this righteousness finds a public, then the collective
narcissism has the potential to become demagogic, with the righteous public not only
opposing its beliefs to those outside its discursive borders but also feeling actively
slighted by the people in the outgroup who they believe deserve to be punished simply
for not being a part of the ingroup. In this way, it can be a quick movement from belief to
narcissism to demagoguery.
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The radical leftist techno-utopians commonly referred to as accelerationists are
currently on such a path to demagoguery. They are not currently demagogic, but they are
clearly a narcissistic public whose laborious prose adamantly argue that the only way to
realize an egalitarian post-capitalist society is by embracing their belief that the
advancement of technological production will enable society to evolve beyond
capitalism. Accelerationists argue that the contemporary left should stop resisting
capitalism by regressively turning toward traditional community practices, and instead
they should martial their resources toward improving societal ills by embracing
contemporary technologies and becoming involved in their design and production. This
argument is intentionally similar to Karl Marx’s proposition that nineteenth-century
workers should take over the means of production in order to manifest a more egalitarian
society. Simply put, accelerationists argue that a new and better society cannot be
reached by repeating the mistakes of the past; instead, they claim that workers need to
struggle to make a new, more equitable society by using new and emergent technologies.
The only way to destroy capitalism, they argue, is by accelerating it and thereby speeding
up its collapse.
Steven Shaviro defines accelerationism as “the argument that the only way out is
through” (2). In a less pithy moment, he claims, “The hope driving accelerationism is
that, in fully expressing the potentialities of capitalism, we will be able to exhaust it and
thereby open up access to something behind it” (3). Accelerationism is a political project
focused on the unfettered expansion of capitalism through a complete embrace of its
logics, mechanisms, and systems. Accelerationists are aware that such an embrace
demands the sacrifice of all other systems—aesthetic, individual, moral, philosophical,

132

political, religious, social, etc.—to the system of capitalist production. Accelerationists
are willing to lose all of this not because they believe in capitalism itself but because they
believe that technology will bring about a better post-capitalist future. How exactly
different accelerationists imagines this future depends on where they identify themselves
on the political spectrum. Those on the left believe that acceleration will completely
exhaust the logics of capitalism, resulting in the need for another system of production.
Those in the center believe acceleration will demonstrate capitalism’s inability to meet
the needs of the populace, and a new variant of it will arise from the resulting turmoil.
Finally, those on the right believe that the perpetual intensification of capitalism will
bring about the technological singularity in which everyone will be constantly producing,
an ending that both destroys and perpetuates the capitalist model.
Despite this variety of thought, most accelerationist theory is written and taken up
by the left. And while their arguments sound convincing, the hubristic claims and
predictions they make demonstrate the ways in which this public is moving toward
demagoguery. For instance, accelerationists simply accept that increasing technological
production to undue capitalism will cause a lot of people to suffer, they argue that utopian
society should be ruled by a small intellectual class, they ignore the political needs of
women and minorities, and they claim that humans should take control of nature and
regulate its processes. These arguments demonstrate not only a callousness for those
outside the public but also a desire for a few people to wield a currently unimaginable
amount of power. Accelerationists will argue, however, that they are not imagining this
power for its own sake but rather are responding to the likely possibilities that will
emerge from humans and technologies co-evolving together. Accelerationists similarly
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claim that they are not utopians because they are basing their ideas on actual material
relations, and in this way they understand an ontological truth that others do not. As the
famous transhumanist Martha Rothblatt’s responded when her work was called utopian:
“this is not speculation, what we talk about will happen” (117). Such assurance in their
understanding of ontology is what leads accelerationists to their collective narcissism,
which seems to be progressing toward demagoguery.

From Narcissism to Demagoguery
The connection between narcissism and demagoguery can be understood through
a close analysis of Ovid’s version of the Narcissus myth in which an attractive youth is
punished for his hubris by a goddess who makes him mistake reality. Narcissus was the
son of a river god and a naiad; he was a beautiful youth for whom many nymphs and
young men pined. Callously, Narcissus denied all of his suitors, most famously Echo, a
nymph who had been cursed by Jupiter’s wife Juno to only repeat the words of others
after she had distracted the goddess with stories so that she would not catch her husband
rendezvousing with the nymphs. When the cursed Echo attempted to seduce Narcissus,
he scorned her, as he had so many potential lovers before. Having been rejected, Echo
fled from her home and hid her face in shame among the leaves and caves where her
body withered until all that was left was her voice. Narcissus was then punished for his
cruelties, both to Echo and others, by Nemesis, the goddess of divine retribution, who led
him to a fountain whose surface had never before been touched by another being. In this
divine pool, Narcissus saw his reflection and fell immediately and intensely in love with
the shadowy stranger in the water. Not being able to access his love, who he did not
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realize was his own reflection, Narcissus remained in that place, staring into the pool.
Finally noticing how his lover’s responses mirrored his own actions, Narcissus realized
that he had fallen in love with his own reflection and began to cry. As his tears dissipated
the reflection, Narcissus feared that his beloved image would disappear, and in a fit of
passion, Narcissus beat himself raw, bloodied, and bruised. Eventually, his beautiful body
was destroyed—consumed not only by his own blows but also “worn away little by little
by the hidden fire [of passion].” As Narcissus died, he called out in self-pity, and Echo,
who had been witness to the entire scene, repeated his words in mourning. The devout
Echo stayed at the spot of Narcissus’s death until his naiad sisters found the beautiful
flowers where his body should have been and named them after the vain young man.
Ultimately, the story of Narcissus’s vanity is one of hubris, which the ancient
Greeks understood as a challenge to both the social order and the supremacy of the
gods—challenges that were often manifested in vulgar displays of power in which
perpetrators harmed victims for their own sadistic pleasure in much the same way that
Roberts-Miller claims demagogues punish the outgroup solely for being inferior to the
ingroup (Ludwig 172). Such ruthlessness is clearly related to Narcissism in the myth by
the presence of the goddess Nemesis, whose primary mythological role was to punish
hubristic humans. By having Nemesis punish Narcissus, Ovid demonstrates a connection
between vanity and violence. Though he did not maliciously attack anyone or upset the
social order, Narcissus still faces the wrath of Nemesis because vanity led him to harm
those he deemed inferior to himself. If vanity leads an individual person to hubris; then
collective vanity leads to collective hubris, and collective hubris is a pithy definition of
demagoguery. The word Demagogue itself is derived from the words demos and agogos
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translating roughly into “leader of the people” or “leader of the mob.” The demagogue is
one who incites the people to realize their own power and rise above their station—the
demagogue literally enacts a collective hubris. For this reason, it is important to
understand the three, increasingly dangerous, traits of narcissistic publics that can led to
demagoguery.
Narcissus’s dying scene illuminates three primary ways in which publics move
from Narcissism to demagoguery. First, just as Narcissus fails to see his reflection for
what it really is, so too do the worldviews of publics change the ways in which their
participants understand and engage reality. Second, just as Echo continues to validate
Narcissus after his death, so too can members of a public continually affirm each other’s
erroneous and dangerous beliefs in ways that lead to obsession. Third, just as Narcissus
scorns potential lovers because he believes himself to be the only one deserving of his
own love, so too can publics ignore, and even detest, those who disagree with their basic
premises.
The first step toward demagoguery is the way a public’s discourse influences how
their participants understand every aspect of the world. To an extent, this influence is an
inherent aspect of language; however, members of narcissistic publics have a tendency to
have very specific terministic screens, leading to very specific understandings of the
world. In Language as Symbolic Action Kenneth Burke defines terministic screens as the
matrices of terminology through which humans understand the world. Similar to how a
photo filter changes an image by manipulating its color, form, emphasis, and texture, so
too do terministic screens, the languages humans use to understand their worlds, change
how individuals perceive it. However, unlike photo filters, with terministic screens there
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is no original way of understanding the world; there is no outside the filter that humans
can access. There is no Ur filter through which humanity can clearly and accurately
understand the world in which they dwell. Likewise, no terministic screen—no set of
terms devoted to a particular study in a particular language for a particular public—
necessarily creates a truer depiction of reality than any other. While some screens are
more logically constructed and can account for more phenomena, they are still screens in
that they create a worldview that draws attention toward different elements of the world,
influencing the observations and understandings of its users. Though some screens work
better or worse than others, they are all semantic constructions. Burke argues that, in
something akin to confirmation bias, everyone’s worldview is influenced by the
terministic screens they use to discuss and argue about it, and for this reason, a narrow
terministic screen creates a narrow worldview, whereas a broad screen creates a broad
worldview. And though terministic screens are unavoidable, people can expand their
screens by adopting, co-creating, and participating in different discourses with different
terminologies and practices. What moves narcissistic publics toward demagoguery, then,
is not that they have terministic screens but that they believe their terministic screens to
be undeniably true.
Many publics understand their terministic screens as true because, while
individual terministic screens may influence how an individual understands the world, the
entirety of human understanding—the sum of all terministic screens—is itself created
through language, meaning that to have any faith in the world at all is also to have faith in
language. In “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” Friedrich Nietzsche argues that
language is a fundamental aspect of how humans understand and interact with the world.
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He begins by claiming that humans have no access to the world as it actually exists but
instead have to filter everything through their senses, which are, if not idiosyncratic, at
least species specific: “if we could only perceive things now as a bird, now as a worm,
now as a plant . . . then no one would speak of such a regularity of nature, rather, nature
would be grasped only as a creation which is subjective in the highest degree” (186).
Nietzsche argues that after humans abstract the world through their senses, they abstract
it again through their language: “we believe we know something about the things
themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess
nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which correspond in no way to the original
entities” (183). Words are not just metaphors for individual sensory experiences; rather,
they are metaphors that equate unequal individual sensory experiences. For instance,
people agree that a myriad of unique things can be considered flowers, though the
similarities among them are fewer than their differences. Nonetheless, humans emphasize
the similarities that exist among flowers in order to perpetuate the category of flowers
that enables people such as botanists, farmers, florists, and gardeners to operate in the
world. In this way, concepts are metaphors that are used to connect some sensory
experiences and separate others by determinative attributes. Through this system of
categorization, Nietzsche argues that humans created a shared world. To deny this shared
world would be both to deny the world and the community that created it. Narcissistic
publics like the accelerationists do not want to deny their community, so they stand firm
to their ontological understandings of the world, which are in part constructed by the
language used to categorize the actors within it.

138

It is important to note that the criteria used to categorize concepts, whether it be
flowers or the co-constitutive nature of humans and technology, is neither completely
arbitrary nor completely reflective of reality, meaning that all metaphoric systems should
be seen as both simultaneously valid and suspect. Nietzsche explains that since humans
create the categories by which they classify and identify things, the resulting hierarchies
say little about the world itself: “If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after
inspecting a camel, declare, ‘look, a mammal’ I have indeed brought a truth to light in
this way, but . . . it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single
point which would be ‘true to itself’ or really and universally valid apart from man”
(185). While this type of knowledge creation and categorization lacks a universal truth or
understanding of the world as it may objectively exist, Nietzsche argues that it is how
humans compose their shared worlds. To attempt to abolish such linguistic structures
would be to ignore the stable “facts” that have been constructed and to destroy
humanity’s ability to act in the world with any degree of certainty. In other words, while
concepts are anthropomorphic truths that do not accurately reflect reality, they do enable
humans to build their shared worlds by developing long term plans, moral codes,
scientific discoveries, logistics, etc. In this way, language, categories, and terministic
screens are not duplicitous negatives; instead, these actors enable activities that are
understood to be fundamentally human, and they allow for our large population to
survive. Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that humans are inherently category builders—
inherently users of terministic and conceptual screens. He argues that abstraction and
categorization are how humans relate to the world, and in making this claim he reaffirms
Aristotle’s famous definition of man as a rational, speaking animal.
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Still, categories and terministic screens can be dangerous. Though there are
worldviews that are inherently more or less hazardous, there is none that is completely
without risk. Thus, though linguistic constructs should not be universally derided, they
also should not be universally accepted. A little bit of skepticism in regards to ontological
commitments is healthy. Nietzsche even warns that one of the primary risks of any
worldview is idealism. When beliefs become so rigid that they deny alternative
possibilities, suppresses artistry, forestall discovery, and limit human capacity, they
become dangerous. In this way, the problem with narcissistic publics is that as they come
to believe in the correctness of their worldview, they also become righteous, thinking that
their worldview is the only correct one. Andrew Pilsch’s rhetorical analysis of
accelerationism is particularly interesting in this regard because, though he admits that
the public has some problems, he asserts that “it is the only discourse today actively
imagining a radical future as radically alien as communism’s idea of a classless society
was in the nineteenth century” (3). He claims that this utopian rhetoric is important
because it, more than any other discourse, enables contemporary society to imagine
possibilities beyond neoliberalism subjectivity. In this way Pilsch, as a critic, speaks to
the singular importance of accelerationist publics in a way that demonstrates its own
righteous tendencies.

Righteous Rhetorics and Niche Publics
Righteousness—adamant belief that the abstracted terministic and conceptual
screens through which a person understands the world are completely and universally
correct, making its adherents better than those with different ontological commitments—
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serves as the second step toward demagoguery. Just as Narcissus was so engrossed with
himself that he ignored the suffering of those around him, so too can members of a
community become so infatuated with a particular terministic screen that they not only
refuse to question the reality it provides them but also claim that it is the realest of all
realities. The communal aspect of this exchange is important in creating this infatuation
because being a part of a community makes it easier for people to accept premises they
may not have accepted otherwise. Leon Festinger’s 1956 study of a small cult in
suburban Chicago called The Seekers elucidates this point well. The leader of the cult,
Dorothy Martin, claimed that beings from the planet Clarion were using her as a vessel to
write letters predicting the destruction of the world by a flood that would occur in the
early morning of December 21, 1955. Martin’s writings stated that the Seekers would be
rescued by a spaceman in a flying saucer who would arrive at the stroke of midnight,
hours before the disaster would occur. When the spaceman did not arrive, there was great
cognitive dissonance as the believers—many of whom had lost family, friends, money,
and reputations by joining the cult—tried to merge their obstinate beliefs with the
disconfirmation of the prophecy. Martin herself cried when her savior did not arrive;
however, at 4:45 a.m. she had another bout of “automatic writing” in which the
inhabitants of Clarion used her body as a vessel to transcribe a message to the group
stating that the earth had been spared because The Seekers had spread so much light
throughout the world.
Instead of disbanding after the spaceman failed to arrive, individual cult members
became even more committed to both the community and its beliefs. The group became
more connected than before, and members began to actively proselytize. In his study,
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Festinger explains that when an individual person has a deep seeded belief for which they
have sacrificed, they can overcome blatant disconfirmation of that belief through the
social support of other believers: “It is unlikely that one isolated believer could withstand
the kind of disconfirming evidence we have specified. If, however, the believer is a
member of a group of convinced persons who can support one another, we would expect
the belief to be maintained ” (4). Journalism professor Charles Seife builds on Festinger’s
study in his own work on polarization. He argues that new information technologies have
increased the capacity for likeminded people to find one another, regardless of how
obscure or ludicrous their opinions may be. This capacity makes it easier to build
communities like The Seekers that are inherently solipsistic. Seife argues that three
prominent phenomenon enable people not only to find and participate in obscure
communities but also to shelter themselves from information that would otherwise
disrupt their worldview: 1) the catering of news to specific political ideologies, 2) the
filter bubbles that determine what internet content people are exposed to, and 3) the
ability to find internet communities to fortify eccentric beliefs. Seife argues that when
people no longer have to encounter dissonant information, they will hold their beliefs
more adamantly, and they may even come to believe increasingly outlandish things as
long as they are propagated by publics with which they identity. In other words, the
ability to limit one’s participation to discursive spaces where only certain interpretations
of the world are allowed and dissonant perspectives are not presented is enabling more
extreme beliefs and more radical political positions. A clear example of this for
accelerationists is the 2017 publication “#AltWoke Companion” which promotes a more
radical version of accelerationism than that originally proposed by Alex Williams and
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Nick Srnicek in 2014. The authors of this article refer to this more extreme position as
hyper-left-accelerationism:
The idea that technosocial processes within capitalism can be hastened, expanded,
or repurposed even more than was originally thought by first generation Left
Accelerationists. Accelerationism is a neutral ideology/phenomenon with Left and
Right political deviations. Left adherents believe that technology can be pushed to
emancipatory ends in order to transition into a post-capitalist world. Right
adherents wish to intensify the conditions of capitalism indefinitely to possibly
bring about the singularity. Hyper-Left-Accelerationism is the application of the
Right Accelerationist methods to the objectives of Left Accelerationism.
Just four years after the initial call for accelerationist politics, its adherents want to push it
to more extreme places, even flirting with intensifying capital itself rather than just the
means of technological production, and if this path leads to the merging of human and
machine consciousness into a singularity, then so be it. In this way, the echo chamber of
accelerationism has amplified its position in ways that are astoundingly radical. Of
course, this position is not as extreme as an apocalyptic spaceman, but the two are not
completely unrelated either; they are both the products of echo chambers.
The reason entering echo chambers not only validate but also intensify peoples
beliefs is not only because of the sheer number of times the messages are circulated but
also because people want to demonstrate their dedication to the groups to which they
belong. As Kenneth Burke argues in A Rhetoric of Motives, identification is the aspect of
rhetoric that makes an audience feel consubstantial with the rhetor while still remaining a
unique entity (1325). Publics are social, and comradery through shared arguments,
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activities, backgrounds, ideologies, interests, opinions, etc. builds community. Through
identification with a group, reasonable persons can come to believe unreasonable things
because they are reasoning affectively rather than logically. People become so attached to
their group identifications that they would rather believe something outlandish than be
separated from the group. Likewise, people may be so attached to the group that they
completely ignore any ideas that come from outside of it.
A common example that demonstrates the power of identification is the increased
polarization and extremism of political discourse and internet news. When users explore
the internet, both their browsers and the individual websites they visit track their
movements and make recommendations based on their browsing and search histories.
These sites then recommend news stories and products based on what content the users
have previously engaged. Similarly, news sites track what stories people are reading, and
then produce increasing amounts of similar content aimed directly at that audience
(Weekend Edition). In this way, people are being funneled toward echo chambers by
algorithms, recommendations, and also self-sorting (Sunstein). As people continue to
gravitate toward sites that reaffirm their opinions, while avoiding ideas that upset or
offend them, they are actively choosing to identify with a single group and engross
themselves in one terministic screen: people are choosing to live in one conceptual world.
And through each individuals participation with that world, their terministic screens come
to have more intensity, more influence on how they understand the world, and more
validity in their individual estimations. Individuals read stories, which reaffirms their
worldviews, which encourages them to read more stories, which further reaffirm their
worldview, and so on. Echo chambers are seemingly infinite loops in which each cycle
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intensifies and individual’s beliefs. Such intensification is evidenced by Yphtach Lelkes
recent article, “The Hostile Audience,” which describes a study in which the authors
showed how access to broadband internet increased political polarization by providing
increased access to more polarized new sources. Of course broadband internet is not the
cause of partisanship, but it is an actor within the problem that exacerbates it by
providing people access to obscure news sources that reinforce their worldviews, even if
these people are not particularly political (Lelkes et al. 17). When provided an invitation
to enter into an echo chamber occupied by other people with whom they identify, many
people will accept it, and once in the echo chamber, these people will most likely begin to
identify more strongly with more extreme positions.
And while it may not be surprising either how many people will believe extreme
positions if they identify with the community or how adamant and radical those beliefs
will be, it is at least alarming how little exposure is necessary to see transformations. For
instance, a 2014 study found that watching only four minutes of Fox News a week
increases the odds of voting Republican by almost an entire percent. The influence news
media has increases as people share stories on various social media sites. For example, a
recent study lead by Yochai Benkler examined the number of stories shared on social
media during the 2016 presidential campaign, and the researchers found that because of
its vast circulation, Brietbart was able to set the agenda for the rest of the news media.
The stories that Breitbart covered became the stories that other conservative sites wanted
to cover in an attempt to get as many social media shares as the far-right publication.
Brietbart’s power was then increased as it explicitly attacked other networks as biased,
uninformed, or unreliable—as it did to Fox News during the Republican Primary. When
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Brietbart attacked another news organization, that organization would respond by
following Brietbart’s agenda more closely in order to avoid the allegations. Eventually,
Breitbart became so influential due to its social media presence that it influenced the
coverage of mainstream and leftist publications as well. Like a blackhole, Brietbart was
able to move the media conversation further to the right because partisan news
consumption is not equal in America. There is no force on the radical left that is large
enough to serve as a counterbalance to Brietbart’s media machine, so the entire
mediascape was pulled to the right.
Benkler’s study found that conservatives are more likely to exclusively read
partisan news than liberals, who are more likely to balance their partisan news with
mainstream and bipartisan sources. In short, the intake of partisan news is not equal on
the right and the left, and this is important because its shows that there is more than
technological advances dictating the polarized intake of news based on identification. If
technology were the determining factor in these cases, there would be symmetry of media
consumption on the right and the left. Since there is much more bias on the right, there is
clearly something else happening. Benkler claims that this other factor is a mix of human
choices and political campaigning. Being algorithmically exposed to a niche public is not
enough to keep someone siloed in an echo chamber, there must be other reasons
supporting the exclusive identification with one public, and I argue that the primary
reason is a clear articulation of a readerly identity. In the tightly knit network of partisan
conservative media, Brietbart is a community that clearly identifies with its audience:
who it is, who it isn’t, and who it wants to be. Readers of Breitbart explicitly know who
they are and what values they stand for; likewise, they know exactly who disagrees with
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them and believe they know their values and motivations as well. Kenneth Buke argues
that along with identification, rhetoric creates division. As a community becomes united
by values, they also divide themselves from those who they see as not sharing those
values. At its most extreme, those within the niche public cease to see any positive value
in those outside the community, who they see as their enemies. At this point, the public
becomes completely demagogic.
Notably, the accelerationist movement was in no small part created by the
division Burke associates with identification in that the movement identifies itself in
opposition to conservative forces such as Brietbart and the alt-right. The accelerationist
movement is in large part a reaction to the current dominion conservative forces have
over the contemporary mediascape. It is an attempt to balance conservative power by
establishing a similarly solipsistic force on the left. For example, the prose of the
“#AltWoke Companion” begins by claiming that the exigence for the movement was a
string a conservative victories such as Brexit and the Trump campaign, which they claim
are “symptomatic of and catalysts for Right Accelerationism.” They then claim that the
famous conservative accelerationist Nick Land’s understandings of nihilism and how to
manipulate the dark side of capitalism is “the suicidal epitome of white privilege”
because those who really understand how to manipulate these systems are the,
predominantly black and brown, criminals—“our relatives, neighbors, and coworkers”—
who have learned how to manipulate the system out of necessity. Beyond this argument,
which also calls for understanding identity as a conglomeration of fluid constructs one
can move between freely, the rhetorical style of the argument resembles that of the altright with graphically sexual images meant to shock the reader, intensely quick
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explanations of arguments, and use of re-appropriated cultural slang such as
#BlackPopMatters, Kanyeing, and Pleb. Finally, the movement literally defines itself
through its mirrored identity to the alt-right: they support cucks, they denounce alpha
males, they want to build a second cathedral, and they promise to kill basilisks. Most
blatantly, they define their own mascot by saying, “Wohjak is to #AltWoke as Pepe is to
Alt-Right.” In this way, the accelerationists are not only righteous in their beliefs but also
they are becoming demagogic in their arguments that those outside their niche public—
especially those in the alt-right and members of the regressive left who are merely
#Woke—are inferior and need to be either punished or converted.

Demagogic Rhetorics
Demagoguery—violent notions about who has value and who does not based on
community identity—is the final evolution of a narcissistic public. Just as Narcissus
refused to see value in any body besides his own, it is possible for people to become so
engrossed with the collective body of which they are a part that they become uncaring, if
not outright combative, toward those they do not identify as part of their community.
Regularly, these communities utilize binary “us vs. them” rhetorics to reify divisions
between the community and those outside of it whom they believe pose a threat. Patricia
Roberts-Miller’s 2009 article, “Dissent as ‘Aid and Comfort to the Enemy’” explains
how this binary works by analyzing a 2007 Gene Simmons interview that went viral after
the Kiss bassist and co-lead singer claimed that supporting the troops while also
protesting the Iraq War gave “aid and comfort to the enemy.” Roberts-Miller explains
that Simmons’s claim was not an argument in the way rhetoricians generally understand
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the term; rather, Simmons’s utterance was a performance of a specific group identity. For
Roberts-Miller, group identity is important for people not because it provides community
but because it says something essential about group members (180). In the Simmons
example, he is speaking to those who identify with war supporters because they believe
such support is essentially virtuous. This belief does not rely on the specific context of
the war or its supporters; instead, “supporting American wars is virtuous” functions as a
commonplace enthymeme, and alluding to it demonstrates one’s inherent goodness and
superiority over those who do not share the belief. The accelerationists have similar
beliefs that enable them to feel superior to those with whom they disagree. For
accelerationists, anyone who does not believe in creating a utopian society through the
acceleration of capitalist technologies is somehow deficient—intellectually, morally,
socially, etc.—when compared to those in the ingroup. These belief helps to create a
simple binary between the good people in the ingroup and the bad people in the outgroup.
But just because such demagogic groups allow for simple binary conceptions of
the world does not mean that the identifications that bind them are mindless. In fact,
people often have to do extra cognitive work to explain why members of the ingroup did
something bad or why members of the outgroup did something good. This extra cognitive
work is rewarded by reifying the individual’s identity as a good person within a group of
other good people; nonetheless, some cognitive dissonance is bound to appear because
groups are not stable. Opinions change, contexts shift, alliances become unproductive,
and people no longer agree. When the composition of the group changes for any of these
reasons, people have a difficult time understanding themselves in relation to it, which is a
problem for members who predominantly understand themselves as good because of their
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affiliation with the group. If one’s goodness is tied to the goodness of others, then what
does it mean when those others do something bad? Roberts-Miller claims that this exact
problem is what gave Gene Simmons’s argument so much power within a certain
community. Simmons was able to identify people who had once been part of the ingroup,
those who supported the troops, with the perceived values of the outgroup, giving
comfort to the enemy. Simmons’s identity performance clearly created two groups where
there had previously only been one; he gave his audience a way to see themselves as
remaining in the ingroup while positioning those with whom they had previously agreed
as aligning with the outgroup.
Roberts-Miller’s analysis of Simmons focuses predominately on
ingroup/outgroup rhetorics, but her most recent work expands into demagoguery more
explicitly. As discussed in the beginning, she defines demagoguery as:
[A] discourse that promises stability, certainty, and escape from the
responsibilities of rhetoric through framing public policy in terms of the degree
to which and means by which (not whether) the outgroup should be punished for
the current problems of the ingroup. Public debate largely concerns three stases:
group identity (who is in the ingroup, what signifies outgroup membership, and
how loyal rhetors are to the ingroup); need (usually framed in terms of how evil
the outgroup is); [and] what level of punishment to enact against the outgroup
(restriction of rights to extermination). (“Characteristics”)
She further explains that demagoguery does not rely on emotionalism or populism;
instead, demagoguery relies on a group seeing themselves both as essentially righteous
and under attack from others in the society. She claims that these types of groups are
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often the forbearers of war, genocide, and the denial of rights; and she explains that they
all have eleven similar characteristics.5 Of these, four are particularly important to the
study of accelerationism. 1) Demagogic publics operate on binaries: the primary one
being who they are and who the outgroup is. 2) These binaries are indicative of the
simple way demagogic groups understand the world; they are naïve realists who believe
that their observations of the world are not only accurate but also universal. Those in the
outgroups can accept or deny these truths, but ingroup members know them to be certain.
3) Despite knowing the absolute truth, demagogic publics always feel as if they are under
threat. Though they are often the dominant force in society, they feel as if they have been
persecuted and oppressed by the outgroup. They claim that they have been magnanimous
victims in the past, but they now need to defend themselves through means that might not
reflect their better natures. 4) Any unseemly tactics (name calling, underhandedness,
violence, etc.) are justified because the ingroup claims that the outgroups are also using
such unscrupulous methods against them (“Characteristics”). In short, the ingroup
understands itself as a superior force who must prove their superiority to the outgroups,
lest they be destroyed by them.
Roberts-Miller argues that demagoguery can, in its most extreme instantiations,
lead to genocide, classicide, or politicide, but it exists well before such atrocities ever
occur. She claims that demagoguery is never confined to one oppressive group acting
insularly but rather transcends to multiple groups within a society. For example, Hitler’s
demagogic rhetoric would not have gained traction if other groups in the Weimar

5

The eleven principles are: binary thinking, naïve realism, authoritarianism, ontological taxonomies,
deductive reasoning, identity as logic, projection, moral equivalence, cunning projection, victimization, and
use of hierarchical metaphors.
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Republic had not also been pointing fingers and claiming to be the victims of outgroups
(Roberts-Miller “Demagoguery”). The culture of Germany between the wars was itself
demagogic. What allowed Hitler to gain power was not his unique use of demagoguery
but his ability to unite and mobilize a large enough ingroup that they could take power.
Because demagoguery transcends specific groups and violences in this way, it is not
always easy to identify. Demagoguery does not start out audaciously; its roots are subtle,
immersive, and variant. People who would not usually be associated with anger, violence,
or hatred can come to identify with demagogic beliefs if exposed to their rhetorics long
enough. Demagoguery is alluring because it frees the ingroup from the complex and
emotionally exhausting work of democracy (Roberts-Miller “Demagoguery”). It asks a
people to ignore the multiplicities of the world and instead embrace a simple realism in
which they are inherently good and righteous. This shuts demagogues off from the rest of
the world until all they can see is their ingroup and all they can hear is its echoing
messages. The world demagogues understand are the ones created by their terministic
screens—the linguistic constructions—of the demagogic publics to which they belong.
Idealogues becomes Narcissus, ignoring a world full of beauty and passion in order to
stare at a young lovers in a shadowy world while a nymphs echo praises back to them.
This image of Narcissus ignoring the world, staring at his reflection, and
mourning his inability to embrace his young lover is an apt metaphor for the ways public
rhetors can become so enrapt in their arguments and the immediate audiences for which
they are writing that they lose track of larger publics, perspectives, and possibilities. Of
course, writing for specific audiences or participating in specific discourse communities
is not inherently demagogic. These types of speech acts and communities are necessary,
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but there is also value in seeing the world beyond one’s usual terministic and conceptual
screens, beyond one’s normal interlocutors, and beyond one’s own abilities to incite
change. If one refuses to leave their discourse community and experience those of others,
then they are much more likely to fall into righteous logics and believe that they alone
have access to absolute truth. This is precisely what has happened to leftist
accelerationists: they have come to display nascent demagoguery, and while they are not
yet a violent ingroup/outgroup thinking public, but their arguments are quite narcissistic,
righteous, and moving in that direction.

Accelerating Toward Demagoguery
Leftist accelerationists are focused predominantly on accelerating the
technological capacities of capitalism, as opposed to its logics or principles, though some
more extreme versions claim that everything within capitalism must be accelerated in
order to manifest better futures. Still, the primary focus of leftist accelerationism is
technological production, with class, consumption, identity, finance, labor, and
ownership being secondary concerns. This fetishizing of technology can be seen in the
introduction to #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader in which Robin MacKay and
Armen Avanessian argue that the “political heresy” of accelerationism is necessary in
contemporary politics because it is the only leftist position that focuses on progress (4).
MacKay and Avanessian characterize the contemporary left as a conglomeration of
luddites who, realizing that technology was the tool of instrumentalist, capitalist, and
conservative oppressors, chose to become “technologically illiterate,” leaving those
powerful tools to the devices of their enemies (6). McKay and Avanessian argue that this
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illiteracy is not only practiced by the left but is also propagated by them as an impotent
and ineffectual form of protest, disruption, and advocacy. This argument is followed by
the claim that the contemporary left has been attempting to hold back progress, if not
completely revert society to an imagined idyllic state. McKay and Avanessian assert that
accelerationism is the only progressive option for leftists, and they call for: “a renewed
Prometheanism and rationalism, an affirmation that the increasing immanence of the
social and the technical is irreversible and indeed desirable, and a commitment to
developing new understandings of the complexity this brings to contemporary politics”
(7). In other words, the accelerationists believe that there is only one indisputable reality
that humans are able to manipulate, and currently it is being manipulated in pro-capitalist
ways. McKay and Avanessian believe that increasing technological capacities will enable
humans to reshape nature, politics, and society to their desires. And while this statement
demonstrates the basic narcissism of accelerationism, a history of the movement is even
more illuminating.
Credit for coining the term accelerationist is given to Roger Zelazny, who used it
in his sci-fi novel Lord of Light to describe a sect of future humans who believe that
technology should be available to everyone, not just the ruling classes. The term was
transformed from sci-fi to theory by Benjamin Noys, who used the term in his 2010 book
The Persistence of the Negative to describe technology fetishists who believe that the best
future can only be created through a complete embrace of all technological advancements
regardless of their individual repercussions. Noys was specifically critiquing both a
radical leftist movement focused on accelerating capitalism as a mode of resistance and
the New Right who were fixated on limiting the power of governments by selling public
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interests to private companies. After Noys’s book, the term accelerationism gained some
traction in the public sphere, but it did not become popular until Alex Williams and Nick
Srnicek published their “#Accelerate: Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics” [MAP]
in 2013, a document that advocated for the leftist position Noys had explicitly critiqued.
The short document made a large impact on a small niche public of radical leftists and
has since been translated into several languages. The response to the manifesto has
created most of the artifacts now associated with accelerationism: there has been an
anemic Twitter campaign, three books, a journal, a workshop, and a movie. There have
also been several books written that are loosely associated with the movement, but few of
them take the movement particularly seriously.6 There have also been some talks,
presentations, and other ephemera, but this list constitutes most of the accelerationist
texts that have been produced.
Due to such limited resources, McKay and Avanessian’s anthology is mostly
comprised of Marxist theories that have influenced accelerationists. The theories both
situate the movement historically and establish “accelerationism ‘itself’ as a fictional or
hyperstitional anticipation of intelligence to come” (8). In other words, the editors hope
that the history they provide not only explains how accelerationism came to be but also
how it makes certain futures possible. The authors believe they are not merely opening up
different possibilities and pathways of thought; instead, they imagine themselves as
creating these futures merely through the act of publishing the collection in the same way
6

The books are #Accelerate by Robin McKay and Armen Avanessian, Malign Velocities by Benjamin
Noys, and No Speed Limit by Steven Shaviro. The journal is &&& edited by Jason Adams, Mohammad
Salemy, and Tony Yanick. The conference was called “At the Limits of Perception and Cognition,” and it
was held in Berlin. The movie is called Hyperstition and was created by Christopher Roth in collaboration
with Armen Avanessian. Some of the books associated with the movement but not a part of it are Inventing
the Future by Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, Four Futures by Peter Frass, and the anthology Fanged
Noumena by Nick Land.
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the oracle at Delphi brought about events by the act of prophesy. The editors believe that
the accelerationist essays they are compiling are neither describing current events nor
prescribing actions for a certain group; they believe they are creating a hype machine that
will bring about a post-capitalist future through the repetition of the accelerationist
apocalypse narrative, and that is why they refer to the work as hyperstitional. Artist
Maggie Roberts explains that hyperstition is the phenomenon by which a fictional
narrative transcends the work of one person and takes on a shared cultural significance
through the mis of rhetoric. Hyperstitions are similar to memes, except they act to create
the fiction they are propagating. To do this efficiently, hyperstitions need a history, and
for accelerationism, this history begins with the writings of Karl Marx, moves through
the poststructuralist theories of Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Francois Lyotard, moves into the
cybernetic theories of Nick Land and the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit, and finally
arrives at contemporary accelerationist texts. It is from this Marxist base that
accelerationists believe they will build a post-capitalist future, but this base is also what is
leading them to demagoguery.
Rooted in Marxism, accelerationism has been nurtured by a narcissistic soil. This
is not to say that the entire Marxist tradition—one of the most widely distributed and
influential intellectual publics of the last two hundred years—has been completely
narcissistic; rather, it is to say that one of the central tenets of Marxism to which
accelerationists cling is inherently narcissistic: false consciousness. While Marx never
used the term false consciousness himself, the term is used in Marxist discourse to refer
to ways in which ideology influences how the oppressed classes understand and operate
in the world. The term builds on Marx’s concept from The German Ideology that a
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society’s economic systems determine its values, despite most workers believing that the
values determine the economic systems. Marx argues that workers believe there are truths
and principles that influence how businesses operate, but in reality businesses operate to
produce capital while ad hoc creating the social values to justify their practices (180).
False consciousness as its own term originated with György Lukács who used it in his
book History and Class Consciousness to explain why working class people were not
always attempting to overthrow their oppressors. Lukács argued—though working class
people are rational, intelligent, and working toward their own interests—their
understandings of the world, their interests, and how they could achieve those interests
have been historically formed against them; in others words, though workers act
rationally, they are doing so in a false paradigm in which they cannot be certain to meet
their needs: they have a false consciousness of the world. Workers will not revolt because
they understand the world incorrectly—their ontological commitments are wrong.
The concept of false consciousness was widely taken up in the 1960s.
Revolutionaries assumed they could move people’s thinking out of false consciousness
and into real consciousness. However, by at least the 1990s, this objective was seen as
naive. As philosophers began to question the epistemological ability to understand the
world directly—as opposed to through a terministic screen, conceptual network, or
ideological lens—the question of false consciousness began to fade (Eagleton 11).
Further, philosophers began to question whether or not ideologies were themselves
actually false. If people are smart and able to understand ideologies as social constructs
that influence how they act in the world, then there must be something in the ideologies
that they either enjoy or find to be convincingly true (12). Such critiques are more

157

generous, and perhaps logocentric, versions of Lyotard’s pronouncement that workers not
only enjoy the consumption of capitalism but also the servitude of it. Lyotard sees
exploitative labor as having a jouissance, a destructive and libidinal pleasure, that
academics, in their want to decry it as exploitative, ignore: “I realize that a proletariat
would hate you [academics] . . . because you dare not say the only important thing there
is to say, that one can enjoy swallowing the shit of capital” (219). Lyotard claims that
academics have invented the suffering of the proletariat because they cannot understand
the libidinal drive that motivates them to stay servile. In contrast, Raymond Geuss argues
that what makes false consciousness false is that the proletariat does not understand that
the created social system was created to maintain oppressive power (62).
It is telling that Lyotard makes three appearances in #Accelerate, whereas neither
Eagleton nor Geuss makes one. Not only does the former’s abrasive style align with the
edgy aesthetic of the movement but also his conceptions of reality, history, and
technology foreshadow accelerationism. In MAP, Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek argue
that the primary problem of the left is that it is “a folk politics of localism, direct action,
and relentless horizontalism” (354). Like Lyotard, they are not interested in the
multiplicities of thoughts, experiences, and realities but are rather focused on
understanding the world from the perspective of a universalist ontology that claims to
know that all humans want increased comfort and consumption. While MAP claims that
capitalism is unjust and perverted, their primary issue is that capitalist systems hold back
the types of progress and plenty for which all humans yearn. Williams and Srnicek
believe that by moving away from capitalism they can unleash the full potential of
technology to be something more revolutionary than minor product upgrades. And while
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this future may be beneficial, the problem with the utopia is that decisions as to what
things will be made and why will not be made equally because in the name of
expediency, the authors claim to need “a collectively controlled vertical authority in
addition to distributed horizontal forms of sociality” (359). Williams and Srnicek neglect
both the values of democracy and diversity as a process of governing collectively and
argue instead for a social hierarchy in which a few lead vertically and the many conform
horizontally.
In short, the goals of accelerationism are to increase technological innovation and
consumption so that everyone can enjoy the future chosen by the select few who believe
that their universal understanding of the world allows them to know what is best for the
rest of the population. Though Williams and Srnicek seem to be advocating for
participatory politics when they claim, “an ecology of organisations, a pluralism of
forces” is necessary to create the kind of egalitarian accelerationist society for which they
are advocating, they undercut this sentiment when they claim:
The overwhelming privileging of democracy-as-process needs to be left behind.
The fetishisation [sic] of openness, horizontality, and inclusion of much of
today’s ‘radical’ left set the stage for ineffectiveness. Secrecy, verticality, and
exclusion all have their place as well in effective political action (though not, of
course, an exclusive one).
The conflict here between open plurality and closed centrality is further explained in their
2016 book Inventing the Future in which Williams and Sirnicek explain that the secretive
vertical authority of the accelerationist future government would be informed by a
populist alliance of interests united by “one particular demand or struggle [that will
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come] to stand in for the rest” (160). What is being offered here is an undemocratic form
of democracy in which a population’s demands are advocated for by a variety of
organizations but are then entered into a secretive closed system to which citizens do not
have access. Further, the demands of these organizations would be influenced by the
accelerationist hegemony that Williams and Srnicek hope to propagate through
education, media reform, and new understandings of identity. The authors argue that such
cultural reform is how political success is defined: “one can only fully understand the
success of movements by the extent to which they are able to achieve broad-scaled
transformations in the public ‘common sense,’ and to change what people desire” (197).
The changing of culture through introducing the population to new terministic screens is
a part of any political revolution; however, the specific use of ideological state
apparatuses to create, propogate, and celebrate new worldviews has had a nefarious and
totlitarian connotation since Lois Althusser coined the term in 1970. Such apparatuses,
which also exist in capitalist and neoliberal societies, argue that there is only one correct
way to understand the world, and those who refuse this outlook are not only wrong but
also dangerous because those in the outgroup are enemies of not only the ingroup but also
the state. Advocating for such institutions is arguing for demagoguery.

Prometheanism Vs. Co-Production
Ultimately, accelerationism is demagogic because it wants the future to be created
only by those who believe in accelerationist values; however, even if the call for
humanity to take control of the future were extended to humans beyond the niche public
of accelerationism, it would still demonstrate a narcissistic tendency within the
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movement because it refuses to acknowledge the agencies of nonhuman actors. The
Prometheanism articulated by Williams and Srnicek is so pronounced and nuanced that it
is worth quoting at some length:
We declare that only a Promethean politics of maximal mastery over society and
its environment is capable of either dealing with global problems or achieving
victory over capital. This mastery must be distinguished from that beloved of
thinkers of the original Enlightenment. The clockwork universe of Laplace, so
easily mastered given sufficient information, is long gone from the agenda of
serious scientific understanding. But this is not to align ourselves with the tired
residue of postmodernity, decrying mastery as proto-fascistic or authority as
innately illegitimate. Instead we propose that the problems besetting our planet
and our species oblige us to refurbish mastery in a newly complex guise; whilst
we cannot predict the precise result of our actions, we can determine
probabilistically likely ranges of outcomes. What must be coupled to such
complex systems analysis is a new form of action: improvisatory and capable of
executing a design through a practice which works with the contingencies it
discovers only in the course of its acting, in a politics of geosocial artistry and
cunning rationality. A form of abductive experimentation that seeks the best
means to act in a complex world. (360)
This relationship to both the environment and society is problematic because of the
amount of control that it seeks to exert. While Williams and Srnicek are correct that much
postmodern thought has been ineffectual (Bruno Latour compares postmodern critique to
a sledgehammer that can only break things down without building anything new) they
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ignore the primary lessons of those critiques: humans do not act alone, and history is not
necessarily a story of progress. In nods to these postmodern concerns, Williams and
Srnicek mention that they will need to be fluid, improvisatory, and cunningly rational, but
they ignore the overarching point that objects in the world have agencies, and it is neither
possible nor just for humans to wield absolute control or refurbished mastery over them.
Rather than Promethean control, accelerationists would need something closer to
an ethical co-production. In Reassembling the Social Bruno Latour argues that mere
passive objects do not exist; instead, everything in the world exerts agency. For instance,
the remote control cannot make anyone a couch potato, but along with the television,
programming, snacks, and a comfortable seat, it can influence a person to stay in their
living room all day (77). Likewise, in response to the right wing cliché “guns don’t kill
people, people kill people” Latour responds that the correct answer would be that an
assemblage of actors composed of gun, bullet, shooter, victim, legal codes, temperature,
time, blood sugar, etc. work together to kill people (Pandora’s 180). That is not to say
that hypothetical shooters do not also make decisions for which they should be held
accountable, but it is to say that any potential decision a shooter makes would be just one
action taken by one actor within a large, complex network of actors exerting influence on
each other. By considering any shooter as enmeshed in this complex network from which
they cannot completely be removed (though actors are constantly shifting in and out,
while exerting more or less force), it becomes clear that shooters are also co-created by
other actors who are therefore co-responsible for their actions. For example, would a
hypothetical shooter shoot if the gun had backfired, if bullets were more expensive, if
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they were feeling sad, if the victim looked different, if gun laws were different, if
enforcement of gun laws were different, if it were cold, or if they had recently eaten?
If any of these variables were changed, no matter how seemingly minute, there is
no certainty as to whether or not the potential shooter would shoot, and there is evidence
that seemingly minor variables can have great effect on human decision making skills. A
recent study by Shai Danzinger et al. found that potential parolees have a 65% chance of
being granted parole at the beginning of the day or directly after a break. Conversely,
potential parolees standing before a judge directly before a break have a nearly zero
percent chance of being granted parole. In other words, the more rested, fed, and
comfortable the judges were, the more empathetic and lenient they were toward those
they were judging. Commenting on this study, Robert Sapolsky went as far as to claim,
“freewill is the biology we haven’t learned yet,” meaning that every deviant behavior has
a biological cause rather than a moral one (Revising). While Sapolsky’s comment brings
in problems of predetermination and normalization, as if humans should/could fix all
deviations from the norm, it also demonstrates the ways in which actors function within
complex assemblages.
Not surprisingly, the scientifically minded accelerationist community is aware of
the ways in which material actors affect humans, which makes it surprising that Williams
and Srnicek would advocate for the kind of dominating Prometheanism they do. It is even
more surprising when considering how Marxism has historically highlighted the agency
of nonhuman actors by describing how machines change the humans with which they
interact. Marx understood this when he wrote in the Gundrisse about human workers
becoming the conscious organs of machine bodies alien to them (401). More recently
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Sadie Plant and Nick Land understood it when they wrote about the influence techno
music, club drugs, and videogames have on both individuals and society. Despite the
importance of nonhuman agency for these thinkers, Williams and Srnicek are not alone in
advocating for Prometheanism. In his article “Prometheanism and Its Critics,” Richard
Brassier defines Prometheanism as, “the claim that there is no reason to assume a
predetermined limit to what we can achieve or to the ways in which we can transform
ourselves and our world” (470). It is worth noting that in this definition Brassier does not
consider the effects achievement will have on nonhuman actors; rather, his focus is solely
on humanity and our world. This myopic focus in indicative of the entire article.
Brassier argues that many current thinkers on both the left and the right are
dismissive of Prometheanism because it upsets what they see as a transcendental
equilibrium between civilization and nature, and he claims that Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s
essay “Some Pitfalls in the Philosophical Foundations of NanoEthics” is indicative of this
critique. Arguing against Dupuy’s critique of nanotechnologies leads Brassier to make a
host of tenuously related arguments about religion, suffering, and the nature of man in
part because Dupuy’s argument is similarly sprawling. Nonetheless, within this critique
of a critique, the most problematic arguments are those that involve Martin Heidegger.
According to Brassier, Heidegger argues that humans are ontologically different from
other beings because their relationship to time and their awareness of their own finitude
provides them with a transcendence that differentiates them from the natural world.
Because of this essential ontological exceptionalism, there are things that are “proper and
improper for human beings to become” (473). Shifting from reading Heidegger to
Hannah Arendt, as if the latter were a proxy for the former, Brassier claims that
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Heideggerians see the world as composed of “things given and things made” (474). The
problem with Prometheanism for Heideggarians then, according to Brassier, is twofold:
1) humans should not be modified like other elements of nature because they are
ontologically distinct from those things and 2) it ignores the things given and overruns
the world with things made. According to Brassier, these arguments erroneously assume
an essentialism for both humanity and the world. Brassier claims that since such essential
qualities are chimeras, there is no reason not to push humanity to its technological limits,
whatever the cost to the world. What Brassier does not discuss is the ways in which his
argument reinforces a modernist ontology that construes humanity and the natural world
as distinct entities in a way that Heidegger does not.
Though Heidegger does argue that the aspect of humans that distinguishes them
from animals is their ability to experience language and to be aware of their own finitude,
this is not a transcendent essence; instead, Heidegger argues that this unique attribute of
humanity, their collective Dasein, emerges from their interactions with the world.
Humanity’s being is a being-in-the-world, and because humans have language and can
understand their own being, they are also called to care for the world and “be the
shepherd of being” (252). This care is not dominion. Heidegger claims, “The essential
worth of human being does not consist in his being the substance of being, as the
‘Subject” among them, so that as the tyrant of being he may deign to release the beings
into an all too loudly glorified ‘objectivity’” (252). Instead, humans should realize that
being, humanity, and the world are all interconnected. As Thomas Rickert says, “This
understanding of the inseparability of world from human being operates in all
Heidegger’s major concepts,” and can be seen in the way his texts use the middle voice to
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blur the border between the human subject and the material object (12). In this way,
Heidegger does not reify the human/nature binary that Brassier wants to attribute to him.
Instead, Heidegger presents a very material understanding of humanity as a group that
dwells within the world as a way of caring for and being in it. Heidegger is not opposed
to human improvement, but he is opposed to subjugating nature to the will of humanity.
Brassier’s misreading of Heidegger is indicative of the problems of accelerationist
Prometheanism in that it cannot get outside of its human-centric perspective. Brassier
simultaneously exalts the human as the essential agent of knowledge and production
while simultaneously wanting to objectify the human as brute matter. He repeats the
binary between humans and the world by trying to have a metaphysics that can both align
and separate the natural world from that of the human. As such, the metaphysics fails as a
justification for Promethean technologies because it collapses under its own internal
logics. If humanity needs a justification for such advanced technologies, and I expect that
such changes will happen whether or not they can be justified, then scholars should be
thinking not about human superiority but about the ways in which humans can improve
themselves by interacting with the world instead of against it.
Donna Haraway’s Staying With the Trouble offers one way this could be enacted.
In the book Haraway argues that instead of waiting for technology to “somehow come to
the rescue of its naughty but very clever children,” those who want to continue living on
this planet need to focus on its current material problems and consider the ways in which
they can collaborate with chthonic actors—those close related to the earth—to bring
about positive change (3). Haraway does not want to dismiss technology, but she argues
that it has to work with other actors, not try to control them, in order to bring about
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positive futures for both the planet and those who dwell on it. The problem with
Prometheanism and techno utopianism is not simply the amount of agency they each
attribute to the human, it is the way they ignore the agency of nonhuman actors in a way
that reinforces the modern Constitution.
Promethean ideas that separate humanity from the rest of the world are the
pinnacle of accelerationist narcissism. While not quite demagogic, accelerationists are a
public that regularly ignores the agency of others because they are not a part of the
ingroup. Accelerationism ignores nonhuman actors, while also claiming that nonaccelerationists are hindrances to creating a utopian society. They believe that everyone
beyond the ingroup of accelerationists fails to realize that the only way for humanity to
survive is through accelerationist ideologies. The texts themselves are so dense, obtuse,
and filled with obscure Marxist jargon that they act as a barrier between the ingroup and
everyone else. This semantic barrier protects the accelerationists from opinions that will
differ from their own, which allows accelerationism to act as an echo chamber in which
the same ideas are constantly reaffirmed. The ideological worldview is thus able to
propagate itself, always seeing the world through the same network of concepts and
terministic screens. In this way accelerationists have transformed themselves into
Narcissus staring into a pool at their own reflection, as Echo repeats the compliments
they shower upon themselves.

Narcissism, Demagoguery, and the Risk of the Rhetor
The risk of narcissism and demagoguery is particularly difficult to foresee
because unlike the risks of unintended consequences and harassment, which are external
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to the rhetor, the internal risk of narcissism does not feel like a hazard. Narcissism can be
relatively innocuous, but it becomes dangerous when rhetors are members of
communities that reaffirm, reify, and validate not only their ideas but also their identities,
in ways that enable them to righteous, as if the way they understand the world is the only
correct way. Such righteousness can lead to demagoguery, in which ingroups feel as if
their worldview is being threatened, leading them to actively attack and punish
outgroups. Besides the inherent violence, demagoguery is also pernicious because it is
not confined to a single public; rather, demagoguery spreads to many publics throughout
a population. For example, the demagoguery of the leftist accelerationists was developed
in part as a response to the demagoguery of the far right who were beginning to take
control of the political discourse in the United States, if not most of the Western World.
Similarly, accelerationism is also a response to leftist political actors whose ideas about
the nature of identity, technology, and localism are popular on digital platforms such as
Tumblr. As a movement, accelerationism is surrounded by many outgroups who are in
their own ways narcissistic, if not demagogic. These publics not only have different
arguments, opinions, styles, and worlds—they fundamentally understand the world to
exist in different ways and have different ontological commitments. Perhaps the core
ontological commitment of accelerationists is their belief that the world exists to be
manipulated by humans. They argue that humans will co-evolve with technology, but
they adamantly assert that they can control how this happens. Ultimately, the
predominant narcissism of accelerationists is that they think they can control the world.
This totalizing worldview is representative of the problems of narcissism and
demagoguery writ large; accelerationists, like all demagogues, believe they are the only
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group of people who can make a positive change in the world because they are the only
ones who understand how the world actually works. Demagogic publics believe that
many outgroups are immoral, misguided, or unintelligent, but the fault of most outgroups
is that they do not comprehend the world correctly: outgroup terministic screens are
incorrect, while the ingroup’s terministic screen provides them with direct access to the
world. The role of the demagogic public then is to convert the outgroups that can be
converted and to punish the outgroups that are beyond saving. Conversion and
punishment are necessary because they are the only ways to keep the ingroup safe from
the actions, futures, and policies of the outgroups. Demagogues believe that only by
taking control of the world they can impose the correct world order and bring about the
best possible future—at least for the ingroup, and that is all that matters. Demagogues are
not interested in the hard work of making connections and co-producing the future with
other actors. They believe in working unilaterally because only the ingroup is capable
enough to save the ingroup, and only the ingroup’s interests matter.
Materialists are perhaps the most vulnerable to this risk of publicness because of
their focus on ontology, but demagoguery is a common hazard for all sorts of rhetors.
The violence between the BPP, the US organization, and the FBI; the single mindedness
of Crip sets; and the alt-right’s violent sphere public are all forms of demagoguery.
Similarly, it is commonly remarked that United States political discourse is becoming
increasingly demagogic as politicians and voters refuse to see value in those with whom
they disagree. The rise of demagoguery in this country should concern everyone, but
especially composition instructors who are tasked not only with helping students learn to
create arguments but also to use those arguments ethically in their private, professional,
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and civic lives. This calling was one of the reasons public writing pedagogies were
originally created, to get students out of their terministic screens and into discourse with
other actors. However, in order to teach students to interact with the public in nondemagogic ways, instructors can neither focus their instruction on writing for an ideal
public sphere that does not exist nor on the tactics of effectively creating and circulating
an argument; instead, what is needed is an empathetic instruction that asks students to
consider their rhetorical forces within an ecology of rhetorical forces emanating from
both human and nonhuman actors. As Byron Hawk argues in A Counter-History of
Composition, instructors should “design occasions” that build productive relationships
and increase the possibilities for actors to act rather than destructive ones that harm
bodies and limit their possibilities (255-58). One answer to this call is to create
pedagogies that focus on writing as co-constructed events, rather than as the singular
creation of texts. Such a pedagogy would not only help students to consider rhetoric in
relation to other actors with whom they intra-act but also demonstrate to them the inherit
risks of rhetoric.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RISKS OF EVENTS: TOWARD EVENT-BASED PEDAGOGIES
Each of the three primary case studies demonstrates a risk associated with the
three categories of public rhetorics. The Crips demonstrate the risk of mis for idealists,
the alt-right demonstrates the risk of harassment for activists, and the accelerationists
demonstrate the risk of demagoguery for materialists. Public rhetorics as they exist in the
world, however, are not as regimented and siloed as they are presented here, and neither
are their risks. For instance, the founding of the Crips was not only idealistic but also
activist and materialist—it was an act that was simultaneously concerned with ethical
models, political tactics, and ontological inquiries. The same is true for the alt-right and
the accelerationists. Categories of public rhetorics bleed into one another, as do their
risks. The Crips did not just misunderstand Black Power when they created their
organization, they also engaged in demagogic ingroup/outgroup thinking and both
harassed and were harassed by other members of the South Central Los Angeles public.
Likewise, the alt-right’s harassment stems from their demagogic ideology that positions
its members as part of a righteous ingroup, despite being mis-interpreted both by those
defining the group from the outside and by different factions within the populist sphere
public itself. Finally, the accelerationists are not only becoming demagogic but also are
actively mis-reading contemporary leftist politics in ways that suggest harassment for
those human and nonhuman actors whose bodies prevent them from realizing their ideal

171

society. Each case-study contains each risk because all the risks of rhetoric grow from the
same root: the transformative nature of the event.
The rhetorical event is a concept central to ecological understandings of rhetoric.
Traditionally rhetoric has been conceived of as a situation in which a rhetor attempts to
persuade an audience to a particular way of perceiving the world and acting within it—a
model based on simple cause-and-effect logic—but in the last three decades the field has
come to see rhetoric as ecological, as composed of multiple actors impacting and
influencing each other in ways that are more substantial than mere persuasion and more
complex than mere cause-and-effect. Such ecological thinking sees rhetoric as an event in
which actors co-influence how they perceive the world, themselves, and others in ways
ranging from the mundane to the extraordinary. Events are encounters where actors coproduce and re-articulate one another. Because of this co-productive nature,
transformations within events are emergent rather than predetermined, which means they
can potentially pose risks to the actors involved, including rhetors. Not all
transformations are positive, and even seemingly mundane events can contain hazards.
The primary case studies serve as extraordinary examples of risk in the public
sphere but risk is pervasive and not limited to grandiose displays of violence and
antagonism. For instance, on October 30, 2014 Jennifer Tyburczy was detained by
University of South Carolina law enforcement after students in her upper-level
“Performance of the Americas” class sang spirituals and wrote chalk messages on the
campus square to make salient the history of slavery that built the campus. Though no
criminal charges were filed, the chalk was immediately washed away by campus facilities
because they perceived it as a risk to the wellbeing of the campus community (Harmon).
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This innocuous example demonstrates how the perception of risk is a topic that needs to
be addressed in public writing pedagogy regardless of the scope of a public writing
project because human perceptions of risk are rarely accurate representations of the actual
hazards people face in the world. Tyburczy did not expect the risk of university sanction,
though it was a hazard; conversely, the university saw risk in social and historical
consciousness, though the performance presented minor, if any, harm to the institution.
In its broadest terms, risk refers to any possibility that harm may occur.
Sometimes the possibility of harm is predictable, but often it is not. Since human and
nonhuman actors are continually changing in unpredictable ways through their
engagements with other actors in ongoing chains of events, they are always at risk.
Despite its ubiquity, humans lack direct access to risk because they access it through
multiple perceptive layers. In The Feeling of Risk, Paul Slovic argues that risk is
perceived along four separate vectors: emotion, culture, psychology, and communication.
Along the first vector, Slovic argues that humans evaluate the risks and benefits of a
situation based on their emotional connection to it rather than by evidence or logic. For
example, people are more easily persuaded by negative examples than positive examples,
are more likely to find an activity less risky if they enjoy doing it, and are more willing to
donate to a cause if they think their actions can eradicate rather than alleviate the
problem. Along the second vector, Slovic notes that people’s cultural positions determine
how they will understand risk. For example, in the United States, white males feel the
least vulnerable to hazards because of their experiences, the experiences of those they
know, and a psychological predisposition against empathizing with women and racial
minorities. Along the third vector, Slovic shows that people’s material, social, cultural,
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institutional, and psychological worlds change the ways in which they perceive risks. For
instance, individual Americans’ feelings about the positive and negative effects of
nanotechnology depend greatly on whether they identify as egalitarian or individualistic;
the former makes one aware of the potential risks, while the latter obfuscates them.
Finally, along the fourth vector, Slovic demonstrates that the communication of risk can
either amplify or attenuate hazards. Risks that are difficult to understand, or effect
marginalized groups, are often seen as less hazardous than risks that are easy to
understand, occur in a single event, and can be blamed on a single group of actors
because the latter are easier to articulate and discuss. When hazards are discussed
frequently, they are usually seen as riskier than those that are discussed less often.
Taken together, these vectors demonstrate that the human perception of risk is a
complex process involving a network of actors and forces. Perceptions of risk are not
based solely on ontological hazards but are constructed from feelings, cultural positions,
psychological predispositions, and participation in discursive publics. Of course, the
world is filled with actual hazards—material actors who can harm both humans and
nonhumans—but these hazards relate little to how humans perceive risk; instead,
innocuous actors like Tyburczy’s students are often perceived as dangerous, while
actually dangerous actors like the alt-right are regularly ignored. For instance, the
probability of being harmed in a terrorist attack, nuclear catastrophe, or epidemic is far
less than the likelihood of being harmed because of naturally-occurring radon gas, car
accidents, or smoking. Despite the probabilities, people perceive the former examples as
riskier than the latter because the latter are complex, ideologically burdened,
unconventional, effect marginalized communities, change as technologies advance, and
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receive less media attention. In short, people are not good at accurately perceiving risk,
and their misperceptions can lead to imprudent decisions such as petitioning government
officials to make laws mitigating minor risks rather than major risks, refusing medical
treatments, being suspicious of organizations for minor infractions of trust, and engaging
in high reward gambles. The inability to accurately assess risk poses a distinct problem
for public writing classrooms focused on teaching students how to engage the public
sphere because neither the instructor nor the students are likely to accurately assess the
hazards public writers are likely to face. Instructors should be concerned about asking
students to engage in public discourse when it is difficult to predict the risks of public
rhetoric?
The question of how best to teach students to navigate risk has been an important
aspect of public writing pedagogies since their beginning. Susan Well’s influential essay,
“Rogue Cops and Health Care,” begins with the story of a Temple University student
being brutalized by Philadelphia police officers, an anecdote that leads Wells to argue
that the violent risks of the public sphere stem from the variety of perceptions, identities,
and power dynamics clashing therein. Later, in his book A Teaching Subject, Joseph
Harris argues that these dangerous elements of publicness are also what make the public
sphere valuable because they allow for productive interchange. In the following decade,
Harris’s logic would be used to justify many public writing and service learning
pedagogies where students left the classroom and wrote for the broader community,
generally helping local volunteer organizations with their writing tasks. However, this
justification was problematized by Paula Mathieu in Tactics of Hope, in which she
articulates the ways composition instructors take advantage of these organizations by not
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ensuring that student writing is actually useful to community partners. Composition
classes and volunteer organizations are supposed to have symbiotic relationships, but
often only the instructors and students benefit because their relationships to community
organizations, reproducing the same problematic clashes among perceptions, identities,
and power dynamics of which Wells had previously warned. In response to this problem,
Linda Flower argues in Community Literacy and The Rhetoric of Public Engagement that
if partnerships are approached with compassion, cultural inquiry, and a pragmatic
approach to problem solving, then they will not repeat the oppressive power structures of
the past but instead create something new in both the classroom and the public. Flower’s
approach quickly became the dominant model for public writing pedagogies because it
attempts to mitigate risk through the enactment of community, conversation, and
partnership—as if these ways of being together with strangers were not themselves risky.
The primary problem with these community-based approaches to public writing
pedagogy is that they assume publics to be stable communities with which instructors can
partner. Nancy Welch argues in Living Room that publics are not stable communities;
rather, they are spaces of discourse created through acts of composition. Welch argues
that neoliberal forces of privatization make creating such spaces difficult, but she insists
that instructors can use the history of subaltern political movements, such as labor and
civil rights, to teach ways of creating discursive spaces and building communities based
on shared concerns. Teaching such subaltern rhetorical methods also provides instructors
a way to avoid reproducing in their classrooms the same clashes among perceptions,
identities, and power dynamics that permeate the dominant public. For these reasons, the
last decade has seen a surge in subaltern rhetorical studies; however, despite this surge,
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there is still little scholarship on how these methods can actually be enacted in the
classroom. Frank Farmer begins to create such methods in After the Public Turn by
studying how subaltern cultural publics use ‘zines and blogs to compose and distribute
messages for politically likeminded individuals, creating a common culture among
readers. Farmer argues that instructors should run their classrooms as subaltern
counterpublics that use discourse to build subversive communities, but this pedagogical
work is still in its nascent stages. Nonetheless, Welch and Farmer both successfully
demonstrate the need for public writers to create discursive spaces—a position that is
mired in risk.
Nathan Crick argues that the spaces created by marginalized publics can also pose
risks not only for the dominant public but also for other marginalized groups. Crick
reminds readers that subaltern publics are not all agents of positive change: some are neoNazis, Holocaust deniers, anti-vaccine activists, etc. Marginalized publics, and their
discursive practices, are as diverse and risky as the dominant publics they are attempting
to usurp because they also contain a variety of perceptions, identities, and power
dynamics. In short, there is no public devoid of risk and there is no mode of participation
that guarantees safety. Writing instructors should stop searching for such idealized spaces
and tactics and instead focus on attuning students to better conceptualize and perceive
risk so that they can better plan their rhetorical activities for their given contexts. Since
instructors cannot be certain what kinds of publics and risks students will encounter, they
should focus not on the risks associated with specific publics but rather on teaching
students to understand the fundamental risk that influences all public rhetoric: its capacity
to transform the actors implicated in the rhetorical event.
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In this chapter I argue that the risk of rhetoric stems not from public actors
themselves but from the transformative characteristic of the rhetorical event: the coconstituted exchange among actors who influence and re-articulate each other. Public
writing should not be taught as a space, either found or created, in which differing
perceptions, identities, and power relations clash but as intra-active encounters in which
actors and publics are collectively changed through their relationships with one another.
Rhetoric is an event from which new perceptions, identities, and power dynamics
emerge, and I propose that writing be taught using event-based pedagogies centered
around communication’s capacity to implicate and rearticulate a variety of actors. To
elaborate on this conception of rhetoric, I combine Composition and Rhetoric scholarship
with Joe Panzner’s articulation of the event in order to demonstrate how rhetoric does not
merely persuade audiences but rather transforms rhetorical actors and their relationships
to the world. I argue that rhetoricians can navigate this transformative risk by inviting
other actors to participate in the event and by remaining open to the multiple futures it
makes possible. To reach this goal, I provide five tenets for creating event-based
pedagogies, each designed to help students perceive risk and their relationship to it.

The Rhetorical Event
Rhetoric is better understood as a transformative event than as a persuasive
situation. Starting in the twentieth century, scholars building on the Aristotle’s artistic
appeals began to understand rhetoric as occurring within a single situation composed of
three discreet entities: rhetor, text, and audience. This dominant model was challenged by
the idea of the rhetorical event as early as 1989 when Barbara Biesecker published
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“Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from Within the Thematic of Différance.” In this
article, Biesecker argues that the rhetorical situation is outmoded because, despite its
many articulations, it derogates the power of rhetoric by claiming it is only capable of
influencing stable subjects rather than recreating those subjects anew. This diminution of
rhetoric is problematic for Biesecker because it forces rhetorical theorists to think beyond
rhetoric and understand the subjectivities of individual audience members as being
created prior to their engagements with the rhetorical situation. Biesecker argues that to
understand rhetoric as an event rather than a situation means to understand rhetoric as the
way in which subjectivities are created. The first step to such an understanding is to
challenge the assumption that individual audience members are essential subjects. Using
Derrida’s conception of différance as articulated in Glas, Biesecker argues that audience
members are not essential and stable subjects; rather, their subjectivities are created
through their relations with others. As such, subjects are constantly being formed and
reformed as they encounter new people, objects, and experiences. Biesecker argues, “If
the subject is shifting and unstable (constituted in and by the play of différance), then the
rhetorical event may be seen as an incident that produces and reproduces the identities of
subjects while constructing and reconstructing the linkages between them” (126). Since
subjects are always being reconstituted through the differences and similarities between
themselves and others, the rhetorical event transforms individual audience members from
one type of subject to another through the play of differences between them, the speaker,
the text, and the rest of the audience.
Biesecker’s model of the rhetorical event was radical for its time because it
depicts rhetoric as possessing a transformative power, not merely an influential one.
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Whereas previous scholars had gone so far as to argue that rhetoric could influence
audience members to understand their subjectivities differently, Biesecker pushes beyond
this by arguing that rhetoric rearticulates an audience member’s actual subjectivity
through the play of différance. Still, this model is limited in two ways: 1) it focuses on
how the rhetor transforms the subjectivities of individual audience members, ignoring
how other human and nonhuman actors within the rhetorical situation transform and are
transformed by each other, and 2) it isolates the rhetorical situation, ignoring the ways in
which rhetorical events transcend specific instantiations of speaker, audience, and text to
influence larger social processes. In order to push past the first limitation, I utilize the
scholarship of Laurie Gries to argue that rhetorical events are complex situations in
which human and nonhuman actors transform each other. To push past the second
limitation, I utilize the scholarship of Jenny Rice to argue that rhetorical events are not
limited to discreet situations but rather spread throughout larger social processes. When
combined, these two new materialist arguments demonstrate how rhetorical events
rearticulate all the actors involved in a discourse before entering into other discourses and
transforming them as well.
In her book Still Life with Rhetoric, Laurie Gries studies how the Obama Hope
icon has contributed to collective life around the globe through its interactions with
human and nonhuman actors. Through her four specific histories of the icon—its use in
the 2008 United States presidential election, its famous influence on United States
copyright law, its contribution to popular culture, and its continued use in social
activism—Gries demonstrates that the icon is a rhetorical actor that influences rhetorical
transformations in ways that transcend the intentions of its creators. Since the image
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transcends the purposes for which it was created, it is not merely a tool but rather an actor
that co-creates the rhetorical situations of which it is a part. Gries argues that the icon is
not only transformed by humans but also transforms humans. She demonstrates that when
the icon reached politically motivated art communities in 2008, it transformed the art they
were making by providing them a common icon to rally behind; in turn, these
communities transformed the image by placing it into new forms, media, and styles.
What these groups co-created with the icon was a phenomenon larger than Shepard
Fairey expected when he created his original image and much larger than Mannie Garcia
expected when he took the photo on which Fairey’s image was based. Communities
remixed and changed the icon, while the icon simultaneously rearticulated and changed
the communities. Gries goes on to argue that this case study demonstrates how all
actors—regardless of whether or not they are the traditional subjects Biesecker discussed
in 1989—reproduce and recreate one another. In this way, Gries is similar to Biesecker in
that she argues that rhetoric is an event, but unlike Biesecker, Gries sees rhetoric as “an
unfolding event—a distributed, material process of becomings in which divergent
consequences are actualized with[in] time and space” (7). Gries understands the
rhetorical event as a moment in which agency is distributed among an enmeshed group of
multiple human and nonhuman actors who co-produce each other, influencing how they
each interact with the world in tangible material ways. What is produced in the event is
not predetermined by one actor but rather emerges from the interactions of multiple
actors. In this way, Gries provides a way of seeing past the first limit of Biesecker’s
argument by demonstrating how all actors within a rhetorical event influence and
transform each other.
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To argue against Biesecker’s second limitation, I invoke the work of Jenny Rice.
In “Unframing Models of Public Distribution” Rice argues that the rhetorical situation
should not be understood as a conglomeration of stagnant elements but rather as an event
occurring within a broader network of rhetorical ecologies. Rhetoric is not limited to
specific situations that respond to specific exigencies; instead, rhetoric occurs within
“events that are shifting and moving, grafted onto and connected with other events” (10).
Actors transform each other within their rhetorical events and then move on to influence
other actors: “Situation bleeds into the concatenation of public interaction. Public
interactions bleed into wider social processes. The elements of rhetorical situation simply
bleed” (9). She argues that rhetoric is powerful not because it is transformative within
singular events but because transformed actors leave their rhetorical events and influence
other actors in different events in response to different exigencies. The transformative
power of rhetoric transcends any single event. Rice provides an example of this
phenomenon in her study of the “Keep Austin Weird” slogan, which was originally
developed to promote local businesses in the Texas capital but grew to be the city’s
unofficial slogan and is currently used to promote everything from municipal services to
nationwide cellphone plans. In this example, the slogan bled among events, and in each
event in which it participated, it both rearticulated the other actors and was rearticulated
by them. As with Gries’s study of Obama Hope, in Rice’s “Keep Austin Weird” example
there was no determinate force within these events; instead, perceptions, identities, and
power dynamics emerged from the engagements among different actors whose influence
spread beyond their immediate rhetorical situations. Taken together, Gries and Rice
demonstrate how rhetorical events function as material and temporal spaces in which
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human and nonhuman actors transform each other until they transcend their events,
influencing the transformations of even more actors.
Gries and Rice articulate the rhetorical event as complex and dynamic, which
opens up a host of questions about how to conceptualize events, transformations, risks,
and personal comportments to change. While both authors suggest answers to these
questions, both are rhetoricians focused on methods. Gries focuses on a method of
tracking icons’ rhetorical influences on the world and Rice focuses on a method of
teaching embodied knowledge creation. As such, to provide a model of the event and its
relationship to risk, I am going to step outside of methodological concerns and outside
the field of rhetoric entirely. In The Process that is the World the musicologist Joe
Panzner elucidates a model of the event by putting the musical compositions of John
Cage in conversation with the philosophical writings of Gilles Deleuze. In discussing the
overlap between the two thinkers, Panzner provides a unique interpretation of the event,
which he describes as an occurrence that “gathers together the potentials inherent in a
specific material situation, implicates and complicates them in one another, and
individuates subjects and objects through its unfolding” (13). Panzner’s event is not itself
a holistic entity but rather a multiplicity defined by the interactions of the elements—
material, conceptual, human, non-human, etc.—that compose it. As with Gries and Rice,
the event is less of a noun and more of a verb. Panzner’s event is not focused on the given
assemblage of elements but on the ways in which the assemblage acts on and reassembles
itself. Within this interplay of forces exists the intentional actions of various humans, but
human forces are only one type among many. As such, the event implicates, complicates,
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and individuates humans as much as any of the other actors that participate within it. All
actors within the event are transformed through participation, including humans.
And while events are always transformative, they are not always exciting. Often
events are mundane. Objects generally interact in consistent and predictable ways, which
means they are implicated, complicated, and individuated with consistent results. For
example, the event of me biking to work is routine, and it usually results in me arriving to
my office a bit sweaty but ready for my day. Still, some events are extraordinary because
the interactions among objects subvert expectations and create unexpected futures. On
my commute I could get hit by a car, my front tire could be punctured, or the bridge I
cross could collapse. In any of these situations, my expectations would be subverted by
other actors within the event, and I would emerge different than I had anticipated. A more
nuanced example is the one Panzner shares about John Cage entering Harvard’s anechoic
chamber in 1952. When entering the chamber in which sound could not resonate, Cage
expected to hear complete silence, but instead he heard the high frequency sound of his
own nervous system and the low frequency sound of his own circulatory system. This
event subverted Cage’s expectations, helped him to rethink the relationship between
sound and silence, and influenced him to compose his famous silent piece “4′33′′.” The
events of the anechoic chamber could not have happened to just anyone at any time;
Cage’s previous work with silence, the methodical way he approached the anechoic
chamber, and his career as a composer—in short his past, present, and future—all acted
within the event to co-create it. Still, Cage was not the only actor within the event. The
chamber, the atmosphere, and Cage’s physiology are just three of the actors that helped to
co-create the event in which Cage’s expectations were subverted in a way that influenced
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his art. In this way, these actors collaborated with Cage to compose “4′33′′,” meaning that
he did not independently compose the piece as an autonomous subject. The coconstitutive nature of the event does not mean that Cage did not compose the piece
because the concept of the event does not replace human agency with material
determinism; instead, the event acknowledges human agency as one force within a
confluence of actors that Panzer refers to as “Life as such.”
Panzner’s event is a coming together of discreet objects that share in the grand
force of impersonal Life as such and in so doing transform each other. Panzner argues
that neither Cage nor Deleuze thought of life as being held captive in the bodies of
organisms; rather, both thinkers argued that “Life is an impersonal and an organic power
exceeding any capacity for lived experience or any logical restrictions placed upon it”
(11). Life is not something organisms have but something in which organisms participate.
Through existence with other seemingly distinct entities, individuals participate in Life,
and by acknowledging its externality, people can become more open to growth, variation,
transformation, and composition. Panzner argues that both Deleuze and Cage saw
creativity and novelty as stemming from this external and impersonal Life rather than
from within individual autonomous human genius. For these thinkers, creativity is an
aspect of Life, and because Life transcends the subject, then creativity does as well. For
this reason, creation—whether it be Cage’s music, Deleuze’s philosophy, or Biesecker’s
scholarship—depends upon thinking outside of the self and acknowledging “the greater,
impersonal, and abstract Life that is the world” (13). Creating anything—texts, art,
subjectivities, etc.—is contingent upon interacting with other human and nonhuman
actors within the event. Being open to such collaboration enables an actor to work with
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uncertainty rather than against it. By acknowledging their own lack of
determinacy, individuals can consider how they will interact with and be open to the
forces that co-create their existences and their worlds. This comportment enables both
growth and creation.
Growth and creation emerge from events in which humans participate but do not
control. In such a paradigm, the role of composers—be they musicians, philosophers,
rhetors, etc.—is threefold: 1) to be open to the events of the world that recreate them, 2)
to assemble material objects so that others can participate in events, and 3) to experiment
with form until their creations “render palpable the potentials in sensation” (Panzner 15).
Composers act as conduits between Life as such and the audience. Acting as such a
conduit does not necessarily mean that composers have any more access to Life than
anyone else; rather, the defining characteristic of conduits is their open comportment to
the dynamic multiplicities, potentialities, and forces that make-up Life as such.
Composers use their specific media to draw attention to the various forces and
possibilities the world presents, which are beyond the mundane and commonplace. Then,
composers ask their audiences not to acknowledge the universal truth they are
articulating, as would composers operating within the paradigm of the autonomous
human subject; instead, composers of events ask their audiences to use their own
agencies to think, create, compose, and perform within the works they have made.
Composers invite their audiences to use their work to articulate their own expressions of
truth. Composers do not control the events of their work; instead, they create the
conditions in which audiences can exercise agency in order to build their own creations
and interpretations within the boundaries created by the composer. Audiences and
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composers work together to create. Likewise, composers, audiences, works, and worlds
are all co-created in the transformational events of performance, meaning that composers’
concepts, ideas, and intentions face the possibility of being enacted, interpreted, and
perhaps subverted through performance. These attributes of the event enable it to
transform others and to be improved by them. It is this unpredictability that makes
compositions worth creating, performing, and otherwise engaging.
Rhetoric occurs in exactly these types of events. Rhetors move among actors,
developing intentions and expectations. They prepare their messages as best they can
through research, practice, editing, and attention to rhetorical elements. Because of this
preparation, rhetors are often able to take account of enough variables so that they can
succeed in reaching their rhetorical goals, but sometimes their expectations are subverted.
Their texts may be misunderstood and misused, their seemingly innocuous audiences
may harass them, or the rhetors themselves may become demagogic. All of these
outcomes are possible because rhetors are not the only actors creating the outcomes of
their rhetorical events. There are other actors who co-create the rhetorical event along
with rhetors, making the outcome uncertain. This uncertainty is the source of risk, and in
response to this risk, rhetors have three options. They can: 1) refuse to create, 2) attempt
to shut-out the other actors within the situation, or 3) accept that they are functions of
emergence and open themselves to the co-participation of multiple futures. For Panzner,
this last option is the one that enables composition by opening up rhetors to the
productive qualities of others, the creativity of the world, and Life as such. By being open
to the perceptions, identities, and power dynamics of others, rhetors are able to participate
in the world rather than trying to force the world to fit into their ideas of what it should
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be. This does not mean that rhetors should completely cede their agential capacity; it
means they should be aware of how their texts, identities, and bodies both co-produce and
are co-produced by others. Rhetors should see themselves as involved in intra-action:
responsible, but not solely responsible, for the world. Such a comportment is the
acknowledgement of risk—the risk of the rhetorical event’s unanticipatable
transformative capacity to make unanticipated futures. This is the risk of not being a
completely autonomous and stable subject. This is the risk of Life as such.

Agential Co-Production and Possible Futures
Seeing the rhetorical situation as an event that engages the creative force of Life
as such and rearticulates the subjectivities of actors can easily be seen as a rejection of
individual agency; however, the event does not deny agency outright but rather argues for
a co-creative agency that stresses a collaborative comportment on the part of the rhetor.
Such a model stresses a collaborative openness to the world, which is an inherently risky
position because it invites the world to co-create the individual as the individual
simultaneously co-creates the world. Marilyn Cooper’s 2011 article “Agency as
Emergent and Enacted” argues that many postmodern critiques of the autonomous human
subject, such as Biesecker’s, have served to shift models of the subject from a completely
self-determining actor to a figure so fragmented as to be “incapable of coherent intentions
or actions” (423). Cooper argues that this overcorrection fails to understand how actors
operate in the world, and in response, she articulates a model of agential actors who are
“unique, embodied, and autonomous individuals in that they are self-organizing, but by
virtue of that fact, they, as well as the surround with which interact, are always changing”
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(425). These actors interact with their worlds and through these experiences adapt to fit
into and understand them, while simultaneously adapting their worlds to their ways of
being; in this way, actors and their worlds co-create each other through their interactions:
“mutual adaptation . . . occurs when organisms or systems perturb one another in a
prolonged interaction, gradually becoming more attuned to one another” (437). This
understanding of an agential actor emphasizes the importance of temporality in
constructing identity. All actors are created through experiences from the past, make
agential decisions in the present, and will affect the world through their decisions in the
future. As time progresses, these agential actors are co-created by their interactions with
the others within the world, as those interaction simultaneously co-create the world.
Cooper’s adaptive understanding of agency asks actors to be responsible for their
own actions while also considering the rights of others to act in the world. Cooper argues,
“Responsible agency . . . requires one to be aware that everyone acts out of their own
space of meaning and that to affirm one’s own meaning as absolute truth is to negate the
other person” (442). For Cooper, the role of rhetors is to respect, rather than negate, the
experiences, identities, and perspectives of other actors as they assert their arguments.
This requires rhetors to listen to others and open themselves up to their understandings of
the world so that they can co-create with each other if possible. Such openness does not
mean that rhetors should refrain from disagreement and argument—openness is not
necessarily harmonious—but it does mean that rhetors should not simply dismiss those
with whom they disagree. Rhetors are encouraged to acknowledge that they co-produce
the world with others, not despite of them, and rhetors should be open to alternative ways
of knowing and being—respectful, but not necessarily benevolent. The subtle
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transformations that emerge from such acknowledgement and co-production are not often
perceived as risky because they occur gradually and imperceptibly, but they are risks
because they influence actors and their engagements with the world in ways that are
potentially hazardous. Nonetheless, Cooper’s emphasis on openness, temporality, and
ethics sets the conditions for thinking about more emergent types of agency.
Michelle Ballif provides an even more radical understanding of rhetorical agency
than Cooper’s, one that is focused on being open to the possibilities of the event . In her
article “Writing the Event: The Impossible Possibility for Historiography,” Ballif is
concerned with how historiographers can “write the event”—how they can create
histories that demonstrate the possibilities and uncertain futurities that events make
possible rather than merely categorizing events and placing them into grand historical
narratives. For Ballif, writing the event is fundamentally an ethical question because the
relationship between actors and the event is the relationship between the world and the
future. Utilizing Derridean philosophy, Ballif argues that the event is an occurrence that
is both constant and exceptional: both commonplace and impossible (247). What allows
for this duality is that actors co-producing relatively minor events bring about uncertain,
and even impossible, futures. Though some actors have specific goals, they cannot know
for certain what their actions will co-produce with others. Nonetheless, through this
confluence of actions, futures that were once impossible come to be enacted. Because
every action invites such an uncertain multiplicity of responses, every event poses a
dilemma because actors will make decisions without being able to know with certainty
what futures they are co-creating. In other words, actors are unable to completely
perceive the risks involved in an event and cannot know what futures will emerge from it
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because the event has its own agency that is co-enacted by actors participating in it. In
such a situation, Ballif argues that if historiographers remain open to impossible futures
and realizations that are beyond their “current capacity to receive,” then they may be able
to start engaging the full potential of events (254). If historiographers remain open to the
transformative power of the event, then they may be able to tap into its agential capacity
and create possibilities rather than limit them. This advice also applies to rhetors engaged
in public writing. If rhetors remain open, attentive, and adaptive to the events in which
they are engaged, then they encourage more actors to participate in the transformations of
the world and to co-produce new possibilities. Rhetors’ openness to co-participation
enables change. Despite being unable to fully predict the consequences of their actions
within agential events, rhetors can help to build positive outcomes through participation
that acknowledges the multiple potential futures the event invites.
Operating in such uncertain and co-productive spaces is challenging, but Joe
Panzner’s reading of Cage and Deleuze offers some examples of how rhetors can remain
open to multiple futures by inviting audiences to co-create compositions. Panzner
demonstrates how both the music of Cage and the philosophies of Deleuze invite other
actors to help co-create new and unexpected pieces and in so doing bring about
unexpected futures. Panzner begins his discussion with Cage, who wrote his
indeterminate works in an attempt to move away from the fealty demanded by traditional
Western classical music. Western classical music is paradoxical because the notational
style demands performers be faithful to the composer’s vision, but such fidelity is
impossible due to the agency of the event. An excellent example of this phenomenon is a
chronological survey of various symphonies playing the opening chords to
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Beethoven’s Eroica Symphony. Though all the well-trained and practiced performers are
attempting to be faithful to Beethoven’s work, each performance sounds slightly different
in timber, pitch, timing, attack, etc. because of the conductors’ interpretations, the
performers, the instruments, the spaces, and the recording equipment (“Beethoven”).
Listening to this brief survey demonstrates the ways in which complete fidelity to one
understanding of a work is impossible. Cage embraced the impossibility of fidelity when
he wrote his indeterminate works, which are defined by their ambiguous instructions that
encourage idiosyncratic performances. Musicians do not merely recite a Cage piece;
instead, through their performances, musicians co-construct it. Panzner argues that this
indeterminacy can also be seen in the abstract writing style of Deleuze, whose
philosophies are written so as to invite interpretation—unlike his treatments of other
philosophers, which are written quite didactically. The style of Deleuze’s philosophy
invites audiences to interpret, think, and invent meaning within the borders he has
drawn—to be co-creators of philosophy. In this way, both the artist and philosopher are
enacting dispositions toward their works that create the conditions for a multiplicity of
seemingly impossible future performances to be enacted.
The indeterminate works of both Cage and Deleuze represent comportments
toward composition that are open to multiple futures because they are not encumbered by
strict fidelity to a single understanding of a given composition. The question is what a
performance or interpretation does not necessarily what it is. For these thinkers, such an
understanding of composition is a disavowal of the limiting structures they believe to
represent morals and an embrace of the potentiality that they consider ethics. Panzner
notes that in various published interviews Cage articulates a distinction between ethics
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and morals that echoes those Deleuze explicitly states in his writings. Both composers
understand morality as the rigid sorting of actions into absolute categories of good or bad
used to pass praise or blame on individual actors. Conversely, ethics are fluid systems
that take seriously the specificity of a situation in order to understand how actions enable
or disable certain possibilities in ways that are comparatively “better or worse” for a
variety of actors. It makes no sense to judge Cage’s works morally, as either good or bad,
but it makes complete sense to judge individual performances ethically, as better or
worse. The judgment of these performances, and any action for that matter, hinges on
whether they enable participation, and open themselves up to multiple futures, or disable
participation, and shut down a multiplicity of futures. Performers should ask: “does my
performance enable more creation and thought or does it limit the capacities of others?”
In this paradigm, most all actions will open up some futures and negate others, which is
why rhetorical judgments need to pay close attention to the specific effects an action is
likely to have on other actors implicated within the event. Despite best intentions,
however, there will always be risks, and there is always the possibility of harm.
Creating compositions that invite other actors to participate in the creation of new
futures does not necessarily create results that affirm the life of rhetors or the worlds they
inhabit; instead, allowing other actors to participate is risky because it demands rhetors be
open to different perceptions, identities, and power dynamics, which will change, even if
imperceptibly, the rhetors and their relationships to the world. This openness leaves
rhetors vulnerable to harm, but it is also how they come to understand themselves as
actors participating in Life as such. In Inessential Solidarity Diane Davis utilizes
Levinasian ethics to argue that rhetoric is first philosophy because the obligation to
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respond to the Other is the precondition for individual humans to understand themselves
as having the capacity to act in the world. When people see the face of others, those faces
demand responses, and through those demands, the seers come to understand their
identities as actors in the world (106). Davis asserts that if the situation were only ever
comprised of two people, then there would be few problems because these people would
continually meet their obligations to one another, and by doing so, they would
completely know themselves; however, because the world is co-created by many people,
a tension arises between the infinite obligation to every person and the impossibility of
meeting those obligations.
Despite every individual’s inability to meet their obligations to every other
individual, they will inevitably respond to everyone because choosing not to respond is
still a response. For this reason, the question shifts from if the individual will respond to
other people to how the individual will choose to respond differently to different people.
Utilizing Derridean philosophy, Davis argues that this contention between infinite
obligations, finite resources, and competing desires is the contention between justice—an
ethical comportment that demands everyone’s needs be met—and law—a moral
comportment that selects whose needs will be met and how (122). Justice, for Davis, can
only be manifested in the contention between the impractical idealized realm of ethics
that allows for the possibility of multiple futures and the strictly ordered realm of
morality that focuses on the needs of the present. This contention is why people need
public spheres that serve as spaces in which they can make prudent judgments between
the impossibility of ethics and the stricture of law; the public sphere is a place where
rhetors can negotiate between the world as it is and the world as they believe it ought to
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be. In engaging in such discussions, rhetors open themselves up to different negotiations
between morality and ethics, the creation of new laws, and new concepts of justice.
As they are subjected to such new ideas, rhetors are also subjecting other actors to
their negotiations and inviting them to adapt to the worlds they are creating. Rhetors who
understand themselves to be obligated not only to humans but also to nonhumans invite
many more actors to co-create the world with them, and some rhetors extend this
invitation to animals, plants, the environment, institutions, or gods. Regardless of whether
or not rhetors extend the invitation, all negotiations in the public sphere will affect a
variety of implicated nonhuman actors as well as human ones. These broad ramifications
are what give public writing its importance but they are also what make it risky.
Public writing is a risk-laden event because it provides a rearticulation of the
world that has indeterminate effects for the human and nonhuman actors that are both
directly and indirectly involved. Responsible rhetors will consider as best they can how
their compositions will enable and disable actors’ abilities to participate within the event
and what futures they are making possible through their rhetorical actions. All the while,
such knowledgeable rhetors are aware of the potential risks associated with
transformation and they acknowledge that they cannot completely foresee the outcomes
of their actions or meet their obligations to every actor. While it is every rhetor’s
responsibility to create compositions that increase the ability for others to act in the
world, they will always fail because every argument will both increase and decrease this
ability in different actors. This is the risk of uncertain and co-created futures. A Ballif
argues, uncertainty is the dilemma of the event, and as Davis argues, there is no way out
of this dilemma because it is a pre-condition for being-in-the-world. If compositionists
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wish to teach their students how to engage in public writing, they should teach their
students to attend to risk, which means asking these three questions: 1) What multiplicity
of futures will be made possible by the rhetorical events being created? 2) What effects
will these futures have on all of the implicated actors? 3) What kinds of responses does
the event invite? Prior to creating spaces of discourse, learning tactics of communication,
or building community partnerships, students should be considering the ramifications of
their actions. Though they won’t be able to perceive all of the risks involved, students
should attempt to consider how their actions will co-create others and how those others
may respond to them. Event-based pedagogies respond to this educational need by
teaching students to consider the possibility of risk as they act within complex, risk-laden
worlds rife with indeterminate futures.

Event-Based Pedagogies
Acknowledging that the fundamental risk of rhetoric is its inherent capacity to
transform the actors it implicates through co-production—making it impossible to
completely predict all of the potential consequences a composition could have—I
propose that public writing instructors adopt event-based pedagogies that invite students
to consider rhetoric as an event in which actors rearticulate perceptions, identities, and
power dynamics through their intra-actions. Event-based pedagogies ask instructors to
teach public writing neither as a product to be assessed nor as a process to be followed
but rather as an event to be experienced. Students should be encouraged to create
compositions designed to have actual impacts on actual audiences. These texts will likely
go beyond not only the traditional essay but also the bounds of traditional argumentation.
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Students should be encouraged to create demonstrations, games, happenings, message
boards, performances podcasts, puzzles, songs, walkouts and other texts that actively ask
audiences to participate in the meaning making process and in so doing ask them to help
create new and unexpected futures. Just as the scores of John Cage and the philosophies
of Gilles Deleuze invite audience participation and performance so too should the work
of students invite reaction and co-creation.
This is a risky approach to writing instruction not only because students could
potentially create offensive or merely ineffectual texts, as they may in a traditional
composition class, but also because students engaging with each other’s open-ended texts
may respond negatively. However, event-based instructors are prepared to discuss the
kinds of problems that could potentially arise because such responses are demonstrative
of the co-production that defines the rhetorical event. Event-based instructors welcome
discussion about the responses texts have garnered because they provide opportunities for
students to reexamine their texts and consider why such responses occurred and what
students could have done differently, if anything, to get different results. Despite their
unpleasantness, ineffectual, negative, or offensive responses provide a concrete impetus
for rhetorical analysis not only regarding why the response occurred but also exploring
why the response is problematic. These problems—and they are problems—present
opportunities for engaging, researching, empathizing, adapting, and re-building not only
for the student who created the text but also for the students who reacted poorly.
Not every response to student writing will be a teaching moment because the
unanticipated nature of the event means that some responses could be so problematic as
to require instructors to shut-down discussion or take disciplinary action; however, this
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possibility is also a risk of traditional pedagogies—a risk that is largely ignored. The
difference between this risk for traditional pedagogies and event-based pedagogies is that
neither event-based instructors nor their students will be blindsided by the antagonistic,
offensive, or violent responses. Since event-based pedagogies ask students to consider
their texts as objects that invite a variety of responses from different audience, students
will prepared for the possibility of hateful and vitriolic audiences. To this end, it would
behoove event-based instructors to explicitly teach their students about the risks of public
writing by analyzing case studies of extraordinarily harmful responses to public writing,
such as the primary case-studies. Such analysis will help students to perceive risk as they
craft their compositions, though it will not necessarily enable them to mitigate such risks,
which are an inherent aspect of the rhetorical situation.
Since instructors will never be able to completely mitigate risk, they should
instead focus their energy on creating parameters in which students can participate in the
co-productive events of composition, trusting that both they and their students will be
able to use rhetorical tools to confront and adapt to risks as they arise. Instructors should
not become so concerned with risk that they forget that the transformative aspect of
rhetoric from which risk stems also enables positive change. By focusing on the positive
futures being enabled through event-based pedagogies, instructors can encourage their
students to engage in transformative rhetorics on topics for which they are willing to
incur risk. This is not to say that instructors should altogether abandon risk assessment
when planning their classes; rather, it is to say that they should not let the perception of
risk overly determine course design, especially since humans are not particularly good at
accurately gauging risk. Instead, instructors should be focused on creating courses in
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which students can co-participate in the event of writing in ways that align with the other
goals of individual students, the class, the program, the department, the institution, and
society. For this reason, every course should be designed idiosyncratically, which is why
this method of instruction is referred to as event-based pedagogies rather than eventbased pedagogy.
Adhering to the indeterminate composing practices of John Cage and Gilles
Deleuze, event-based pedagogies do not provide a stable set of practices for teaching
public writing but rather create parameters within which instructors can create their own
methods and practices. Similarly, instructors should not approach their courses as sets of
instructions that students must faithfully follow in order to be successful but should
instead approach them as parameters along which students can exercise their capacities
for composition by tapping into the creative potential beyond themselves and
participating in Life as such. Likewise, students should be encouraged to compose works
that do not demand understanding and fealty from their audiences but rather invite
participation and response in ways that invite their audience to co-produce seemingly
impossible futures.
Event-based pedagogies are not a strict methods for teaching but rather a
collection of considerations for designing courses in which students are encouraged to
participate in transformational rhetorical activities. This collection of considerations can
be summed up in five basic tenets aimed both toward instructors and students: 1) enable
other actors to participate in Life as such, 2) conduct nuanced research that illuminates
the complexity of public discourse, 3) be open to the diverse array of opinions and
perspectives expressed within and among various publics, 4) adapt positions and
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arguments in response to new information, and 5) attend to the ways in which new
arguments are constructed from elements of prior arguments. Taken together, these tenets
help to create classrooms where students and instructors open themselves up to change
and engage in creating rhetorical events. These pedagogies are risky, but they have the
potential to transform students into actors capable of engaging unpredictable events. Each
tenet invites instructors to develop classroom practices that aid students in understanding
the dynamic quality of publicness by embracing the uncertainty of the event and
considering the rhetor’s relationship with and obligation to the other actors within it.
Many of these practices will probably look familiar to contemporary composition
instructors because event-based pedagogies stress the rhetorical skills and practices that
are most preparing out students for eventful writing and asking instructors and students to
keep these in the forefront of their minds as they engage in the event of rhetoric.
The following definitions of the five tenets are not meant to be exhaustive; rather,
they are written as provocations for thought—invitations for other instructors to co-create
not only the meaning of each tenet but also how they will be enacted.

Enable Other Actors to Participate in Life as Such
Instructors should encourage students to create texts that invite readers to
participate in Life as such through engagement with their texts rather than creating texts
that simply ask readers to acknowledge the creativity or conviction of the rhetor. Such a
mode of composition anticipates the kinds of engagements that individual audience
members will have with the text regardless of authorial intention. As Jacques Rancière
explains in The Emancipated Spectator: “The spectator also acts . . . She observes,
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selects, compares, interprets” (13). Even when rhetors desire to simply transmit their
worldviews to their readers, those readers will act agentially, derive their own
understandings of the text, and act to transform their worlds accordingly. Student rhetors
can either choose to lean into the co-productive nature of the rhetorical event and invite
new interpretations and iterations of their work, like John Cage, or resist the agency of
the audience and demand an unflinching fidelity of interpretation and response that will
be impossible to accomplish.
Scholars such as Jody Shipka are already encouraging students to create such codeterminative work by modelling the behavior for them. In her article “This was (NOT!!)
an Easy Assignment” Shipka explains the types of tasks she assigns her students:
I provide students with open-ended, inquiry based tasks that ask them to consider
how even seemingly simple, straightforward, and relatively familiar
communicative objectives (i.e., creating a text based on outside readings/research,
summarizing and analyzing a text) might be accomplished in any number of
ways, and with any number of semiotic resources, depending on how they choose
to contextualize, frame or coordinate their responses to the tasks.
Shipka does not demand that her students faithfully reconstruct correct writing formulas;
instead, she invites them to respond to rhetorical situations by considering all the means
of persuasion available to them. Notably, Shipka’s students often respond to her
provocations by creating texts that also invite audience engagement. Most notably in this
article, the student Amanda created an interactive definition of the word representation
that included three hands-on activities, including a puzzle. Building on Shipka’s work,
Jim Brown Jr. and Nathaniel Rivers imagine composition classrooms in which students
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specifically focus on creating objects that enable their audiences to rethink a particular
issue. The authors provide the specific example of students creating a blue sphere with
different chambers into which audience members have to equally distribute water; this
interaction between the audience and the object is supposed to help participants rethink
how fresh water is distributed throughout the earth. The sphere is an example of how
students can invite audience members to co-create meaning because, though the topic is
predetermined by the rhetors and the object, the understanding that emerges is coproduced.
Another important aspect of co-productive agency that instructors should be
modelling for their students is that it is not actors should not be coerce into participating
within the public sphere. Specifically, this relates to the ways in which some public
writing instructors assign their students to engage in the public sphere in very structured
ways. As Hannah Arendt argues in “The Crisis of Education” this practice violates the
social border between the classroom and the public. Arendt argues that the classroom is a
place where students are compelled to complete certain tasks, whereas the public sphere
is a discursive space into which people freely enter. To coerce public engagement
through grading is not only to expose students to risks for which they might not be
prepared but also to ignore the social convention that everyone participating in the public
is acting out of their own volition. If students are going to enter a space as risky as the
public, then it should be because they, for whatever reasons, have chosen both how and
why they are doing so—not because they were compelled to by instructors. The risks of
publicness are too severe for anyone to be forced into participation, though this does not
mean that instructors cannot invite or encourage such engagements. If instructors want
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students to have practice with public writing, then they should model their classrooms as
publics where students are encouraged to argue about common topics and interact with
each other as equals without the same severity of risk. Instructors should not coerce
students to incur the risks of the public sphere, and this is important because in showing
this restraint instructors are teaching students that it is up to them to choose when, why,
and how they enter into public discourse. Perhaps it will even help students to consider
the ways in which they are already public actors.

Conduct Nuanced Research that Illuminates the Complexity of Public Discourse
Though the co-productive nature of the rhetorical event means that rhetors cannot
know for certain how other actors will engage with their texts and what futures will be
made possible through those engagements, thorough research can increase the likelihood
of positive results by providing them with more information about their arguments, their
semiotic resources, and their audiences. Arguing that students should learn how to
research topics is in no way radical. It is merely a reflection on the important day-to-day
work that is occurring in Composition and Rhetoric courses throughout the country;
however, arguing that students should also be spending time researching the genres,
media, and modes in which they will be writing, as well as the audiences to whom they
will be writing, is surprisingly less common.
For the last twenty years, a contingent of Composition and Rhetoric scholars has
been arguing that there should be more focus on the semiotic tools students use to create
arguments; however, the question of how best to do this has been divided between two
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poles: breadth and depth. Cynthia Selfe clearly argues for breadth in her article “The
Movement of Air, the Breath of Meaning” when she argues:
Young people need to know that their role as rhetorical agents is open, not
artificially foreclosed by the limits of their teachers’ imaginations. They need a
full quiver of semiotic modes from which to select, role models who can teach
them to think critically about a range of communication tools, and multiple ways
of reaching their audiences. (645)
Conversely, Katherine Ahern argues for depth in her article “Tuning the Sonic Playing
Field” when she argues that the breadth position fails to provide students with enough
experience in any genre, medium, or mode to imagine with any complexity the kinds of
texts any one of these things makes possible (77). Ahern argues that students need
extensive practice with individual semiotic tools to understand how they can make
something meaningful with them. And though each event-based pedagogy will navigate
its own path between these two poles, I argue that instructors should tend toward depth
because focus on a few particular genres, media, and modalities allows students to
understand those semiotic resources as agential actors who make different realities
possible, not as simple tools to be wielded by rhetors toward their own ends.
Along with researching content and semiotic tools, event-based pedagogies also
argue that students should research their audiences in order to tailor their invitations to
co-create the world. Audience research largely went out of favor in Composition and
Rhetoric in the late 1980s when scholars such as Laurie Anderson, Barry Kroll, and
Russell Long argued that the practice positioned the audience as enemies, did not reflect
the practices of professional writers, encouraged stereotyping, and failed to consider how

204

texts would be read outside of their immediate situations. Event-based pedagogies are
concerned with all these critiques, but I assert that nuanced research and engagement
does not necessarily position the audience as antagonistic, result in stereotyping, or
ignore future audiences. This last point is particularly important in composing for the
event, and I assert that creating a text with a specific audience in mind does not negate its
appeal for future audiences. As Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford argue in “Audience
Addressed/Audience Invoked,” it is impossible to predict every future audience for a
work, but that uncertainty is no reason for the rhetor not to consider the actual external
actors who will engage with it. Though uncertainty may be the unavoidable risk of
rhetoric, researching the topic, genre, media, mode, and potential audiences of a text can
help rhetors not only to mitigate their initial risks but also to better invite their
interlocutors to co-create the world with them.

Be Open to the Diverse Array of Opinions and Perspectives Expressed Within and
Among Various Publics
Event-based pedagogies ask rhetors to remain open to persuasion as they research
their topics, genres, media, modes, and audiences. If rhetors are dismissive of ideas,
identities, perspectives, and power dynamics beyond the ones with which they are
familiar, then they are not enabling themselves to experience the world beyond their
current understandings—they are limiting their own participation in Life as such. Surely
rhetors do not need to be changed by every text they read, but they should attempt to
remain open to the possibility of persuasion whenever it seems reasonably safe to do so
because they cannot know what arguments, insights, or realities can be made manifest by

205

collaborating with unanticipated actors. In this way, being open to others is primarily
about listening. In her book Rhetorical Listening, Krista Ratcliffe defines the practice as:
[A] trope for interpretive invention, that is, a stance of openness that a person may
choose to assume in relation to any person, text, or culture; its purpose is to
cultivate conscious identifications in ways that promote productive
communication, especially but not solely cross-culturally. (25)
Listening is about being open to experiences, opinions, and arguments regardless of the
sources from which they come. Ratcliffe argues that listening should promote
understanding of the self and others, proceed with a logic of accountability, create
identification through both commonalities and differences, and analyze claims as cultural
logics. In other words, listening requires close attention to the world as understood
through both the experiences of others and the historical/cultural contexts in which those
experiences occurred. This comportment is a slow, painful, and not necessarily fruitful
way of engaging with other actors, but it is a method that respects their intrinsic, rather
than their instrumental, value; as such, listening encourages questions such as “what is
being communicated,” “what can I learn,” and “how can I best respond,” as opposed to
the usual, “what can I do with this?” In short, listening is a method that sees others as
actors to whom the author is obligated in the Levinasian sense rather than as tools that
can be used to reach a desired end. This does not mean that all actors will be treated with
peace and benevolence; sometimes listening lets the listeners know that the person to
whom they are listening needs to be avoided or rebuked.
The openness associated with listening asks the rhetor to be vulnerable, but this
request does not negate the importance of prudence and self-care. Event-based
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pedagogies acknowledge that rhetoric has material risks, but they do not ask students to
simply embrace those risks. Students in event-based classes are being asked to navigate
their enmeshed positions and to determine how they relate to the variety of actors with
whom they are intra-acting, and sometimes avoiding, ignoring, or standing-up to actors is
the best method. Though listening to a variety of actors should be encouraged because it
enables unexpected possibilities, making assessments from that listening is equally
important. The potential, likelihood, and severity of harm that some actors possess would
make it imprudent for the rhetor to engage with them directly, especially if the potential
benefits are minimal or unlikely. Certainly, the choice to ignore or confront a certain
actor should not be taken lightly—rhetors should consider what they can learn from any
give actor, the kinds of threats posed by listening, and the possible futures that could be
co-created by engagement before they make a decision—but ultimately the choice of how
to act lies with the student rhetors in their specific enmeshed positions. Like all the tenets,
listening is a guidepost, not a strict moral law, and how it will be enacted in any given
case is contingent upon a host of factors.

Adapt Positions and Arguments in Response to New Information
To be open to the world is to invite change regarding one’s actions, feelings,
identities thoughts, and understandings; such openness is frightening because it allows for
the possibility that writers may exit rhetorical situations having been changed and
understanding their previous selves as deeply flawed. When Krista Ratcliffe discusses
this aspect of rhetorical listening, she quotes from the feminist author and poet Adrienne
Rich: “Yet we can’t wait for the undamaged to make our connections for us; we can’t
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wait to speak until we are perfectly clear and righteous. There is no purity and, in our
lifetimes, no end to this process” (123). The in media res aspect of rhetoric that Rich is
describing is the experience of Life as such; one’s identity is constantly being recreated
through events; however, identities are additive and previous ones are never completely
erased. These identities, either inherited or created, haunt individuals, influencing how
they experience and understand the world. As with terministic screens, there is no outside
of identity. Instead, people are thrown into the world with some sense of who they are
imposed onto them. These identities build, grow, and mutate, but they do not disappear,
and individuals can only ever engage the event from their particular embodied positions,
which can make it difficult for them to engage actors with radically different identities.
Stephen Mailloux provides a way to navigate the difficulty of communication
among actors whose experiences radically differ from one another in his essay “Making
Comparisons.” In this essay, Mailloux focuses on cultural differences as he argues that
the culture of individual critics will always influence the ways in which they relate to
people from other cultures because their latent hermeneutic and political ethnocentrism—
i.e. the terministic screens through which they understand the world—will always compel
them to understand the Other from the critics “geographically and historically situated
network of beliefs and desires” (267). Unable to genuinely experience the world from the
position of the Other, critics find themselves somewhere between the poles of cultural
relativism, from where they can acknowledge the futility of understanding the Other, and
cultural determinism, from where they can use their cultures as the standard by which to
judge all Others. Articulating the unproductive binary, Mailloux provides a third,
rhetorical, method for communicating across differences. He argues that communication
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across cultures is possible if critics expand theirs terministic screen through patient and
imaginative interactions with Others. Through this practice, critics understand the worlds
of Others through the critics’ terministic screens until those screens are themselves
transformed through exchange. Communication changes how critics understand their
world, if they are willing to adapt. Event-based pedagogies respect the cultural,
embodied, and experiential identities of actors—especially student actors—while also
asking them to be open to the possibility of adapting through the changing situations of
the rhetorical event because it is this possibility for unanticipated growth that makes the
event potentially significant for all of the human and nonhuman actors involved.
On a more pragmatic level, adaptation also asks students to be open to
inventiveness and experimentation. Event-based pedagogies ask students to try different
arguments, genres, media, modes, and styles in order to provoke different responses from
their audiences. Public communication is difficult, and it is easy for students to become
discouraged when their arguments are ignored or refuted. Event-based pedagogies ask
students to acknowledge the problems with their arguments, to take honest stock of their
rhetorical practices, and then try something else. Students should be encouraged to
experiment and rework their arguments in response to other actors, even if this risks
failure—if they don’t, they risk stagnation.

Attend to the Ways in which New Arguments are Constructed from Elements of Prior
Arguments
Event-based pedagogies argue that new identities, possibilities, relationships,
texts, understandings, etc. emerge from the intra-actions of actors who rearticulate one
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another within rhetorical events, and as such, they understand rhetors as bricoleurs who
interact with the materials available to them in order to create new possibilities while
those same material actors act upon and rearticulate rhetors. For this reason, students in
event-based classrooms should not feel the need to create wholly original arguments but
rather to engage and experiment with new combinations of arguments, genres, ideas,
media, methods, modes, theories, etc. to see what emerges from those interactions. While
having specific goals can be useful, it is also useful to try different methods for attaining
them. Event-based pedagogies should be less interested in students creating perfect texts
or following specific steps in a process and more interested in them experimenting with
the potentialities of languages and the ways in which compositions can be used to engage
audiences and participate with the creative and transformative force that is Life as such.
Students should be encouraged to deeply, empathetically, and meaningfully interact with
other actors in order to co-create transformative events.
Part of teaching students to intra-act with other human and nonhuman actors
productively is acknowledging that Composition and Rhetoric courses are themselves
rhetorical events that have been co-created by a variety or elements including the
mandates of departments, the identities of instructors, the research of compositionists,
and the decisions of textbook publishers. In relating to all of these different actors,
instructors should see themselves not as autonomous creators but as conduits to Life as
such. Among other commitments, this comportment to the course-as-event asks
instructors to encourage students to combine different readings in the class with their own
experiences, identities, and research to create something new within indeterminant
parameters. This indeterminate style does not mean that all student work will be valued
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equally—events still allows for judgments of better or worse—but it does means that
instructors should evaluate work by paying attention to the specificity of each student’s
composition and its potential outcomes rather than sorting texts into absolute categories
based on a few select attributes. In this way, questions of correctness and fidelity should
be replaced with questions about the possible futures being invited by student writing.

Teaching Co-Productive Uncertainty
In a small midwestern university, students in an introductory composition course
are working frantically on their final projects. All semester long they have not only been
reading, researching, and writing about the United States’ prison system but also creating
arguments about it, considering audiences that need to be made aware of their arguments,
and considering the best ways to reach those audiences. Using an online team messaging
app, they have shared and critiqued their arguments as well as rough diagrams of
different ideas and goals statements for what they are hoping to accomplish. “But really
why will they care?” has become a common question as students try to make their work
as potentially impactful and honest as possible. On this final work day before their
projects are due, students can be seen reworking audio files, filling out zoning permits,
and laying out poster designs. After discussing a variety of media and getting hands on
practice with a few, students have chosen a variety of ways to present their arguments to
various publics including students at the school, the State Board of Regents, and a local
philanthropic organization. The team messaging app is projected on the screen in the
front of the classroom and last minute questions, comments, and encouragements are
regularly being posted. The platform has becomes a kind of cursory public—a place to
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test ideas and gauge reactions. For many students, this semester has been frustrating.
They were asked to perform readings from prisoners to build empathy, to create article
summaries targeted toward different audiences, and to conduct audience analysis to
inform how they would create their arguments. However, the final projects look good;
though they are not required to, many students are choosing to distribute what they have
created once the class is over. They think their texts can actually make a difference, and
the impact statements that accompany their projects explain what they think that
difference could potentially be.
This hypothetical classroom is the goal of event-based pedagogies. Students have
considered how to engage audiences, researched their topics, listened empathetically to
Others, adapted to feedback, and created arguments from the tools at their disposal.
Moreover, students have interacted with each other in ways that mimic actual publicness.
Though they have not entered into the public sphere, they have paid close attention to
how it rhetoric functions as a transformative event within it. They have considered the
risks of their arguments and are ready to submit projects that they believe could have a
positive impact on the world. The example shows how the five tenets that compose
event-based pedagogies can help instructors to co-create classes that increase the capacity
for students to participate in the rhetorical event, while also asking students to create
compositions that enable other actors to participate in Life as such. While the practices
may seem mundane, that is largely because humans perceive preparation as less valuable
than it actually is.
As the example shows, event-based pedagogies are less interested in the processes
of writing and the products of writing and more interested in their effects. Event-based
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pedagogies are post-process pedagogies focused on the ways in which research, writing,
distribution, and circulation operate within interrelated rhetorical events that impact the
human and nonhuman actors who participate within them. Building on the work of
philosophers, social theorists, and compositionists, event-based pedagogies stress the
importance of engagement, research, empathy, adaptation, and bricolage in creating
better compositions and more productive engagements in the public sphere. These tenets
of event-based pedagogies are not strict rules but rather guideposts meant to help writers
consider both the ways in which they engage in publics and the ways they participate in
the rearticulation of perceptions, identities, and power dynamics.
Despite the harmonious goals of this pedagogy, its practitioners should be aware
that with co-production comes uncertainty, and with uncertainty comes risk. Though
conducting empathetic research and crafting bricolaged compositions meant to invite
participation and response can help rhetors mitigate the likelihood of risk and their ability
to directly cause harm, these practices cannot eliminate risk altogether because the event
is larger than individual intentions and actions. Rhetors cannot simply create good or bad
compositions that lead to good or bad results; instead, every composition participates in
an indeterminate event and relates to a myriad of implicated actors. Michelle Ballif
argues that such events often manifest what was previously impossible, meaning that
there is no way for rhetors to fully predict the consequences of their actions; the best they
can do is be open to a multiplicity of possible futures. Rhetors can perceive risks in
regards to each of these futures, but as Paul Slovic demonstrates, their perceptions will
most likely not reflect the actual hazards of the world. The outcome of the event cannot
be known beforehand.

213

Despite its risks, instructors should teach their students to understand rhetoric in
all of its transformative uncertainty because this is the place from where rhetoric draws
its power: its ability to change audiences, rhetors, texts, and worlds. And though
instructors cannot teach students how to mitigate risks in all circumstances, by focusing
pedagogy on the ultimate cause of risk, they can provide them with the skills and
comportments necessary to enter into such uncertain events. By building students’
capacities to engage audiences, conduct research, empathize with others, adapt to
changing situations, and create arguments from all the available means of persuasion,
instructors can perhaps teach their students to better perceive the risks of rhetoric and
become more effective public rhetors. Of course, the pedagogy risks failure because it is
impossible to be certain what will emerge from the events of the classroom, but that
uncertainty is the fundamental risk of our field.
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